CLAUSEWITZ ON
,seldomread, classical strategy,aainterpretedbyClaueewitz,asaKa f-kaesquelandacapeofviolenceandbrutality ,when,inactuality, ,andafterhisdeathhiscollectedworkewerepu b-lishedin10volumes, ,hisinfluencehadbecomesopervasivethathis ideas,andavenhiaphrases, showtherecanbenosingle, ; ,and,duringNapoleonBonaparte eretreatfromMoscow, , ,perhaps, ...warisanactofforce,andtotheapplication oftheforcethereisnolimit. , continuationofpoliticalintercourse,acarr yingoutofthesamebyothermeans. ,Te$waTranspor-tationInstitute,TexasA&MV niver-sitg,CollegeStation, ~its, Maokin&r aHeartlandandEaeafationRatchet ,andhisthe-orieshaveexertedtremendousinf lu-enceonalmostallmajorstrategicthought ,therefore, , ,Clausewitsthought,oratIeaetnowarshouldb ebegunifpeopleactedwisely withoutfirstfindingananswertothequestion ofwhatwastobea~ , ,andthusalsomakeprep-arationsbeforeband, ,tobesure,itsowngrammar, ,inreality, , ,states,classes,passions, ,nevertheless,alwayscaughtAmericansunpre paredintel-lectually,emotionally, ,unfortunately,doesnotcorrelatewiththeha rshfaceofreality.
CLAUSEWITZ ON LIMITED WAR William D. Franktin T HE strategic genius of Karl von Clausewitz is one that is often quoted, seldom read, and little understood. Many viewed “classical” strategy, aa interpreted by Claueewitz, as a Kaf-
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