Transcription of 11 The Constitutional Separation of Powers
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220 T R. S. Allan as the basic demand of human dignity. We can envisage a seamless transition from study of the domestic legal regime, specific to a single jurisdiction, to deeper explora-tion of the underlying philosophy of right: the former is underpinned and inspired by the latter. Legal rights and duties are genuine provoking legitimate state force in their defence only when they are features of a scheme of governance that, correctly inter-preted, accords each individual the freedom that his human dignity demands. 11 The Constitutional Separation of Powers Aileen Kavanagh* In the panoply of principles regulating Constitutional government, the Separation of Powers occupies a position of deep ambivalence. On the one hand, all constitu-tional democracies rest on some form of division between three distinct branches of government the legislature, executive, and judiciary. Moreover, within these coun-tries, the Separation of Powers is invoked as an ideal, that is as a standard (or, perhaps, set of standards) to which the legal and Constitutional arrangements of a modern state ought to conform.
government—the legislature, executive, and judiciary. Moreover, within these coun-tries, the separation of powers is invoked as an ideal, that is as a standard (or, perhaps, set of standards) to which the legal and constitutional arrangements of a modern state ought to conform. The assumption is that the separation of powers is an ideal worth
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