Transcription of Bargaining with Incomplete Information - Ausubel
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Bargaining with Incomplete Information - Ausubel
Bargaining with Incomplete Information Lawrence M. Ausubel , Peter Cramton, and Raymond J. Deneckere*. June 2000. JEL No.: C78 ( Bargaining Theory), D82 (Asymmetric and Private Information ). Keywords: Bargaining , sequential Bargaining , Incomplete Information , asymmetric Information , private Information , Coase Conjecture Send comments to: Lawrence M. Ausubel Peter Cramton Raymond J. Deneckere Department of Economics Department of Economics Department of Economics University of Maryland University of Maryland University of Wisconsin College Park, MD 20742-7211 College Park, MD 20742-7211 Madison, WI 53706. *The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of National Science Foundation grants SBR 94 10545, SBR 94 22563, SBR 94 23104 and SBR 97 31025. Bargaining with Incomplete Information Lawrence M. Ausubel , Peter Cramton, and Raymond J. Deneckere 1 Introduction A central question in economics is understanding the difficulties parties have in reaching mutually beneficial agreements. Why do labor negotiations sometimes involve a strike by the union?
1 Bargaining with Incomplete Information Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, and Raymond J. Deneckere 1 Introduction A central question in economics is understanding the difficulties parties have in reaching mutually
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