Transcription of Bargaining with Incomplete Information - Ausubel
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Bargaining with Incomplete Information Lawrence M. Ausubel , Peter Cramton, and Raymond J. Deneckere*. June 2000. JEL No.: C78 ( Bargaining Theory), D82 (Asymmetric and Private Information ). Keywords: Bargaining , sequential Bargaining , Incomplete Information , asymmetric Information , private Information , Coase Conjecture Send comments to: Lawrence M. Ausubel Peter Cramton Raymond J. Deneckere Department of Economics Department of Economics Department of Economics University of Maryland University of Maryland University of Wisconsin College Park, MD 20742-7211 College Park, MD 20742-7211 Madison, WI 53706. *The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of National Science Foundation grants SBR 94 10545, SBR 94 22563, SBR 94 23104 and SBR 97 31025. Bargaining with Incomplete Information Lawrence M.
1 Bargaining with Incomplete Information Lawrence M. Ausubel, Peter Cramton, and Raymond J. Deneckere 1 Introduction A central question in economics is understanding the difficulties parties have in reaching mutually
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