Transcription of ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW - Harvard Law School
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ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW - Harvard Law School
Chapter 25 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAWLOUIS KAPLOW and STEVEN SHAVELLH arvard Law School and National Bureau of ECONOMIC ResearchContentsAbstract 1665 Keywords 16651. Introduction 16662. Liability for accidents Incentives Unilateral accidents and the level of care Bilateral accidents and levels of care Unilateral accidents, level of care, and level of activity Bilateral accidents, levels of care, and levels of activity Empirical evidence on the effect of liability on safety Risk-bearing and insurance Administrative costs Administrative costs of the liability system Administrative costs and the social desirability of the liability system Magnitude of liability: damages Basic theory Nonpecuniary elements of loss Punitive damages Accuracy of damages Components of loss that are difficult to estimate Causation Basic requirement of causation Uncertainty over causation Proximate causation Judgment-proof problem Product liability Liability versus other means of controlling accidents Intentional torts 16823.
textbook on economic analysis of law and his establishment of the Journal of Legal Studies. As this survey will indicate, research in economic analysis of law has been active since the 1970s and is accelerating'. The field, however, is far from mature; one indication is the lack of empirical work on most topics.
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