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Electronic copy available at: copy available at: issn 1045- 6333 HARVARD EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AS AN AGENCY PROBLEM Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried Discussion Paper No. 421 04/2003 As revised for publication in: 17 Journal of Economic Perspectives 71-92 (2003) HARVARD Law School Cambridge, MA 02138 The Center for Law, Economics, and Business is supported by a grant from the John M. Olin Foundation. This paper can be downloaded without charge from: The HARVARD John M. Olin Discussion Paper Series: The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection: This paper is also a discussion paper of the John M. Olin Center's Program on Corporate Governance. JOHN M. OLIN CENTER FOR LAW, ECONOMICS, AND BUSINESS Electronic copy available at: copy available at: Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried Abstract This paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a managerial power approach to executive compensation.
ISSN 1045-6333 HARVARD EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION AS AN AGENCY PROBLEM Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Jesse M. Fried Discussion Paper No. 421 04/2003 As revised for publication in: 17 Journal of Economic Perspectives 71-92 (2003) Harvard Law School Cambridge, MA 02138
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