Transcription of The Terrorist Endgame
{{id}} {{{paragraph}}}
Example: barber
The Terrorist Endgame
JOURNAL. ARTICLE. Bueno de Mesquita OF CONFLICT. / THE Terrorist . RESOLUTION. Endgame . The Terrorist Endgame A MODEL WITH MORAL HAZARD AND LEARNING. ETHAN BUENO DE MESQUITA. Department of Political Science Washington University The author models the relationship between a government and former terrorists as a game with both moral hazard and learning. The government is uncertain about both the former terrorists' ability and skill at providing counterterrorism aid. The government has the option after observing the success or failure of counterterrorism of replacing the former Terrorist leadership with a new negotiating partner. This study demonstrates that the threat of replacement, in addition to promised concessions, provides incentives for for- mer terrorists to exert counterterrorism effort, particularly when the potential replacements are of moderate ability.
10.1177/0022002704272193ARTICLEJOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTIONBueno de Mesquita / THE TERRORIST ENDGAME The Terrorist Endgame A MODEL WITH MORAL HAZARD AND LEARNING
Loading..
Tags:
Information
Domain:
Source:
Link to this page:
Please notify us if you found a problem with this document:
Related search queries
Kott, “King Lear or Endgame, Multilinear Algebra and Chess Endgames, Endgame, NEW POLIO ‘ENDGAME’ PLAN – SECURING A LASTING, Endgame: Sky Key Contest Official Rules, Terms and Conditions, Endgame Contest Official Rules, Terms and Conditions, Official Rules, Terms and Conditions, End of the debt supercycle, Endgame? The Fiscal Crisis of the German