Chapter 12 Repeated Games - MIT OpenCourseWare
the unique Nash equilibrium at each of these subgames. Therefore, the actions in the last round are independent of what is played in the initial round. Hence, the players will ignore the future and play the game as if there is. no future game, each playing . Indeed, given the behavior in the last round, the game ...
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