Freud, Psychoanalysis, and Symbolism

1 freud , Psychoanalysis, and SymbolismAgnes Petoczpublished by the press syndicate of the university of cambridgeThe Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdomcambridge university pressThe Edinburgh Building, Cambridge, CB2 2RU, United West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia Agnes Petocz 1999 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisionsof relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part maytake place without the written permission of Cambridge University published 1999 Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, CambridgeTypeset in Monotype Plantin 10/12 pt.

2 [wv]A catalogue record for this book is available from the British LibraryLibrary of Congress cataloguing in publication dataPetocz, AgnesFreud, psychoanalysis, and Symbolism / Agnes bibliographical references and 0 521 59152 X1. freud , Sigmund, 1856 1939. 2. Symbolism (Psychology).3. Psychoanalysis. I. 52 dc21 98-39047 CIPISBN 0 521 59152 X hardbackContentsList of figurespage viiiPrefaceixIntroduction1 Part One: Exegesis and Extraction71 From disorder towards the focus of inquiry92 The Freudian Narrow (FN) theory of symbolism213 The symbol in freud s early writings (1893 1899)364 Continuation and elaboration (1900 1913)565 The core years for the FN theory (1914 1917)986 The treatment of Symbolism in freud s later writings(1918 1940)125 Part Two: Consolidation and Defence1497 The problem of the system unconscious 1518 The problem of language1789 Ernest Jones s contribution19810 The Freudian Broad (FB) theory of symbolism21511 Symbolism .

3 Logical constraints and psychologicalrequirements239 Epilogue266 List of references269 Index278viiFigures1 The symbol in freud s early writingspage462 Jones s contribution to the FB theory2133 Summary of the logical constraints and psychologicalrequirements241viii1 From disorder towards the focus of inquiryThe problem of definition There is something very curious in semantics , says Le vi-Strauss(1978), that the word meaning is, probably, in the whole language,the word the meaning of which is the most difficult to define (p. 12).Perhaps because of its intimate connection with the concept of meaning,the term symbol , despite an extensive literature devoted to the subject,is almost as difficult.

4 Derived from the Greek verb (literally, to throw together ), the noun (a tally ) referred originallyto each of the two corresponding pieces of some small object whichcontracting parties broke between them and kept as proof of identity(Liddell and Scott 1968). That meaning subsequently expanded toinclude a diversity of meanings (other kinds of token, seal, contract,sign, code, etc.), which today has mushroomed even further. Many con-temporary definitions reflect the mystique originally associated withsymbols, and which prompted Whitehead (1927) to comment on the unstable mixture of attraction and repulsion (p.)

5 60) in our attitudetowards Symbolism . But the most frequent observation is that it isimpossible to find a general, unifying definition. Bertalanffy (1981), forinstance, complains that in spite of the fact that symbolic activity is oneof the most fundamental manifestations of the human mind .. thereis no generally accepted definition of Symbolism (pp. 41 2), andSafouan (1982) warns that anyone who tries to study Symbolism in allits generality is liable to discover that there is no unity at all that under-lies these different uses of the word (p. 84). To underscore the point,we are faced with such vacuities as whatever has meaning is a symbol,and the meaning is whatever is expressed by the symbol (Radcliffe-Brown, in Skorupski 1976, p.

6 117), or, worse, wherever welook around us, everything can be expressed by the concept of symbol (Ver Eecke 1975, p. 28). Even amongst those who bring some rigourto their treatment of the topic, there is considerable disagreement: dis-agreement, for example, about how to classify signs and symbols what9 freud , psychoanalysis, and symbolism10is the difference (if any) between the two, which is the broader term,and to which does language belong; disagreement also about the natureof Symbolism what constitutes Symbolism , what activity may properlybe described as symbolic , what are its origins, development, role,effects, and so this picture of disorder should not lead us to agree too readily thatthere can be no general theory of Symbolism .

7 Instead, by considering thedefinitions of Symbolism from two different perspectives in turn, thefirst an overview both of the scope of the subject matter and of theextent of the disorder, the second allowing a convergence on the realcentres of controversy, we shall find ourselves on a journey which leadsthrough the disorder towards a focus of one: the broad to narrow continuumThe more obvious perspective is to regard the enormous range of defi-nitions of Symbolism as lying along a continuum, from very broad defi-nitions to extremely narrow ones. At the broad extreme we find thesymbol as superordinate category. Here are located the Bibles ofsymbolism (as Bertalanffy (1981) calls them): Cassirer sThe Philosophyof Symbolic Forms(1953, 1955, 1957 [orig.)]

8 1923, 1925, 1929]), andLanger sPhilosophy in a New Key(1942). Each of these works is neo-Kantian in spirit; philosophical concern with the question of meaning intersects with the treatment of symbols from a strongly phenomeno-logical, constructivist perspective. Cassirer s Kantian debt is the moremarked; for him, the symbolic is equated with structure or form ,and it is the symbolic concept, not the semantic, that is truly , the conceptual definition of a content goes hand in hand withits stabilization in some characteristic sign. Consequently, all truly strictand exact thought is sustained by thesymbolicsandsemioticson whichit is based (1953, p.

9 86). Langer also says that symbolisation is theessentialact of thought, and that The symbol-making function is oneof man s primary activities, like eating, looking or moving about. It isthe fundamental process of his mind, and goes on all the time (1942,p. 41). Unlike Cassirer, however, Langer combines this broad definitionwith a more modern information-processing view of thinking, accordingto which the human brain is constantly carrying on a process of sym-bolic transformation of the experiential data that come to it (ibid., ). This notion is still, of course, popular, especially with thoseinvolved in computer applications in psychology and artificial intelli-gence.

10 McCorduck, for instance (in Graubard 1988), suggests that arti-ficial intelligence might be the best hope for discovering that universalFrom disorder towards the focus of inquiry11symbolic code , that set of universal concepts , which underlies allhuman symbolic expression (p. 82). Others who appear to follow thegeneral Cassirer Langer broad approach include: Rapoport (in Royce1965), for whom symbols are products of the human abstracting pro-cess (p. 97), Hayakawa (ibid.), for whom Symbolism is that whichshapes the entire psychic life of man (p. 92), and Whitehead (1927),for whom Symbolism is inherent in the very texture of human life ( ).