NUREG-2203 'Glossary of Security Terms for Nuclear Power ...

1 glossary of Security Terms for Nuclear Power Reactors Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response NUREG-2203 glossary of Security Terms for Nuclear Power Reactors Manuscript Completed: March 2015 Date Published: February 2017 Prepared by: Amy Roundtree Wayne Chalk Kris Jamgochian, NRC Project Manager Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response NUREG-2203 iii ABSTRACT This is a glossary of Security Terms specifically for Nuclear Power reactors that are commonly used in the Nuclear industry and regulatory community. These Terms were compiled from Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Nuclear industry sources. This is published to assist agency authors, readers, and stakeholders in understanding common Terms used in Security . v CONTENTS 1. glossary OF Security 2. 1 1.

2 glossary OF Security Terms 10 CFR: Title 10, Energy, of the Code of Federal Regulations. (Regulatory Guide (RG) , Access Authorization Program for Nuclear Power Plants ) Access Authorization Compensatory Measures (AA CM): Order issued by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for Compensatory Measures Related to Access Authorization, dated January 7, 2003. access-denied: the clearance condition where an individual is not considered trustworthy and reliable based upon the reviewing official s evaluation of potentially disqualifying information. access control: the control of entry or use, to all or part, of any physical, functional, or logical component of a critical digital asset (CDA). accessible: describes a structure, system, or component with which an adversary could make physical contact without the aid of scaffolding or a ladder.

3 Achievable target element: target element that is within the capabilities included in the design-basis threat. action: functional parts of a firearm that move together to place a cartridge in the chamber or otherwise ready a cartridge for firing. active insider: a person who, while in an unescorted access status and within the protected area, takes direct action to assist a design-basis threat (DBT) ( , participates in planning, uses an authorized key card to open a controlled access door, creates an operational or Security diversion, or impedes a response to the threat). active vehicle barrier: an obstacle with a changeable configuration that has two positions: one position that denies passage of a vehicle and a second position that allows vehicle passage. active violent insider: a person who, while in an unescorted access status and within the protected area, takes direct action to harm plant components, a member of the Security force, or plant staff with the intent of preventing the operation of equipment or of preventing the person harmed from participating in protective or recovery strategies, or who takes action to engage and/or divert operations or Security resources from normal protective or recovery strategies.

4 Administrative withdrawal of UAA/UA: a process to temporarily withhold unescorted access authorization (UAA) or unescorted access (UA) from an individual while action is taken to complete or update an element of the UAA requirements. adversary: an individual who has not been granted unescorted access to a site s protected area, or access to a site s critical systems, who attempts (or is actively engaged in 2 planning for or attempting) to gain unauthorized entry to the protected or vital areas, or access to a site s critical systems for the purposes of committing an act of radiological sabotage. adverse impact: a direct deleterious effect on a critical digital asset ( , loss or impairment of function; reduction in reliability; reduction in ability to detect, delay, assess, or respond to malevolent activities; reduction of ability to call for or communicate with offsite assistance; or reduction in emergency response ability to implement appropriate protective measures in the event of a radiological emergency).

5 Cases in which the direct or indirect compromise of a support system causes a safety, important-to-safety, or emergency-preparedness system or support system to actuate or fail safe and not result in radiological sabotage ( , causes the system to actuate properly in response to established parameters and thresholds) are not considered to be adverse impacts as defined in 10 CFR (a). aircraft imminent threat: a threat that meets one of the following conditions: (1) a large-threat aircraft is heading toward and is within 5 minutes of a site, and an altitude change aligns a large-threat aircraft with a site; (2) a large-threat aircraft is locally observed; or (3) a site receives specific, credible intelligence that a small aircraft heading toward the site presents a greater threat than its size would indicate, and the estimated time to the site is 5 minutes or less.

6 Aircraft informational threat: a threat that meets one of the following conditions: (1) a large-threat aircraft is heading toward but is more than 30 minutes from a site; or (2) the threat is a small aircraft and the site has either observed the threat aircraft locally or has not received specific, credible intelligence information that the aircraft presents a threat greater than its size would indicate. aircraft probable threat: a threat that meets one of the following conditions: (1) a large-threat aircraft is heading toward and is greater than 5 but less than 30 minutes from a site, or (2) a site receives specific, credible intelligence that a small aircraft heading toward the site presents a greater threat than its size would indicate, and the estimated time to the site is greater than 5 but less than 30 minutes. alarm station operator: a person responsible for, but not limited to, monitoring Security systems, assessing alarms, initiating response to a Security threat, and making notifications to both onsite and offsite support agencies in accordance with site procedures.

7 Annual/annually: requirements specified as annual should be scheduled at a nominal 12 months. Performance may be conducted up to three months before to three months after the scheduled date. The next scheduled date is 12 months from the originally scheduled date, unless a mid-cycle activity is conducted to establish a new schedule date. any failure, degradation, or discovered vulnerability: the performance of a Security safeguards measure has been reduced to the degree that it is rendered ineffective for the intended purpose. This includes cessation of proper functioning or performance of equipment, personnel, or procedures that are part of the physical protection program 3 necessary to meet the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Physical Protection of Plants and Materials, or a discovered defect in such equipment, personnel, or procedures that degrades their function or performance to a degree that could be exploited for the purpose of committing acts described in Appendix G, Reportable Safeguards Events, to 10 CFR Part 73.

8 Apparent-cause investigation: the use of abbreviated investigation techniques and readily available information to correct a specific problem. A formal root-cause analysis is not expected. An apparent-cause investigation should provide a reasonable degree of confidence that the implementation of the corrective action(s) for the apparent cause(s) will correct (not prevent the recurrence of) the problem. The last part of the investigation should address whether the significance level of the problem should be increased and additional investigation is needed. An apparent cause is most probable cause of the problem using abbreviated investigation technique. applicant: applicants for an operating license or holders of a combined construction permit and operating license (combined license), who choose to implement their access authorization programs, which were approved by the Commission in their Physical Security Plan, prior to receiving their operating licenses or their Commission findings.

9 Armed escort: an armed person, not necessarily uniformed, whose primary duty is to accompany shipments of special Nuclear material for the protection of such shipments against theft or radiological sabotage. armed responder: an armed member of the Security organization who: is trained and qualified in accordance with the training and qualification plan. must be immediately available at all times inside the protected area to implement the protective strategy and is supported in this role by other onsite and offsite resources. Immediately available means having the ability to respond within the timelines required to effectively implement the site protective strategy. has the primary responsibility of responding to threats against the facility up to and including the DBT. may be assigned other duties that do not prevent them from effectively responding in accordance with the protective strategy.

10 They are not assigned any duties that would impede an effective response. is equipped with or has readily available (if at a stationary post) a contingency weapon. has ready access to body armor, gas mask, and other equipment as appropriate to assure an effective response. Ready access means that the responder is able to pick up the equipment en route within required timelines. 4 armed response personnel: persons, not necessarily uniformed, whose primary duty in the event of attempted theft of special Nuclear material or radiological sabotage shall be to respond, armed and equipped, to prevent or delay such actions. armed Security officer: an armed member of the Security organization who: is trained and qualified to perform duties and responsibilities involving the possession and use of assigned firearms. may or may not be designated to respond to a contingency event.