THE FUTURE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

1 Edited by Mark SedraTHE FUTURE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORMTHE FUTURE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORMTHE FUTURE OF SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Mark Sedra, Editor6 Copyright 2010 by The Centre for International Governance InnovationThe opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Centre for International Governance Innovation or its Board of Directors and/or Board of work was carried out with the support of The Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI), Waterloo, Ontario, Canada ( ). This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Non-commercial No Derivatives Licence. To view this licence, visit ( ). For re-use or distribution, please include this copyright published in 2010 by The Centre for International Governance InnovationISBN 978-0-9867077-0-4 Cover and page design by Steve CrossThe Centre for International Governance Innovation 57 Erb Street West, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 6C2, Canada OF CONTENTSTABLE OF CONTENTSF oreword Clare Short 10 Acknowledgements 15 Introduction: The FUTURE of SECURITY SECTOR REFORM 16I The Origins and Evolution of the SSR Concept 281 The Evolution of the SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Agenda Nicole Ball 292 Why Is SSR Important?

2 A United Nations Perspective Adedeji Ebo and Kristiana Powell 453 The Global War on Terrorism and Its Implications for US SECURITY SECTOR REFORM SupportJake Sherman 594 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM , the European Way Peter Albrecht, Finn Stepputat and Louise Andersen 745 Less Post-Conflict, Less Whole of Government and More Geopolitics? Luc van de Goor and Erwin van Veen 886 Towards Second Generation SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Mark Sedra 102II From Concept to Context: Implementing SSR 1177 SSR and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: The Armed Wing of State Building?Paul Jackson 1188 Breathing Room: Interim Stabilization and SECURITY SECTOR REFORM in the Post-war PeriodMark Downes and Robert Muggah 1369 Stabilization Operations and Post-conflict SECURITY SECTOR REFORM : Strange Bedfellows or Close Allies?Ann Fitz-Gerald 15410 Justice SECTOR Development Assistance in Post-Conflict Countries In Search of StrategyKirsti Samuels 1699 TABLE OF CONTENTS11 Learning the Hard Way: Implementing SSR in Africa s Post-Authoritarian StatesAlice Hills 17712 Following the Yellow Brick Road?

3 Current and FUTURE Challenges for SECURITY SECTOR REFORM in AfricaLauren Hutton 19213 The FUTURE Is Non-State Bruce Baker 208 III Challenges to Implementation 22914 SECURITY SECTOR REFORM and the Challenges of Ownership Eirin Mobekk 23015 Civil Society and the FUTURE of SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Marina Caparini 24416 Just Add Gender? Challenges to Meaningful Integration of Gender in SSR Policy and PracticeJennifer Erin Salahub and Krista Nerland 26317 Securing Human Rights: Shifting the SECURITY SECTOR REFORM ParadigmNicholas Galletti and Michael Wodzicki 28118 The Financial Dimension of SECURITY SECTOR REFORM William A. Byrd 30119 The Role of the Private SECTOR in SECURITY SECTOR REFORM Alex Martin and Peter Wilson 31420 Scaling the Hurdle or Muddling through Coordination and Sequencing Implementation of SECURITY SECTOR REFORM in AfricaJeffrey Isima 327 Acronyms 339 Contributors 344 About CIGI 35310 CLArE ShOrTFOREWORD Clare ShortIt was just 10 years ago that I made my speech on SECURITY SECTOR REFORM (SSR) at the Centre for Defence Studies in King s College London.

4 It feels like much longer. Those were much more hopeful Cold War was over. The international system had been thrown into disarray by the ending of 40 years of division between the West and the Communist world, which had shaped every division and conflict in the world. The confusion resulting from this lack of structure had resulted in total failure in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. But new hope was emerging. With no great conflict dividing the world, there was an increasing possibility that reducing poverty and creating a more equitable world order might become the focus of international this new beginning was to be achieved, we needed to re-examine all the instruments of policy. Aid could no longer be an instrument of Cold War policy propping up kleptocratic dictators such as Mobutu simply because they were firmly pro-Western. Arms sales, and export credits and military assistance programs needed re-examination.

5 And the propaganda, which stressed the provision of aid as an act of charity for the poor and hopeless, also needed reconsideration. If we meant to seize this historical opportunity, we needed to re-examine all the old assumptions and develop policy focused on helping end conflict and building competent state institutions that would encourage economic growth and human development in the poorest countries. This was a big challenge to the thinking on foreign policy, aid, trade, environment, international institutions and military cooperation among the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. But it was an exciting challenge with enormous possibilities for the advancement of human civilization. It would also increase the possibility of global agreement and cooperation in dealing with mounting environmental threats facing course, all big historical opportunities are held back by old thinking in the bureaucracies and among intellectual and political elites.

6 In Africa, the first consequence of the end of the Cold War had been a large reduction of aid 11 CLArE ShOrTFOrEWOrD spending and an outbreak of internal conflict as the great powers retreated from supporting and constraining their surrogates. By 1999, 20 of the poorest countries were thus either involved in conflict or had recently emerged from whole approach to SSR was to link the SECURITY and development agendas. I was working closely with officials in the Conflict and Humanitarian SECTOR of the United Kingdom s (UK) Department for International Development (DFID). Traditionally, development workers had wanted no relationship with the military. But we had come to understand that one of the principal obstacles to progress in development was the existence of bloated, repressive, undemocratic and poorly structured SECURITY services in many developing countries. We recognized that all countries have legitimate SECURITY needs and that a SECURITY SECTOR that was well tasked and managed served the interests of all.

7 We were also well aware from participative poverty assessments, which give the poor the chance to voice their own concerns, that safety and SECURITY both at home and in the wider society were among their major addition, in many countries a bloated SECURITY SECTOR soaked up resources that could be better used elsewhere. Resources spent on excessive procurement and perks for the military meant the denial of basic services to the poor. Beyond this, in many developing countries elements in the SECURITY SECTOR were a source of insecurity and human rights abuses. This could lead to the militarization of society and mean that tensions tended to be resolved through violence. And of course repressive SECURITY sectors can often trigger violent resistance. There were particular problems in post-conflict societies such as Sierra Leone, where the army and police were broken and large numbers of ex-soldiers without employment and marooned in demobilization camps, threatened a return to was easy to conceptualize the problem.

8 Turning this understanding into a shift of policy across the UK government and the international system was going to be more first challenge was Sierra Leone. I had outlined in a 1999 speech how badly the international system had failed Sierra Leone by its failure to prevent a return to violence. We were therefore focused on carrying forward disarmament, demobilization and reintegration trying to disarm and find employment for former fighters and helping restore government systems despite a flawed peace agreement, which, for example, put ex-rebel leader Foday Sankoh in charge of mineral extraction. The weakness of the initial peace agreement led to United Nations (UN) peacekeepers being taken hostage in large numbers and 12 CLArE ShOrTUK forces being deployed to evacuate the Europeans. Given the relatively good outcome in Sierra Leone, in terms of stability but not yet in human development, it is worth reminding all who are interested in SSR that UK policy was initially written on the back of an envelope.

9 Elsewhere in Africa, I was desperately ringing Tony Blair to say that if the UK troops evacuated the Europeans and left the country, Freetown would fall again and the UK would be shamed. Because his father had worked in Sierra Leone and the first African he had met had been from Sierra Leone, Tony was particularly sympathetic, so the soldiers stayed without a clear mandate. Then, 11 of them were taken hostage and special forces were deployed to rescue them. In the course of the rescue, significant numbers of rebels were killed and one UK soldier lost his life. The UK thus became committed and the prime minister and the army became persuaded that we must stand firm with Sierra decision to set up the Africa Conflict Pool and Global Conflict Prevention Pool was also made ad hoc. In the course of a spending review, the Treasury floated, to all departments, the idea that it would provide 25 million to encourage interdepartmental cooperation if departments committed matching funds.

10 By this time, I had become more sympathetic to the desire of the MI6 to work with DFID. It is worth remembering that before the declaration of the war on terror, the budgets of intelligence agencies and the military had been slashed. They were desperate for a new role. To this end C, as the head of MI6 is known, had called on me more than once to try to persuade me that we should work with them in Africa. I was not convinced until a more junior agent explained to me that whenever he travelled in Africa, presidents were keen to meet him. The agent explained that throughout Africa, presidents were anxious to keep a firm grip on their military and anxious to develop networks of competent spies and informants so that they would know what was going on. My initial distaste for the idea of potentially spying on governments with which we were working was transformed by this discussion.