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1 Knowledge Management IN. Police Oversight . Knowledge Management IN. Police Oversight . LAW ENFORCEMENT INTEGRITY AND. ACCOUNTABILITY. PETTER GOTTSCHALK. BrownWalker Press Boca Raton Knowledge Management in Police Oversight : Law Enforcement Integrity and Accountability Copyright 2009 Petter Gottschalk All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without written permission from the publisher. BrownWalker Press Boca Raton, Florida USA. 2009. ISBN-10: 1-59942-504-1 (paper). ISBN-13: 978-1-59942-504-7 (paper). ISBN-10: 1-59942-505-X (ebook). ISBN-13: 978-1-59942-505-4 (ebook). Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Gottschalk, Petter, 1950- Knowledge Management in Police Oversight : law enforcement integrity and accountability / Petter Gottschalk. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references. ISBN-13: 978-1-59942-504-7 (pbk.)

2 : alk. paper). ISBN-10: 1-59942-504-1 (pbk. : alk. paper). 1. Police --Complaints against. 2. Police administration--Citizen participation. 3. Knowledge Management . 4. Police corruption. I. Title. 2009. '2--dc22. 2009032725. TABLE OF CONTENTS. CHAPTER 1. INTEGRITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN POLICING .. 13. Integrity and Accountability Issues ..15. Living on Both Sides of Law ..20. The Case of Victoria Police Integrity Office ..23. The Case of United Nation's Assessment Toolkit ..26. Police Ethics and Dilemmas ..34. CHAPTER 2. THE CASE OF Police CORRUPTION .. 41. Typology for Police Police Corruption in Bosnia and Herzegovina ..46. Corruption and Crime Reporting ..47. Corruption and Poverty ..50. Economic Models of Corruption ..54. Patterns of Police Corruption ..56. EPAC European Partners Against Corruption ..58. Organized Crime Corruption ..60. Corruption as Business Practice ..67. Cause and Effect in Police Corruption ..67. CHAPTER 3. Police Oversight METHODS .. 69. Police Oversight Models in the United States.

3 70. Police Complaints Systems ..76. Police Complaints System in Australia ..78. Reactive versus Proactive Agency Role ..79. Police Integrity Investigations ..80. Police Integrity Surveys ..82. Trust in the Police in 16 European Countries ..98. CHAPTER 4. Knowledge Management IN Oversight .. 101. Knowledge Categories ..102. Knowledge Management Systems ..110. Data Information Knowledge Wisdom ..111. Crime Analysis ..113. Knowledge and Evidence ..117. v TABLE OF CONTENTS. Unified Communications ..120. Building Knowledge Networks ..125. CHAPTER 5. Police Oversight PERFORMANCE .. 127. Police Organization and Leadership ..127. The Belgian Registration System ..130. Entrepreneurial Management ..132. New Public Management ..135. Performance Indicators for Oversight Agencies ..138. Police Crime CHAPTER 6. Police Oversight INVESTIGATIONS .. 149. How Investigations Work ..150. The Case of IPCC Investigations ..152. Knowledge Workers in Investigations ..153. How Detectives Work.

4 154. Detective Thinking Styles ..158. Characteristics of Effective Detectives ..162. Profiling Police Complaints Detectives ..169. CHAPTER 7. THE CASE OF AN Oversight AGENCY .. 175. 21 Police Employees on Trial in Norway in 2008 ..176. The Role of the Norwegian Bureau ..184. Police Complaints in Performance Evaluation of the Agency ..192. Whistle Blowing in the Police ..195. Knowledge in Criminal Court Cases ..201. CHAPTER 8. RESEARCH INTO Police CRIME .. 205. Coding of Court Cases 2005-2008 ..207. Research Models for Empirical Testing ..212. Predictors of Police Crime ..215. New Survey Instrument for Police Integrity ..219. Integrity and Accountability Issues ..228. CHAPTER 9. PREDICTORS OF Police CRIME SENTENCE .. 233. Organizational Structure ..233. Organizational Culture ..237. vi TABLE OF CONTENTS. Coding of Court Cases ..240. Research Model and Research Results ..246. CHAPTER 10. MATURITY LEVELS FOR Oversight AGENCIES .. 251. Characteristics of Stage Models ..252.

5 Stages of Growth in Knowledge Organizations ..253. Stages of Growth in Oversight Agencies ..259. Criticism of Stage Models ..265. History of Stage Models ..267. Modeling Process for Stage Models ..275. CHAPTER 11. Police Oversight INFORMATION SYSTEMS .. 279. Information Sources in Police Oversight ..280. Characteristics of Information Sources ..283. Stages of Information Information Technology for Knowledge Work ..296. Information Systems Strategy ..299. Information Systems CONCLUSION .. 305. References .. 309. Appendix: Raw Data Table for 327. vii INTRODUCTION. A ccording to the United Nations (UNODC, 2006a ), the great majority of individuals involved in policing is committed to honorable and competent public service and is consistently demonstrating high standards of personal and procedural integrity in performing their duties. Still more would probably do so if the ap- propriate institutional and training was given. However, in every po- licing agency there exists an element of dishonesty, lack of professio- nalism and criminal behavior.

6 The prevalence of Police deviance is a much-debated statistic and one that is often rife with problems, according to Porter and Warrender (2009). While some researchers suggest that corruption is endemic to Police culture across the globe, others argue that inci- dents are rare. Despite such statistical problems, incidents of Police deviance do surface from time to time all over the world. Some ex- amples in the UK involve suppression of evidence, beating of sus- pects, tampering with confidential evidence and perjury. The Police shall protect the society against threats, and detect, stop and pursue crime. To meet new security challenges and fight more complex crime than before, the Police in many countries have been given comprehensive powers. For those mandated to monitor the Police , these comprehensive powers and the development of po- lice organizations from bureaucratic to Knowledge organizations, means new challenges. Inadequate control with the Police could make the Police power monopoly a threat to the rule of law and democracy.

7 It is also a fact that amongst employees in the Police service, are indi- viduals who abuse the powers of their office to commit criminal acts, in some cases even take part in organized crime (Presthus, 2009). Klockars et al. (2000) find that the history of virtually every po- lice agency attests that policing is an occupation that is rife with op- 9. Knowledge Management IN Police Oversight . portunities for misconduct. Policing is a highly discretionary, coer- cive activity that routinely takes place in private settings, out of the sight of superiors, and in the presence of witnesses who are often regarded as unreliable. According to UNODC ( 2006a ), key drivers in the institutionali- zation of Police integrity include the selection, education and training of Police officers, their salaries, working conditions, discipline and supervision, and the need for mechanisms for the receipt and processing of complaints by members of the public. The organizational culture of the Police service the shared as- sumptions, beliefs, and most important, behavior of individual officers and the service as a whole is critical if the public is to trust the Police to do their job in an honest, fair, efficient and lawful man- ner.

8 And if that trust is there the public is far more likely to co- operate fully with the Police (Graham, 2006). United Nations has adopted the code of conduct for law en- forcement officials, which expects and requires that Police officers fulfill their duty, respect human dignity, not tolerate torture, not tole- rate corruption and keep confidential matters confidential. The code is to be implemented into national legislation and practice. The code can be applied in benchmarking the Oversight capacity and integrity of a Police system. In addition to developing an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of a nation's approach to ensuring the in- tegrity and accountability of the Police services, the study of code implementation in a nation will also enable to identify opportunities for reform and development (UNODC, 2006a ). There are many ways in which supervisory mechanisms for complaints may be structured. They may be managed by a branch of the central command structure or by a regional department.

9 They may be entirely separate from the command hierarchy, or they may report directly to it. There may also be independent non-government organizations or interest groups that monitor Police activity and measure it against international standards of behavior. Often there will be a different set of procedures for minor procedural or adminis- trative misconduct on the one hand and serious malfeasance or crim- inal behavior on the other. The former may remain at an internal local level whilst the latter will be dealt with by formal tribunals and prosecution (UNODC, 2006a ). The existence of a legislative structure for complaints is an im- portant step towards Police integrity and accountability, but that sys- tem must be more than a legislative expression of intent. Any system 10. INTRODUCTION. must be readily accessible to members of the public and user friend- ly. It must protect complainants against negative consequences and offer a responsible, professional and timely resolution.

10 Without such qualities, the public will soon label the complaints system as a waste of time and will not support it (UNODC, 2006a ). Oversight and accountability of the Police becomes credible and valid only by reference to the society it serves. Partnership with other agencies or organizations helps to ensure that the monitoring of po- lice action has both depth and breadth. However, it is also conceiva- ble that some partnerships may be based on the expectation of prefe- rential treatment or more favorable levels of service. Whilst there may be national arrangements for Oversight and inspection of the activities of the Police , those at a local level may be crucial to the practical delivery of Police services (UNODC, 2006a ). According to Smith (2009), Police refers to traditional Police forces or services and other publicly authorized and/or controlled services granted responsibility for the state, in full adherence to the rule of law, for the delivery of policing services.