Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology

1 Order Code RL32759Al qaeda : Statements and Evolving IdeologyUpdated July 9, 2007 Christopher M. BlanchardAnalyst in Middle Eastern AffairsForeign Affairs, Defense, and Trade DivisionAl qaeda : Statements and Evolving IdeologySummaryAl qaeda leaders and affiliates have conducted sophisticated public relationsand media campaigns since the mid-1990s. Terrorism analysts believe that thesecampaigns have been designed to elicit psychological reactions and communicatecomplex political messages to a global audience as well as to specific sub-populations in the Islamic world, the United States, Europe, and Asia.

2 Some officialsand analysts believe that al qaeda s messages contain signals that inform andinstruct operatives to prepare for and carry out new attacks. Bin Laden and otherleading al qaeda figures have referred to their public Statements as importantprimary sources for parties seeking to understand al qaeda s Ideology and politicaldemands. Global counterterrorism operations since 2001 appear to have limited BinLaden s ability to provide command and control leadership to al qaeda operativesand affiliated groups. Other al qaeda leaders and affiliates continue to releasestatements that encourage and provide guidance for terrorist operations.

3 Iraq hasbecome a focal point for jihadist rhetoric, underscoring al qaeda leaders interest inIraq and support for the ongoing released by Osama Bin Laden and his deputy Ayman al Zawahirisince late 2004 have rekindled public debate in Europe and the United Statessurrounding al qaeda s Ideology , motives, and future plans for attacks. Statementsreleased following the July 2005 al qaeda -linked suicide bombing attacks on theLondon transit system have characterized those attacks and al qaeda s ongoingterrorist campaign as a response to British and American military operations in January 2006, Bin Laden stated that al qaeda does not object to a long-termtruce with the United States on the basis of fair conditions but alluded to nearlycomplete preparations to carry out attacks inside the United States.

4 The ideological content and political tone of recent al qaeda Statements haveled some terrorism analysts to speculate that the messages may signal an on effort byAl qaeda founders to reaffirm their leadership roles and the role of the Al Qaedaorganization as the vanguard of an emerging, loosely organized international jihadistmovement. Others have argued that the presently limited operational capabilities ofAl qaeda s founders have inspired them to focus on ideological outreach activitiesand efforts to influence public opinion in the United States and Europe.

5 Manyobservers believe that the group s primary goal remains to inspire, plan, and carry outattacks against the United States and its allies around the world, with particularemphasis on targeting economic and energy infrastructure and fomenting unrest inIraq, Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf states, and countries neighboring Israel. This report reviews al qaeda s use of public Statements from the mid-1990s tothe present and analyzes the Evolving ideological and political content of thosestatements. The report focuses primarily on Statements made by Osama Bin Laden,but also considers: Statements made by Ayman al Zawahiri, the late Abu Musab alZarqawi, Iraq-based al qaeda affiliates, and al qaeda military leader Sayf al report will be updated periodically.

6 For background on al qaeda , see CRSR eport RL33038, al qaeda : Profile and Threat Assessment, by Kenneth qaeda : Statements Declaration of Jihad ..2 Clash of Civilizations ..3Al qaeda Post-9/11 ..4 The Goals of the New York Strike ..5Al qaeda Statements in and Truce and al qaeda s Ideology ..7 Strategic Perspectives ..7 Tactical Differences? ..8 Iraq and al qaeda s Regional Ambitions ..9 The Islamic State of Iraq and Discord ..9 Political Goals and Perspectives on Three qaeda on Democracy and Reform ..11 Strategic Framework ..13 Targeting Israel.

7 14 The Importance of Oil ..15 Implications and Conclusion ..15Al qaeda s Audiences ..16 Pragmatic Messianism ..16Al qaeda and the Jihadist International ..171 Unless indicated, translated citations are derived from Compilation of Usama Bin LadinStatements 1994-January 2004, Open Source Center (OSC) Report, GMP20040209000243,February 9, 2004. 2 Recent al qaeda messages have been produced by a dedicated studio, known as the for Media For example, in Bin Laden s October 2004 presidential election messag,e hereferred to specific pre-9/11 interviews with a variety of media outlets as previousindications of al qaeda s Ideology and William McCants and Jarret Brachman, Militant Ideology Atlas: Executive Report, Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy, November 2006.

8 Available( ) al qaeda : Statements and Evolving IdeologyIntroductionAl qaeda leaders and affiliates have conducted sophisticated public relationsand media campaigns since the mid-1990s using a series of faxed Statements , audiorecordings, video appearances, and Internet Terrorism analysts believe thatthese campaigns have been designed to elicit psychological reactions andcommunicate complex political messages to a global audience as well as to specificsub-populations in the Islamic world, the United States, Europe, and Asia. Bin Ladenand his deputies have personally stated their belief in the importance of harnessingthe power of international and regional media for al qaeda s benefit.

9 And al qaeda scentral leadership structure has featured a dedicated media and communicationscommittee tasked with issuing reports and Statements in support of the group Some officials and analysts believe that al qaeda s messages containsignals that inform and instruct operatives to prepare for and carry out new Laden has referred to his public Statements as important primary sources forparties seeking to understand al qaeda s Ideology and political Throughhis public Statements over the last ten years, Bin Laden has portrayed himself bothas the leader of a consistent ideological movement and a strategic commander willingto tailor his violent messages and acts to respond to specific political circumstancesand to influence specific audiences and events.

10 Surveys of jihadist literature suggestthat such a leadership role may remain elusive for Bin Laden and Al Zawahiri,particularly among ideologues and religious scholars who otherwise support jihadistactivities and goals. A study completed by the Combating Terrorism Center at Military Academy at West Point in November 2006 concluded that both menhave had an enormous impact on the wider Jihadi Movement, but our data shows thatthey have had little to no impact on Jihadi thinkers. 4 CRS-24 (..continued)at [ ]5 For an autobiographical account of the influence of the Afghan conflict on Bin Laden, see1988 footage in Jihadist Website Posts Rare Bin Ladin Afghanistan Video, OSC ReportFEA20061208039746, December 8, For more on Bin Laden and defensive jihad, see James Turner Johnson, Jihad and JustWar, First Things, June/July 2002, pp.