Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting (AJP-3.9)

1 NATO STANDARD. Allied Joint Doctrine FOR Joint . Targeting . Edition A Version 1. April 2016. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION. Allied Joint PUBLICATION. Published by the NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO). NATO/OTAN. (INTENTIONALLY BLANK). NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO). NATO STANDARDIZATION OFFICE (NSO). NATO LETTER OF PROMULGATION. 8 April 2016. 1. The enclosed Allied Joint Publication , Edition A, Version 1, Allied . Joint Doctrine FOR Joint Targeting , which has been approved by the nations in the Military Committee Joint Standardization Board, is promulgated herewith. The agreement of nations to use this publication is recorded in STANAG 2524. 2. , Edition A, Version 1, is effective upon receipt and supersedes which shall be destroyed in accordance with the local procedure for the destruction of documents. 3. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used commercially, adapted, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

2 With the exception of commercial sales, this does not apply to member or partner nations, or NATO commands and bodies. 4. This publication shall be handled in accordance with C-M(2002)60. ). Edvardas MAZEIKIS. Major General, LTUAF. Director, NATO Standardization Office (INTENTIONALLY BLANK). Allied Joint Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting Edition A Version 1. Allied Joint ( ), dated April 2016, is promulgated as directed by the Chiefs of Staff Head Doctrine Edition A Version 1. (INTENTIONALLY BLANK). Edition A Version 1. Adopting NATO Doctrine NATO underpins the defence of the UK and our allies, while also providing deployable, expeditionary capabilities to support and defend our interests further afield. In addition, the European Security and Defence Policy specifies that European Union-led military operations should also use NATO Doctrine . The need to achieve maximum coherence and interoperability within, and between, our closest allies and partners is vital.

3 NATO is the institution best placed to help us achieve this. In July 2012, the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Permanent Under Secretary issued clear direction on how the UK's contribution to NATO could be further improved, stating that: We should use NATO Doctrine wherever we can, and ensure coherence of UK Doctrine with NATO wherever we cannot.'. For UK national operations, this Doctrine should be read in conjunction with Joint Service Publication (JSP) 900, UK Targeting Policy. I Edition A Version 1. (INTENTIONALLY BLANK). II Edition A Version 1. RECORD OF RESERVATIONS. CHAPTER RECORD OF RESERVATION BY NATIONS. Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document Database for the complete list of existing reservations. III Edition A Version 1. (INTENTIONALLY BLANK). IV Edition A Version 1. RECORD OF SPECIFIC RESERVATIONS. [nation] [detail of reservation].

4 DEU Chapter 4, 0419: No-strike list The no strike list (NSL) is comprised of entities that are designated by the NAC as protected. Engagement of NSL entities could violates applicable international law, the Law of Armed Conflict, agreements, conventions, NAC policies or rules of engagement, depending on the reason for listing them on the NSL .. Rationale: As policy may be the reason for putting an entity on the NSL, it needs to be crystal clear that not all attacks on NSL entities will constitute a violation of law. ITA With reference to ITA maintains that the PID of the Target is always to be acquired in Phase 5 (Mission Planning and Force Execution) of the Targeting cycle only in case of dynamic Targeting . In particular, the PID is acquired in the fix step of the F2T2E2A (find, fix, track, target, engage, engage, exploit and assess) process, commonly used to execute dynamic Targeting . USA (1) The US has reservations with numerous terms (definitions and acronyms) that do not conform to the guidance found in C-M (2007).

5 0023. These are shown on the accompanying comment matrix. The US reservations are withdrawn once the terms are formally agreed by NATO and reflected in the NTMS. (2) The US has reservations with the way effects' are described in the AJP at paragraphs 0407, 0505, and in Fig. We have consistently asserted that effects are created or generated to support achievement of objectives. This reservation will be withdrawn once the three paras are revised, consistent with our comments. (3) The US has reservations with Targeting against a range of actors, not only against adversaries (preface paragraph 3). Joint Targeting is conducted only against a named adversary in an approved plan or order. This reservation will be withdrawn once the paragraph is revised, consistent with our comments. (4) The United States does not subscribe to the language as drafted in paragraph 0120 a. which states: "Any target prosecuted must offer a definite military advantage. If there is a choice between targets in order to realize a similar military advantage, the target that offers the least risk of collateral damage should be chosen.

6 Military necessity never V Edition A Version 1. justifies a breach of international law. The obligation under the law of war to minimize the risk of collateral damage derives from the legal principal of proportionality, not military necessity. This reservation will be withdrawn once the paragraph is revised, consistent with our comments. (5) The United States does not subscribe to the language in paragraph 0120 c. which states: Offensive action must only be directed against military objectives, making a clear distinction between them, civilian objects and civilians. All feasible precautions are to be taken in the choice of means and methods of any target prosecution to avoid or at least minimize incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects. Particular care must be taken when considering targets in the vicinity of entities on the no-strike list. The obligation under the law of war to minimize the risk of collateral damage derives from the legal principle of proportionality not distinction.

7 This reservation will be withdrawn once the paragraph is revised, consistent with our comments. (6) The US disagrees with the assertion that only the is engaged in sharing specific target intelligence. The para should be corrected to be inclusive to member nations. The characterization of extract is not the intent and direction the is pursuing. Asserting that the will extract the US MIDB is undermining to the improvements to data exchange. This reservation will be withdrawn once the paragraph is revised, consistent with our comments. Note: The reservations listed on this page include only those that were recorded at time of promulgation and may not be complete. Refer to the NATO Standardization Document Database for the complete list of existing reservations. VI Edition A Version 1. Preface Scope Allied Joint Publication (AJP) (A) Allied Joint Doctrine for Joint Targeting is the keystone NATO Doctrine for Joint Targeting . It addresses the roles, responsibilities, processes and products from the strategic, operational and tactical commands, and the political guidance and oversight inherent in this process.

8 Purpose (A) explains how Joint Targeting is planned, conducted and assessed. The document focuses on the operational level. It reflects the evolution of Joint Targeting to incorporate a full spectrum approach using the full range of military capabilities against a range of actors, not only against an adversary. Application (A) is intended primarily as guidance for NATO commanders and staffs. However, the Doctrine is instructive to, and provides a useful framework for, operations conducted by a coalition of NATO members, partners and non-NATO nations. It also provides a reference for NATO civilian and non-NATO civilian actors. VII Edition A Version 1. (INTENTIONALLY BLANK). VIII Edition A Version 1. TABLE OF CONTENTS. Page Chapter 1 Fundamentals of Targeting Section I Introduction 1-1. Section II Descriptions and Definitions 1-1. Section III The purpose of Joint Targeting 1-4. Section IV Joint Targeting principles 1-5. Section V A full spectrum approach to Joint Targeting and 1-6.

9 Effects Section VI Legal considerations 1-7. Section VII Collateral damage considerations 1-9. Chapter 2 Joint Targeting Section I Introduction 2-1. Section II The Joint Targeting cycle 2-2. Chapter 3 Joint Targeting considerations at the strategic level Section I Political direction 3-1. Section II Military strategic Targeting responsibilities 3-2. Section III National inputs 3-3. Section IV Operations planning 3-4. Section V Post-campaign and operations activities 3-4. Chapter 4 Joint Targeting at the operational level Section I General 4-1. Section II Strategic input to the operational-level Targeting 4-1. process Section III Joint force commander's Joint Targeting 4-2. responsibilities Section IV Component commander's Joint Targeting 4-3. responsibilities Section V Targeting and synchronization during operations 4-4. Section VI Target lists and databases 4-7. Section VII Intelligence support to Joint Targeting 4-9. Chapter 5 Targeting at component level Section I General 5-1.

10 Section II Decide, detect, deliver, assess 5-4. Section III NATO Special Operations Targeting : Find, fix, 5-7. finish, exploit, analyze, disseminate IX Edition A Version 1. Page Annexes Annex A Prosecuting time-sensitive targets A-1. Annex B Example NATO target sets B-1. Lexicon Part I Acronyms and abbreviations Lexicon-1. Part II Terms and definitions Lexicon-3. Figures Figure The engagement continuum 1-3. Figure Operational-level planning and Joint Targeting 1-6. Figure Ends, ways, means and Targeting 1-7. Figure The Joint Targeting process 2-1. Figure The Joint Targeting cycle 2-2. Figure Typical composition of the Joint Targeting Coordination Board 4-6. Figure Target lists and their relationships 4-9. Figure Component integration with the Joint Targeting process 5-3. Figure D3A 5-6. Figure F3 EAD cycle 5-7. Figure TST cell and TCE at Joint force level A-3. Figure Example of a time-sensitive target matrix A-8. X Edition A Version 1. CHAPTER 1 FUNDAMENTALS OF Targeting .