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An Introduction Social Psychology

An IntroductiontoSocial PsychologyWilliam McDougall, , of Corpus Christi college , and Reader inMental philosophy in the University of OxfordFourteenth Edition with Three Supplementary ChaptersBatoche BooksKitchener2001 William McDougall (1871 1938)Originally published by Methuen & Co. , edition published byBatoche Books52 Eby Street SouthKitchener, 3L1 Canadaemail: to the Fourteenth Edition .. 5 Chapter I: Introduction .. 13 Section I: The Mental Characters of Man of Primary Importance forHis Life in Society .. 26 Chapter II: The Nature of Instincts and Their Place in the Constitu-tion of the Human Mind .. 26 Chapter III: The Principal Instincts and the Primary Emotions ofMan .. 42 Chapter IV: Some General or Non-Specific Innate Tendencies .. 69 Chapter V: The Nature of the Sentiments and the Constitution ofSome of the Complex Emotions.

Social Psychology William McDougall, D.Sc., F.R.S. Fellow of Corpus Christi College, and Reader in Mental Philosophy in the University of Oxford Fourteenth Edition with Three Supplementary Chapters Batoche Books Kitchener 2001

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1 An IntroductiontoSocial PsychologyWilliam McDougall, , of Corpus Christi college , and Reader inMental philosophy in the University of OxfordFourteenth Edition with Three Supplementary ChaptersBatoche BooksKitchener2001 William McDougall (1871 1938)Originally published by Methuen & Co. , edition published byBatoche Books52 Eby Street SouthKitchener, 3L1 Canadaemail: to the Fourteenth Edition .. 5 Chapter I: Introduction .. 13 Section I: The Mental Characters of Man of Primary Importance forHis Life in Society .. 26 Chapter II: The Nature of Instincts and Their Place in the Constitu-tion of the Human Mind .. 26 Chapter III: The Principal Instincts and the Primary Emotions ofMan .. 42 Chapter IV: Some General or Non-Specific Innate Tendencies .. 69 Chapter V: The Nature of the Sentiments and the Constitution ofSome of the Complex Emotions.

2 90 Chapter VI: The Development of the Sentiments.. 115 Chapter VII: The Growth of Self-consciousness and of the Self-Regarding Sentiment .. 124 Chapter VIII: The Advance to the Higher Planeof Social Conduct.. 148 Chapter IX:Volition .. 160 Section II: The Operation of the Primary Tendencies of the HumanMind in the Life of Societies .. 184 Chapter X: The Reproductive and the Parental Instincts .. 184 Chapter XI: The Instinct of Pugnacity .. 192 Chapter XII: The Gregarious Instinct.. 203 Chapter XIII: The Instincts through which Religious ConceptionsAffect Social Life .. 207 Chapter XIV: The Instincts of Acquisition and Construction .. 218 Chapter XV: Imitation, Play, and Habit.. 220 Supplementary Chapter I: Theories of Action .. 237 Supplementary Chapter II: The Sex Instinct .. 259 Supplementary Chapter III: The Derived Emotions.

3 285 Notes .. 301 Preface to the Fourteenth EditionIn this little book I have attempted to deal with a difficult branch ofpsychology in a way that shall make it intelligible and interesting to anycultivated reader, and that shall imply no previous familiarity with psy-chological treatises on his part; for I hope that the book may be of ser-vice to students of all the Social sciences, by providing them with theminimum of psychological doctrine that is an indispensable part of theequipment for work in any of these sciences. I have not thought it neces-sary to enter into a discussion of the exact scope of Social psychologyand of its delimitation from sociology or the special Social sciences; forI believe that such questions may be left to solve themselves in the courseof time with the advance of the various branches of science would only say that I believe Social Psychology to offer for research avast and fertile field, which has been but little worked hitherto, and thatin this book I have attempted to deal only with its most fundamentalproblems, those the solution of which is a presupposition of all profit-able work in the various branches of the I have severely criticised some of the views from which I dissent,and have connected these views with the names of writers who havemaintained them, it is because I believe such criticism to be a great aidto clearness of exposition and also to be much needed in the presentstate of Psychology .

4 The names thus made use of were chosen becausethe bearers of them are authors well known for their valuable contribu-tions to mental science. I hope that this brief acknowledgment may serveas an apology to any of them under whose eyes my criticisms may owe also some apology to my fellow-workers for the somewhat dog-matic tone I have adopted. I would not be taken to believe that my utter-ances upon any of the questions dealt with are infallible or incapable of6/William McDougallbeing improved upon; but repeated expressions of deference and of thesense of my own uncertainty would be out of place in a semi-popularwork of this character and would obscure the course of my I have tried to make this book intelligible and useful tothose who are not professed students of Psychology , it is by no means amere dishing up of current doctrines for popular consumption.

5 And itmay add to its usefulness in the hands of professional psychologists if Iindicate here the principal points which, to the best of my belief, areoriginal contributions to psychological Chapter II I have tried to render fuller and clearer the concep-tions of instinct and of instinctive process, from both the psychical andthe nervous Chapter III. I have elaborated a principle, briefly enunciated in aprevious work, which is, I believe, of the first importance for the under-standing of the life of emotion and action the principle, namely, thatall emotion is the affective aspect of instinctive process. The adoptionof this principle leads me to define emotion more strictly and narrowlythan has been done by other writers; and I have used it as a guide inattempting to distinguish the more important of the primary Chapter IV.

6 I have combated the current view that imitation is tobe ascribed to an instinct of imitation; and I have attempted to givegreater precision to the conception of suggestion, and to define the prin-cipal conditions of suggestibility. I have adopted a view of the mostsimple and primitive form of sympathy that has been previously enunci-ated by Herbert Spencer and others, and have proposed what seems tobe the only possible theory of the way in which sympathetic induction ofemotion takes place. I have then suggested a modification of ProfessorGroos s theory of play, and in this connection have indulged in a specu-lation as to the peculiar nature and origin of the emulative Chapter V. I have elaborated the conception of a sentiment which is a relatively novel one. Since this is the key to all the construc-tive, as contrasted with the more purely analytical, part of the book, Idesire to state as clearly as possible its relations to kindred conceptionsof other authors.

7 In the preface to the first edition of this book I attrib-uted the conception of the sentiments which was expounded in the textto Mr. A. F. Shand. But on the publication of his important work on The Foundations of Character in the year 1914, I found that the con-ception I had developed differed very importantly from his as expoundedat length in that work. I had to some extent misinterpreted the very briefAn Introduction to Social Psychology /7statements: of his earlier publications, and had read into them my ownmeaning. Although I still recognise that Mr. Shand has the merit ofhaving first clearly shown the need of Psychology for some such con-ception, I must in the interests of truth point out that my conception ofthe sentiment and its relation to the emotion is so different from his as tobe in reality a rival doctrine rather than a development of it.

8 Lookingback, I can now see that the germ of my conception was contained inand derived by me from Professor Stout s chapter on Emotions in his Manual of Psychology . At the time of writing the book I was notacquainted with the work of Freud and Jung and the other psycho-ana-lysts. And I have been gratified to find that the workers of this importantschool, approaching psychological problems from the point of view ofmental pathology, have independently arrived at a conception which isalmost identical with my notion of the sentiment. This is the conceptionof the complex which now occupies a position of great importance inpsycho-analytic literature. Arrived at and still used mainly in the at-tempt to understand the processes at work in the minds of neurotic pa-tients, it has been recognised by some recent writers on mental pathol-ogy (notably Dr.)

9 Bernard Hart) that the complex, or something verylike it, is not a feature of mental structure confined to the minds ofneurotic patients, and they are beginning to use the term in this widersense as denoting those structural features of the normal mind which Ihave called sentiments. It would, I venture to suggest, contribute to thedevelopment of our psychological terminology, if it could be agreed torestrict the term complex to those pathological or morbid sentimentsin connexion with which it was first used, and to use sentiment as thewider more general term to denote all those acquired conjunctions ofideas with emotional-conative tendencies or dispositions the acquisitionand operating of which play so great a part both in normal and morbidmental Chapter V. I have analysed the principal complex emotions in thelight of the conception of the sentiment and of the principle laid down inChapter II, respecting the relation of emotion to instinct.

10 The analysesreached are in many respects novel; and I venture to think that, thoughthey may need much correction in detail, they have the merit of havingbeen achieved by a method very much superior to the one commonlypursued, the latter being that of introspective analysis unaided by anyprevious determination of the primary emotions by the McDougallIn Chapters VI, VII, VIII, and IX. I have applied the doctrine of thesentiments and the results reached in the earlier chapters to the descrip-tion of the organisation of the life of emotion and impulse, and havebuilt upon these foundations an account which is more definite than anyother with which I am acquainted. Attention may be drawn to the ac-count offered of the nature of active or developed sympathy; but theprincipal novelty contained in these chapters is what may, perhaps, with-out abuse of the phrase, be called a theory of volition, and a sketch ofthe development of character conceived as consisting in the organisationof the sentiments in one harmonious the heterogeneous assortment of ideas presented in the secondsection of the book I find it impossible to say what and how much isoriginal.


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