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CLAUSEWITZ’S CENTER OF GRAVITY: CHANGING …

CLAUSEWITZ S CENTER OF gravity : CHANGING OUR WARFIGHTINGDOCTRINE AGAIN!Antulio J. Echevarria IISeptember 2002**The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of theArmy, the Department of Defense, or the Government. This reportis cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.**Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should beforwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, Army WarCollege, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this reportmay be obtained from the Publications Office by calling (717) 245-4133,FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronicdissemination.

FOREWORD Over the last 25 years, the center of gravity concept has grown increasingly central to the U.S. military’s warfighting doctrine. It …

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Transcription of CLAUSEWITZ’S CENTER OF GRAVITY: CHANGING …

1 CLAUSEWITZ S CENTER OF gravity : CHANGING OUR WARFIGHTINGDOCTRINE AGAIN!Antulio J. Echevarria IISeptember 2002**The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do notnecessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of theArmy, the Department of Defense, or the Government. This reportis cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.**Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should beforwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, Army WarCollege, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Copies of this reportmay be obtained from the Publications Office by calling (717) 245-4133,FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI)monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronicdissemination.

2 SSI s Homepage address is: **The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mailnewsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcomingconferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides astrategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you areinterested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail or by calling (717) 1-58487-099-0iiFOREWORDOver the last 25 years, the CENTER of gravity concept hasgrown increasingly central to the military swarfighting doctrine. It has been hailed by each of theServices and the Joint community as the cornerstone of theoperational art; and it has come to occupy a common place in the vocabulary of professional soldiers.

3 It is somewhatsurprising, therefore, that, over the last quarter-centuryespecially, the term has come to have so many differentmeanings. In this monograph, the author, Lieutenant ColonelAntulio Echevarria II, cuts through the myriadinterpretations surrounding the concept and gets back tothe original idea as conceived by its author, the Prussianmilitary theorist, Carl von Clausewitz. In going back to theoriginal concept, Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria revealsthat Clausewitz intended the CENTER of gravity to functionmuch as its counterpart in the mechanical sciences does,that is, as a focal point. Lieutenant Colonel Echevarria thusargues, quite persuasively, that the Clausewitzian CENTER ofgravity is not a strength, nor a weakness, nor even a sourceof strength.

4 A CENTER of gravity is the one element within acombatant s entire structure or system that has thenecessary centripetal force to hold that structure is why Clausewitz wrote that a blow directed against acenter of gravity will have the greatest effect. Themonograph concludes with recommendations for revisingJoint and Service doctrine so that they will reflect a moreaccurate and coherent definition of a CENTER of gravity . Italso offers some considerations for the war planner whenapplying the C. LOVELACE, Studies Institute iiiBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHORANTULIO J. ECHEVARRIA II, a lieutenant colonel in Army, is currently assigned as the Director of StrategicResearch at the Strategic Studies Institute.

5 He graduatedfrom the Military Academy in 1981, was commissionedas an armor officer, and has held a variety of command andstaff assignments in Germany and Continental UnitedStates; he has also served as an assistant professor ofEuropean history at the Military Academy; SquadronS3 of 3/16 Cavalry; Chief of BN/TF and Bde Doctrine at Army Armor CENTER at Fort Knox; as an action officerat the Army After Next project at HQ TRADOC, Ft. Monroe,VA; and as a speechwriter for the Army Chief of is a graduate of the Army s Command and GeneralStaff College, the Army War College, and holds degrees in History from Princeton University. Hehas published articles in a number of scholarly andprofessional journals to include the Journal of StrategicStudies, Journal of Military History, War in History, War &Society, Parameters, Joint Force Quarterly, MilitaryReview, and Airpower Journal.

6 His book, After Clausewitz:German Military Thinkers before the Great War, waspublished by the University Press of Kansas in the spring CENTER of gravity has become one of today s mostpopular military concepts despite the fact that its originsextend back to the early industrial-age. Clausewitz smilitary CENTER of gravity (CoG) and the CoG of themechanical sciences share many of the same properties:neither is a strength or a source of strength, per se, butrather a focal point where physical (and psychological)forces come together. The military s doctrinalpublications especially Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for JointOperations, and Joint Pub , Joint Doctrine forCampaign Planning should be revised to reflect a moreaccurate definition of the Military Doctrine and the CoG the last 2 decades especially, the military hasstruggled both to understand the CoG concept as developedby Clausewitz, and to find practical ways to apply it.

7 In theprocess, however, it has drifted away from Clausewitz soriginal idea. For example, each of the services shaped bydifferent roles, histories, and traditions tended to view the CoG concept in their respective images. The CoG concepthas, therefore, been fitted with many guises over the Joint community attempted though with only limitedsuccess to pull the various service perspectives togetherinto a single definition with the publication of Joint Pub 3-0in 1995. In other words, Joint Pub 3-0 strove to achieve an authoritative consensus by drawing together many of theservices predilections. However, in so doing, it definedCoGs too broadly and offered no real method fordetermining recently released Joint Pub (January 2002)builds upon Joint Pub 3-0 and attempts to provide a generalmethod for determining CoGs.

8 However, the process thatvJoint Pub describes for determining a CoG actuallyleads us not to a CoG, but to a set of critical (physical orpsychological) capabilities. This process appears to haveborrowed from Dr. Joseph Strange s popular CG ( CENTER ofgravity) CC (critical capabilities) CR (criticalrequirements) CV (critical vulnerabilities) approach. Intheory, Strange s approach linked CoGs (which he definedas dynamic agents of action or influence to CVs in a waythat war planners could put to practical use. However,because any number of dynamic agents of action orinfluence can exist within a given nation or within a givenbattlespace, his definition fails to offer a way to focus one sefforts and other resources on something that will provedecisive.)

9 Strange s method only brings war planners to theenemy s centers of critical capability, rather than to anactual CoG. Clausewitz s CENTER of s original definition follows the physicsanalogy more closely than previous analyses of his workhave appreciated. In fact, it is not a source of strength or acritical capability, but a focal point that is essentiallyeffects-based, rather than capabilities-based. In modernelementary physics, which was about the state of themechanical sciences in Clausewitz s day, a CoG representsthe point where the forces of gravity converge within anobject. Striking at the CoG with enough force will usuallycause the object to lose its balance, or equilibrium, and CoG is, therefore, not a source of strength, but a factor ofbalance.

10 A closer look at the German text shows that Clausewitznever used the term source (Quelle). Moreover, theconcept remains valid only where the enemy possessessufficient unity or interdependence (Zusammenhang) toact as a single body. Before applying the concept in warplanning, therefore, we must ask ourselves whether we canconsider the enemy to act as a single entity. If so, we shouldvilook for connections among the various parts of anadversary, or adversaries, in order to determine what holdsthem together. This is the , Clausewitz s CoG focuses on achieving aspecific effect, the collapse of the enemy. Hence, it is aneffects-based approach, rather than a capabilities-basedone and it resembles an emerging concept calledEffects-Based Operations (EBO) more than it does thecapabilities-based notion that underpins today s important point is that Clausewitz did notdistinguish between tactical, operational, or strategic CoGs.


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