第一讲政府治理与事权划分 - econ.fudan.edu.cn

1 1 2017 2017 1-4 23 Wind 94% 96% 81% 86% 89% OECD 59%4 ( 2018 ) 5 6 7 8 & 9 2013 10 1 11 The Division of Jurisdictions: economy of scale in providing public goods & heterogeneity cost (Alesina& Spolaore, 2005)A linear segment of the world (continuum)N>=1, number of jurisdictionsOne single public good, government , in each jurisdictionUtility of (immobile) individual i, uniform distribution 12 The Social Planner s Solution 3-level optimization: jurisdiction number N*; size of each jurisdiction In each jurisdiction, the location of the public good government 13 Optimum k: cost of the public good.

2 Higher, smaller N, larger jurisdictionsize S. (economy of scale)g: maximum utility of the public goodhigher, larger N, smaller jurisdictionsize : disutility from the distancehigher, larger N, smaller jurisdiction size .. 15 Economy Of Scale Of Fiscal Policy When the dimensions of a State attain to a certain magnitude, it requires the same energy of government and the same forms of administration which are requisite in one of much greater extent. ---Hamilton, the Federalist Paper 1316 & 18 2627 Michalopoulos (2012)28 Michalopoulos (2012)29 (2017)30 Polluting Thy Neighbor (Cai, Chen, Gong, 2016)31 Wind32 2 33 Incomplete Contractand Organization Given that a contract will not specify all aspects of asset usage in every contingency, who has the right to decide about missing usages?

3 According to the property rights approach, it is the owner of the asset in question who has this right. That is, the owner of an asset has residual control rights over that asset: the right to decide all usages of the asset in any way not inconsistent with a prior contract, custom, or law. In fact, possession of residual control rights is taken virtually to be the definition of ownership. Oliver Hart (1995), Real Authority: Why Delegation? (Aghion& Tirole, 1997) Each project {1, }: profit for principal, for agent Congruence parameters: , (0,1] If principal s preferred project is chosen: B for principal, expected benefit for agent If agent s preferred project is chosen: b for agent, expected benefit for principal Information Acquisition Agent: perfectly learn with a probability eat private cost ( ); 1-elearn nothing Principle: perfectly learn with a probability Eat private cost ( ).)

4 1-Elearn nothing 35 36Li (2017)37 GDP Li (2017)38 GDP Li (2017)39 2018 2017 2015 2016 2018 2016 2900 40% 2017 1 GDP 1/3 6654 40 Chen, Qiao, Zhu ( 2018 )42(He, Wang, Zhang, 2020)43(He, Wang, Zhang, 2020) 3 44 Quality & Cost Trade-offs, Conflict of Interests (Hart, Shleifer, Vishny1997) Efforts to reduce cost ecan lead to the reduction in cost c(e) Efforts to improve quality ican lead to the improved quality ( ) Trade-offs between quality and cost: b(e)45 Benefits to G (central government, the public, etc.)

5 Cost to M ( privatized firm, local government, or employees of central government etc.)The first-best solution: if they can contract on everything and all contingency 46 vs. 4748 2007 GDP ,ZHANG, CHEN, GUO ( 2018 )49 Alesina& Spolare, 2005 Aghion& Tirole, 1997 B, b , E,e,g(.) Hart, Shleifer, Vishny, 1997 b c(e), ( ) 502013 512016.

6 52 53 ..54 ..55 5657 References 2013 . 2018 4 2017 2013 .Aghion, Philippe, and Jean Tirole(1997). "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations."Journal of Political : , Alberto, and Enrico Spolaore(2005).The Size of Nations. MIT Press Cai, Hongbin, YuyuChen, and Qing Gong (2016).

7 "Polluting thy neighbor: Unintended consequences of China s pollution reduction mandates."Journal of Environmental Economics and Management76: , Shuo, XueQiao, and ZhitaoZhu ( 2018 ), Chasing or Cheating? Theory and Evidence on the Political Economy of GDP Manipulation in China , working paperHart, Oliver (1995).Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. Clarendon Press, Hart, Oliver, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny(1997). "The proper scope of government: theory and an application to prisons."Quarterly Journal of : , Guojun, Shaoda Wang, and Bing Zhang (2020): Watering down environmental regulation in China. Quarterly Journal of , Xing, Chong Liu, Xi Weng, and Li-An Zhou (2017) Target Setting in Tournaments: Theory and Evidence from China , Economic Journal, forthcomingMichalopoulos, Stelios (2012), "The Origins of Ethnolinguistic Diversity.

8 "American Economic : 1508-39 Zhang, Bing, XiaolanChen, and HuanxiuGuo ( 2018 ), Does Central Supervision Enhance Local Environmental Enforcement? Quasi-experimental Evidence from China. Journal of Public Economics