Fighter Combat - Blu3wolf

1 Fighter CombatTACTICS AND MANEUVERINGBy Robert L. ShawNaval Institute PressAnnapolis, MarylandCopyright 1985by the United States Naval InstituteAnnapolis, MarylandFifth printing with corrections, 1987 All rights reserved. No part of this bookmay be reproduced without written permissionfrom the of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataShaw, Robert L., 1947- Fighter : Fighter plane Combat . I. 1985 ' 142 85-21452 ISBN 0-87021-059-9 Printed in the United States of AmericaContentsPreface ixAcknowledgments xvAbbreviations xvii1 Fighter WeaponsAir-to-Air GunsGuided MissilesNotes 611312 Basic Fighter ManeuversPursuit Curves 62 Lag Displacement Rolls 67 High Yo-Yo 71 Low Yo-Yo 73 Lead Turn 74 Nose-to-Nose and Nose-to-Tail Turns 77 Flat Scissors 82 Vertical and Oblique Turns 86 Rolling Scissors 89 Defensive Spiral 93 Notes 973 One-versus-One Maneuvering.

2 Similar AircraftGuns Only 99 Rear-Quarter Missiles Only 113 All-Aspect Missiles Only 121 Multiple-Weapons Scenarios 127 Dissimilar Weapons 1286298VI CONTENTSD efensive Maneuvering 130 Summary 138 Notes 1384 One-versus-One Maneuvering, Dissimilar Aircraft 139 Low Wing Loading versus High Thrust-to-Weight 141 Single-Dissimilarity Engagements 178 Double-Superior and Double-Inferior Conditions 182V/STOL and Helicopter Tactical Considerations 185 Notes 1945 Section Tactics, Two-versus-One 195 Background 195 Fighting Wing 196 Double Attack 200 Loose Deuce 214 One-versus-Two Maneuvering 223 Notes 2356 Section Tactics.

3 Two-versus-Two 236 Human Limitations and Task Loading 236 Two-versus-Two Tactical Doctrine 240 Summary 2637 Division Tactics 266 Background 266 Pre-Engaged Division Maneuvering 270 Other Division Formations 272 Engaged Division Maneuvering 274 Dissimilar-Aircraft Divisions 286 Notes 2898 Unlimited-Aircraft Tactics 290 One-versus-Many 291 Few-versus-Many 309 Many-versus -Many 314 Notes 3159 Fighter Missions 316 The Fighter Sweep 317 Point/Area Defense 323 Strike Escort 335 Notes 34510 Tactical Intercepts 346 Intercept Terminology 347 Forward Quarter 348 Stern Conversion 350 CONTENTSVllSingle-Side Offset 353 Trail 355 Sweep 358 Pincer 359 Drag 361 Lead-Around 363 Hook 364 Option 367 Break-Away 370 Cross-Block 372 Division Intercepts 373 Visual Considerations in Air CombatSummary 383374 Appendix.

4 Fighter PerformanceInstantaneous Turn Performance 387 Energy Maneuverability 392 Climb Performance 403 Acceleration Performance 405 Sustained Turn Performance 407 Gravity Effects on Turn Performance 411 Roll Performance 412 Pitch Performance 415 Note 417 BibliographyIndex387419421 PrefaceAs a young "nugget" naval aviator and aspiring Fighter pilot I listenedintently to my instructors, studied hard, did my best to apply what I hadlearned during airborne practice flights .. and constantly got "ham-mered." After some period of enduring this humiliation I began askingembarrassing questions of my salty old instructors concerning what Iassumed to be pretty basic tactical concepts. Probably the best answer I gotwas: "Oh, you're supposed to lose at this stage."We wanted a man of the caliber of Boelcke or Mannock or Molders or Malanto explain the unknown and to clear our confused and apprehensive minds;but on this occasion the right senior officer was not Vice-Marshal J.

5 E. "Johnnie" Johnson, RAFL eading RAF Ace in Europe, WW-II38 VictoriesBeing a hard-to-please sort of guy, I have persisted in my dumb questionsthroughout what seems to be a rather long, but unillustrious, career as afighter pilot. After a relatively short time, however, I came to a startlingconclusion: Nobody seemed to have the answers I was looking for or ifthey did, they weren't talking. In desperation I searched the literature,thinking that surely, in sixty years of Fighter aviation, someone had writ-ten the answers down. What I found, mostly, were histories that coveredperiods of aerial Combat with broad strokes and a superficial depth, histo-ries whose authors, it often appeared, were working from newspaperaccounts to find information on a subject about which they had littlefirsthand knowledge.

6 There were also some personal histories written bysuccessful ( , living) Fighter pilots (or derived from interviews with thesepilots), who recounted in detail some of their more interesting combatanecdotes. Aside from being fascinating to another Fighter pilot, this latterclass of work quite often actually covered tactics the pilots used and thoseemployed by their opponents. Unfortunately, I soon discovered that theseX PREFACE tactics varied greatly, and, amazingly, that all were sometimes successfulbut disastrous at other times. Although some of the more general conceptsof air Combat gleaned from such accounts seemed to be valid in modernwarfare, many of the details were not. Each engagement appeared to be alittle slice out of time which could never be repeated.

7 The aircraft, thepeople, the weapons, the tactics, and the conditions all came together toform a result, and if the engagement had been repeated, even the next day,the outcome easily could have been reversed. Luck and chance seem to bevery strong players in this game. Indeed, one of a Fighter pilot's favoriteexpressions is "I'd rather be lucky than good any day."An excellent weapon and luck had been on my side. To be successful the bestfighter pilot needs General Adolph GallandGeneral of the Fighter Arm, Luftwaffe, 1941-45104 VictoriesBut my engineering background had taught me that somewhere thereexists a neat mathematical solution to even the messiest of problems, so Icontinued to search for the basic "truths" that govern these events or atleast stack the odds one way or the other. Some of these principles do exist,and I hope most of them are included in this text.

8 Much of what you willread here has been derived from personal flight experience, engineeringanalysis of Fighter performance data, and "bar talk" with other fighterpilots. (It's amazing how smart a person becomes after a couple of beers.) IfI have stolen anyone's favorite move or pet expression, please accept myapologies. I can assure you the theft was not intentional. It is impossible tobe certain of the exact origins of impressions and opinions formed overmany years. Neither do the tactics described here necessarily reflect thetactical doctrines of the air services of any nation. I have done my best to beas objective as possible on this controversial subject by discussing the prosand cons of several doctrines. No doctrine is perfect, and there will, nodoubt, be " " flags flown by some students and practitioners of thisscience.

9 In this business there is certainly plenty of room for is true in Randy "Duke" Cunningham, USN5 Victories, Vietnam ConflictIt has been my experience that nations, and even separate air armswithin a given nation, differ in air Combat tactics as widely as they do inother areas. In fact, they often disagree even on what constitutes a "tacticaldoctrine." For example, I have found that asking two pilots for theirtactics in a given situation elicits three different answers. By contrast, it ismy understanding that three Russian Fighter pilots will all give the sameanswer. Probably neither of these extremes is optimum. Obviously, if youhave only one tactic, it had better be the correct one; however, even if thisis the case, there are disadvantages to inflexibility. Almost any tactic canbe defeated if it is totally predictable, and dogma stifles innovation.

10 Totalflexibility is not ideal either, as it is difficult for the Fighter pilot to becomeproficient if he is constantly changing his style and a Fighter pilot must be free to propose improvements [in tactics] or he willget himself Randy "Duke" Cunningham, USNA few words might be in order to explain the title of this work, Fight-er Combat : Tactics and Maneuvering. The subtitle may sound redun-dant, but actually many Fighter tactics have very little to do with maneu-vering. Although all the maneuvers described here have tacticalapplications, some are used more in practice than in actual Combat , whereanything more than a level turn feels exotic. Air Combat maneuvering(ACM), therefore, has a connotation of "simulated" Combat .