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Framework for SCADA Security Policy - Energy

1 Framework for SCADA Security Policy Dominique Kilman Jason Stamp Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, NM 87185-0785 Abstract Modern automation systems used in infrastruc-ture (including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, or SCADA ) have myriad Security vulnerabilities. Many of these relate directly to inadequate Security administration, which precludes truly effective and sustainable Security .

legislative requirements on automation systems are differ-ent than other IT systems. 1.2. Enforcement Hierarchy Policy is the cornerstone of any sustainable security sys-tem. Systems without security policy and administration do not possess measurable, self-perpetuating security, and ex-perience has shown that every ungoverned information

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Transcription of Framework for SCADA Security Policy - Energy

1 1 Framework for SCADA Security Policy Dominique Kilman Jason Stamp Sandia National Laboratories Albuquerque, NM 87185-0785 Abstract Modern automation systems used in infrastruc-ture (including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition, or SCADA ) have myriad Security vulnerabilities. Many of these relate directly to inadequate Security administration, which precludes truly effective and sustainable Security .

2 Adequate Security management mandates a clear administrative struc-ture and enforcement hierarchy. The Security Policy is the root document, with sections covering purpose, scope, posi-tions, responsibilities, references, revision history, enforce-ment, and exceptions for various subjects relevant for system Security . It covers topics including the overall Security risk management program, data Security , platforms, communica-tions, personnel, configuration management, audit-ing/assessment, computer applications, physical Security , and manual operations.

3 This article introduces an effective frame-work for SCADA Security Policy . Index Terms SCADA systems, Policy , administrative con-trol, Security administration. 1. SCADA MANAGEMENT CONTROLS SCADA systems support our critical infrastructures such as electrical power generation, transmission and distribu-tion, oil & gas transport, and water supplies. The primary purpose of SCADA systems is to monitor and control infra-structure equipment. The Sandia interpretation of the terms PCS and SCADA include the overall collection of control systems that measure, report, and change the process.

4 Es-sentially, any subsystem that electronically measures state, alters process control parameters, pre-sents/stores/communicates data, or the management thereof is subsumed in our definition of SCADA . One of the most common problems seen in modern SCADA environments is the lack of a SCADA -specific Security Policy . Other vulnerabilities include poor account maintenance, insecure network connections, and a lack of maintenance and monitoring of equipment. See [1] for an in-depth discussion of observed vulnerabilities.

5 SCADA -Specific Security Administration SCADA systems need a separate, SCADA specific secu-rity administration structure to ensure that all the special-ized features, needs, and implementation idiosyncrasies of the SCADA system are adequately covered. [2] contains a table which lists the key differences in IT and SCADA sys-tem designs which can affect Security and Policy decisions. Acceptable use of SCADA should be narrower than IT systems due to its different mission, sensitivity of data, and heightened criticality. SCADA systems are oftentimes used to control time-critical functions.

6 When time is an impor-tant factor, some standard IT Security practices may not be appropriate for SCADA . For example, since anti-virus scanning can sometimes slow down a system, these may not be acceptable for some SCADA platforms. Therefore, the blanket recommendation in IT Policy to include anti-virus scanning on every machine would not be appropriate for SCADA . The mission in these automation systems may have safety-critical tasks which would preclude any significant downtime. While an IT system can at times allow down-time of hours, an electrical power plant cannot tolerate im-portant safety functionality being lost for any period of time during operation.

7 Also, since automation systems have more immediate physical consequences, interconnections between SCADA systems and external networks must be better controlled, and access must be more strictly enforced and monitored Immediate adoption of Security patches that are essential in IT may be impractical in SCADA . At times, vendor con-tracts preclude SCADA systems from installing patches that have not been approved and vetted by the vendor. Also, the possibility of a patch disrupting critical functionality is not tolerated in a SCADA system.

8 Finally, the data produced by a SCADA system may have different sensitivity than the data generated in the business side of the operation. SCADA data also has a different lifetime, so some SCADA data may only need protection for several minutes as opposed to days/months/years for personnel data residing on a business network. Administration and enforcement is simpler with a sepa-rate Policy . Trying to tailor a traditional IT Policy to in-clude SCADA may seem like a time saving effort, but in reality it is probably not.

9 Trying to capture all the caveats needed for SCADA could be counterproductive and may produce a document which is not easily understandable. The resulting Policy will often be so convoluted, watered Copyright 2005, Sandia Corporation. The submitted manuscript has been authored by a contractor of the Government under contract No. DE-AC04-94AL85000. Accordingly, the Government retains a nonexclusive, royalty-free license to publish or reproduce the published form of this contribution, or allow others to do so, for Government purposes.

10 Unlimited release approved for public release. Sandia National Laboratories report SAND2005-1002C. Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation, a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy s National Nuclear Security Administration under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. 2down, inaccurate and vague that it is difficult to know what is and is not allowed. Since SCADA systems also have a small audience (including SCADA engineers, technicians, operators, and administrative personnel), the detail of the Policy sections can be more precisely targeted.


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