Game Theory in Action: An Introduction to Classical and ...

1 Schecter 2016/2/1 14:59 page vii #7 ContentsPreface and acknowledgmentsxiChapter 1. Backward s in extensive form with complete Monkey and Little Monkey , promises, s Centipede s model of duopoly s model of duopoly induction for finite horizon of backward 2. Eliminating dominated s in normal and s elimination of dominated Battle of the Bismarck form of a game in extensive form with Monkey and Little Monkey of elimination of dominated Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher.

2 For general queries, contact schecter 2016/2/1 14:59 page viii #8 viii ContentsChapter 3. Nash Monkey and Little Monkey 3 and the definition of Nash equilibria by inspection: Important Pollution over elimination of dominated Monkey and Little Monkey Nash equilibria using best Monkey and Little Monkey Pollution s model of 4. games in extensive form with incomplete functions and Fire in extensive form with incomplete a Used Travails of Boss Gorilla Missile 5. Mixed strategy Nash strategy Nash ways to find mixed strategy Nash Two-round zero-sum Ultimatum Blotto vs.

3 The People s Pollution for computing Nash of Nash 6. More about games in extensive form withcomplete perfect Nash Monkey and Little Monkey 6152 Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher. For general queries, contact schecter 2016/2/1 14:59 page ix #9 Contents perfect equilibria and backward and Rubinstein bargaining factor and repeated Wine Merchant and the Folk value of a Samaritan s Rotten Kid 7.

4 Symmetries of a Ratio symmetries of 8. Alternatives to the Nash game stability with two pure Ratio 9. Differential equations and scientific phase and differential differential 10. Evolutionary vs. dynamics with two pure and Doves of the replicator , Defectors, and Tit-for-Tatters246 Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher. For general queries, contact schecter 2016/2/1 14:59 pagex #10 x strategies and the replicator evolutionary Big Monkey and Little Monkey Hawks and Doves with Unequal The Ultimatum Minigame Problems258 Appendix.

5 Sources for examples and problems265 References269 Index271 Copyright, Princeton University Press. No part of this book may be distributed, posted, or reproduced in any form by digital or mechanical means without prior written permission of the publisher. For general queries, contact