GUIDELINES ONACCESS CONTROL, SCREENING & …

1 NewYorkCityPoliceDepartment49ccesscontro l, SCREENING ,andmonitoringsystemscanplaya nintegralroleinsecuringabuildinganditsim mediatesurroundings. Accesscontrolsystemslimitwhocanenterabui lding;screeningsystemslimitwhatcanentera building ;andmonitoring systems observe the people and things in and around a building . mitigate the risks associated with terrorist penetration of buildings, the NYPD recommends that owners of Medium and High Tier buildings implement accesscontrol systems. As a rule, building owners should design access control systemsthatdonotobstructorimpedeegressor emergencyevacuation. Forthepurposesofaccess control , the NYPD distinguishes between buildings with controllablepopulation flows and buildings with inherently non-controllable population :thoserelated to general building access and access to sensitive areas, including parkinggaragesandlocationswithlargepedes trianpopulations;andthoserelatedtosensit ivesecurity information and critical facilities, such as rooms housing electrical,mechanical,andtelecommunicati onsequipment.

2 Theformerapplyonlytobuildingswith controllable population flows, and the latter apply equally to buildings , SCREENING &MONITORINGA50 EngineeringSecurityGeneralBuildingAccess andAccesstoSensitiveAreasAccess control systems keep track of who enters and exits a building . On themost basic level, these systems distinguish between building insiders includingtenantsandemployees andbuilding outsiders includinginvitedguests and the general public. The NYPD created the followingrecommendations to address the threat from unknown, potentially dangerous outsiders. For HighTier buildings, the NYPD recommends the implementation of accesscontrolsystemsthatincorporateident ityauthenticationandturnstilestoenforcee ntry authorization.

3 Insiders should access HighTier buildings using accesscontrolcards,biometricdevices,orba dgesthatsupportmulti-layeredtechnology( ,smartcardswithbiometrics);and outsiders shouldaccessthesebuildingsusingtime-sens itivetemporarypassesorproxycards. Additionally,theNYPD recommendsthatthesesystemslimitaccesstos ensitiveareaswithinHighTierbuildingsbase donpersonnelcategory( ,tenant,non-tenantemployee,visitor,gener al public, etc.). Owners of High Tier buildings should configure accesscontrolsystemstocomplywiththeNIST standardsissuedpursuanttoHomelandSecurit y Presidential Directive 12 to rapidly and electronically authenticatesecure, Medium Tier buildings, the NYPD recommends the implementation ofperimeteraccesscontrols,suchasbadgeori dentificationcardsystems,toquicklyproces s insiders atallentrancesandexits.

4 Outsiders shouldaccessMediumTier buildings using temporary guest passes, and security personnel shouldcontinually man security stations within the building , with open sight lines needs of Medium Tier buildings, owners of Low Tier buildings whodesire to implement access control systems may find these recommendationsuseful. Regardless, security personnel at Low Tier buildings should developstandard operating procedures and protocols for access control that can outsiders, historyhasdemonstratedthepotentialfor insider exploitationof building vulnerabilities and sabotage. For example, in March 2004, Britishauthoritiesdisruptedahomegrownter roristcellplanningtouse1, ,oneofthecellmembers,WaheedMahmood,stole sensitiveCD-ROMsthatdetailedthelayoutof gas pipelines in southeast a separate incident in 2007, BritishauthoritiesarrestedOmarRehman, ,includingthosecontainingsensitivesecuri tyinformation,whichmaybeusedtoexploitspe cificvulnerabilities and in attack planning.

5 The NYPD recommends that owners ofMediumandHighTierbuildingslimitaccesst oblueprintsandfloorplans,andthat all building owners further limit access to documents containing sensitivesecurity information. This may be accomplished by establishing requirementsfor storage, disclosure, reproduction, transmission, shipment, disposition, andlabeling of these documents. Additionally, owners of Medium and High Tierbuildings should allow access to documents containing sensitive securityinformationonlyonanas-neededbasi s, ,theNYPD recommendsthataccesscontrolsystems limit access to critical facilities, including building security, buildingengineering, ,securitypersonnelinHighTierbuildings should conduct background checks on all individuals with access tocriticalfacilitiesbothduringandafterco nstruction,withrecurringscreeningsofindi vidualsinvolvedwithcriticalbuildingfunct ions.

6 ForMediumTierbuildings,theNYPD recommendsthatsecuritypersonnelconductba ckgroundchecksonallpost-construction employees with access to critical facilities. To the extentpossible, ,theNYPD recommendsthatownersofMediumandHighTierb uildingswith controllable population flows implement SCREENING systems. The NYPD srecommendationsrelatingtoscreeningsyste msspanthreegeneralcategories:peopleandha nd-heldbags,deliveredpackages,andvehicle s. TheNYPD ,theleveltowhichsecuritypersonnelshoulds creenforexplosivesdependsontheDBTlevelsf orthreatsfromacontactcharge,measuredinTN T-equivalency,ofthebuilding sstructuralcolumns. Toensurethatanattackfromwithinabuildingd oes not result in its collapse, the NYPD recommends that owners of High Tierbuildingssetscreeningthresholdsatlev elsnohigherthantheDBTlevelforthreatsfrom a contact charge on a structural column.

7 For example, if the DBTlevel ofstructuralcolumnsinagarageis90-poundsT NT-equivalent,allpersons,packages,andveh iclesaccessingthatgarageshouldbescreened suchthatnobombwitha90-pound TNT-equivalent yield or larger can gain access. This respect to people and their hand-held bags, the NYPD recommendationsdistinguishbetweenscreeni ng insiders and outsiders. ForHighTierbuildings, outsiders should pass throughmagnetometers and their bagsshould be x-rayed; insiders neednot pass through magnetometers,but their bags should be subject tosearch. Beyond these minimumstandards, owners of High Tierbuildingsshouldconsidertheuseofaddit ional SCREENING technologies,including walk-through explosivesdetection portals and radiationdetector portals or pagers.

8 TheChapterFiveMagnetometers and x-ray machines screen people and their hand-held bags. NewYorkCityPoliceDepartment53 NYPD also recommends that owners of High Tier buildings create secondaryscreeningareaswheresecuritypers onnelcanresolveanomaliesusingexplosivetr acedetection equipment, handheld magnetometers, pat downs, and manual ,theNYPD recommendsthatsecuritypersonnelx-rayall outsiders bags upon entry and store magnetometers on-site for use ,theNYPD recommendsuniversalscreeningatMedium and HighTier buildings with stationary x-ray equipment and explosivesdetection canines or equipment. building owners should post signage, indicatingthatallpackagesaresubjecttosea rch.

9 ,theNYPD recommendsscreeningforHighTierbuildingsa t direct entry points as well as at the entrances to underground parking areas andloadingdocks. Effectivevehiclescreeningrequiresanadequ atenumberofwell-litvehicle entrances to accommodate peak flows of vehicular traffic and to personnel at High Tier buildings ensure that vehicle access points aresecurely locked when not operational, illuminated during off-hours, and inspectedperiodicallybyarovingpatrol. Additionally,barriersystemsshouldbeputin placetothwartanyattemptto rush NYPD recommends that owners of High Tier buildings provide for off-sitescreening of vehicles;7when no such design is feasible, building owners shouldcreate hardened on-site areas sufficiently removed from critical facilities andoccupiedspaces.

10 Becauseundergroundparkingareasandloading docksmaycreatesignificantvulnerabilities basedontheirproximitytothebaseofabuildin g,ownersofHighTierbuildingsshouldhardent hemasmuchaspossible, that MediumTier buildings maintain signage noting that all ,deliveredpackages,andvehicles, SCREENING categories, security personnel at HighTier buildings should certain instances, local law enforcement presence combined with , systems can play an important role in protecting a building fromterroristattack. Forexample,aneffectivemonitoringsystemma ydeterterroristsconductingreconnaissance fromtargetingabuilding. Monitoringcapabilities,suchas closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems, give security personnel enhanceddomain awareness and improve their ability to detect suspicious ,crimes, terrorists will take the existence of monitoring systems intoconsideration when conducting pre-attack planning and assessing operational ,between2000and2004,DhirenBarot( )carefullyscrutinized the positions and features of CCTV cameras while conductingsurveillance missions in the United States.