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HSL/2002/20 - Risk Based Inspection - A Case Study ...

Crown copyright 2002 Broad Lane, Sheffield, S3 7 HQTelephone: +44 (0)114 289 2000 Facsimile: +44 (0)114 289 2500 Risk Based Inspection -A case Study Evaluation of Onshore Process PlantHSL/2002/20W Geary PhD MIM CEngProject Leader: W GearyEngineering Control GroupSummary Objectives Risk Based Inspection (RBI) as a method for prioritising the Inspection of plant has receivedconsiderable attention over the last few years and methods have been developed nationally,for example by the American Petroleum Institute (API) and by a number of privateorganisations, particularly in the petrochemical industry. A co-ordinated approach to thesedevelopments is currently underway in Europe (RIMAP). A survey of approximately 50 UK organisations carried out by HSL in 1999 showed thatapproximately half were using an approach to plant Inspection Based on risk.

2 Case study data was requested in a format similar to that required for analysis using the API methodology. An example of the data requirements is shown in Appendix 1.

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Transcription of HSL/2002/20 - Risk Based Inspection - A Case Study ...

1 Crown copyright 2002 Broad Lane, Sheffield, S3 7 HQTelephone: +44 (0)114 289 2000 Facsimile: +44 (0)114 289 2500 Risk Based Inspection -A case Study Evaluation of Onshore Process PlantHSL/2002/20W Geary PhD MIM CEngProject Leader: W GearyEngineering Control GroupSummary Objectives Risk Based Inspection (RBI) as a method for prioritising the Inspection of plant has receivedconsiderable attention over the last few years and methods have been developed nationally,for example by the American Petroleum Institute (API) and by a number of privateorganisations, particularly in the petrochemical industry. A co-ordinated approach to thesedevelopments is currently underway in Europe (RIMAP). A survey of approximately 50 UK organisations carried out by HSL in 1999 showed thatapproximately half were using an approach to plant Inspection Based on risk.

2 It was clearhowever, that a wide range of systems were in use including commercial software packagesand in-house systems specific to individual plants. Given the disparate nature of some of thesesystems and the likelihood that RBI assessments might produce very different resultsdepending on which methodology was used, HSE took the view that a Study should beundertaken using a number of example cases to tease out the differences between the is the subject of the current investigation. The work (Programme JR32082) has beenjointly funded by HSE s Technology Division (TD) and the Hazardous InstallationsDirectorate (HID). The programme was essentially in two parts. Firstly, a case Study roundrobin was undertaken by HSL, the subject of this report, and secondly, a review of Europeandevelopments has been carried out by Mitsui Babcock Technology, the details of which arereported in Reference Findings1 Considerable variation in the selection of damage mechanisms for assessment Pre-sifting of damage mechanisms, thought to be inactive, had Significant variability was found in the assignment of the importance of damagemechanisms.

3 Different conclusions, regarding the activity of a damage mechanism, weredrawn from identical Where software systems were used and calculations of the consequences were made, it wasnot transparent what assumptions had been made; details were frequently hidden in the blackbox .5 Assumptions made about nearby plant and the likely occupancy by plant personnel togetherwith the differences in the definitions of equipment, production and business were A number of the RBI methods considered the likelihood and consequences method has the benefit of simplicity and ensures conservatism but lacks the accuracy ofsystems where the consequences are assessed separately for each damage In some cases RBI systems averaged the individual consequences associated with healthand safety, business and plant issues and environmental factors to generate an overall conse-quence factor.

4 Thus it appears possible that plant judged to have, for example, high safetyconsequences could be assessed as having medium overall consequences. From HSE s view-point this might require some Inspection plans were Based on the assessment of the damage mechanisms and the assessedrisk and consequently there were significant differences in both the content of the proposedinspections and in the Inspection In most cases Inspection plans only included procedures for damage mechanisms regardedas active. There was evidence, in a smaller number of plans, of procedures explicitly includedfor inactive or unlikely The HSE best practice document suggests that for high consequence plant sample checksfor unanticipated mechanisms would be beneficial, however, little sample checking orspeculative Inspection was proposed by the Given the diversity of views on active damage mechanisms, some speculativeinspection would, arguably, be Use of existing guidance on Inspection periodicity was made by all the participants andincluded reference to IP 12 and 13 (5,6), SAFed (2) and API 510 (4) documents.

5 Inspectionintervals were, therefore, limited to half remnant life in many The participants did not set limits to Inspection periods Based on the existing or historicalperiods for the vessel under Subjective judgements Based on limited information did lead to some significantdifferences in Inspection Generally, the Inspection periods reflected the assessed risk. Nevertheless considerablescatter was apparent in the data and some participants exhibited greater conservatism in theirassessments than Recommendations1 The reporting and assessment of damage mechanisms lacks transparency (presifting), someadditional guidance to users would be Software, expert systems and expert judgement all have merits, greater integration of theseelements might be A review of how damage mechanisms are treated Based on uncertain data would increaseconfidence in the Some clarification of the definition of each the element of consequences is Transparency is needed in the assessment of consequences particularly with respect to theassumptions that are Inspection planning guidance may be useful particularly for speculative inspections andsample checks for high consequence 1.

6 INTRODUCTION1 2. THE PARTICIPANTS1 3. case STUDIES1 4. Participant Participant B3 Participant C3 Participant D4 Participant E5 Participant F6 Participant G7 5. EVALUATIONS8 case 1 Molecular Sieve8 Participant A8 Participant B11 Participant C11 Participant D11 Participant E12 Participant F14 Participant G15 Summary15 Likelihood15 Consequences17 Risk17 Inspection Plan and Period18 case 2 Distilate Hydrotreater19 Participant E19 Participant F19 Participant C20 Summary20 Likelihood20 Consequences21 Inspection

7 Plan and Period21 case 3 Autoclave21 Participant B21 Participant A22 Participant F23 Participant E23 Participant C24 Summary24 Likelihood24 Consequences25 Risk25 Inspection Plan and Period26 case 4 Methanol Storage Drum26 Participant F26 Participant E27 Participant C27 Summary27 Likelihood27 Consequences27 Risk, Inspection Plan and Periodicity27 6. DISCUSSION28 Introduction28 Likelihood analysis29 Consequences and Risk29 Inspection Plan and Period30 Mitsui Babcock review of Inspection recommendations31 7.

8 CONCLUSIONS33 8. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER WORK34 9. REFERENCES35 Appendix 1 Data Requirements Appendix 2 case 1 Molecular Sieve Appendix 3 case 2 Distilate Hydrotreater Appendix 4 case 3 Autoclave Appendix 5 case 4 Methanol Storage Drum Appendix 6 case 1 Mol. Sieve additional information Appendix 7 case 1 Mol. Sieve additional information 2 11 INTRODUCTION Risk Based Inspection (RBI) as a method for prioritising the Inspection of plant has receivedconsiderable attention over the last few years and methods have been developed nationally,for example by the American Petroleum Institute (API) and by a number of privateorganisations, particularly in the petrochemical industry.

9 A co-ordinated approach to thesedevelopments is currently underway in Europe (RIMAP). A survey of approximately 50 UK organisations carried out by HSL in 1999 (1) showed thatapproximately half were using an approach to plant Inspection Based on risk. It was clearhowever, that a wide range of systems were in use including commercial software packagesand in-house systems specific to individual plants. Given the disparate nature of some of thesesystems and the likelihood that RBI assessments might produce very different resultsdepending on which methodology was used, HSE took the view that a Study should beundertaken using a number of example cases to tease out the differences between the is the subject of the current investigation.

10 The work (Programme JR32082) has beenjointly funded by HSE s Technology Division (TD) and the Hazardous InstallationsDirectorate (HID). The programme was essentially in two parts. Firstly, a case Study roundrobin was undertaken by HSL, the subject of this report, and secondly, a review of Europeandevelopments has been carried out by Mitsui Babcock Technology, the details of which arereported in Reference 8. PARTICIPANTS A number of organisations known, as a result of the survey work carried out earlier or by theproject steering committee, to be actively involved in the use or development of RBI werecontacted and asked to participate in a round robin exercise using a number of specificallyprepared case studies.


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