Hurricane Katrina August 23-31, 2005

1 Service Assessment Hurricane Katrina August 23-31, 2005 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) National Weather Service (NWS) Silver Spring, Maryland Cover: NOAA-15 satellite image of Hurricane Katrina at 7:47 Central Daylight Time, August 29, 2005, just east of New Orleans, Louisiana. Service Assessment Hurricane Katrina August 23-31, 2005 June 2006 NOAA s National Weather Service David L. Johnson Brigadier General, USAF (ret.)

2 Assistant Administrator for Weather Services i reface P The devastation along the Gulf Coast from Hurricane Katrina was staggering. The physical destruction and personal suffering surmounted that of any weather disaster in recent history. The loss of life and extraordinary damage made Katrina the costliest Hurricane in history and one of the five deadliest hurricanes to ever strike the However, without NOAA s National Weather Service forecasts, warnings, communication, outreach, and education, the impacts and loss of life would have been far greater.

3 I chartered a team to assess NWS performance during the event. The Team found the NWS performed exceptionally well in forecasting, warning, communication, preparedness, and post-storm recovery efforts. This is confirmed by the overwhelming positive response received from users and partners of the NWS. Our National Hurricane Center predicted the central Gulf Coast, including the New Orleans metropolitan area, would be directly affected by Katrina as a major Hurricane about 56 hours before landfall.

4 Forecasts of Katrina s path from NHC were better than long-term average errors and better than the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) 2006 goals established for Hurricane track forecasts. The evacuation rate during Hurricane Katrina was near 80 percent. This is an impressive public response to an approaching threat. This remarkable response resulted from a long-working relationship and open communication between NWS, the emergency management community at all levels, and the media.

5 While NOAA s National Weather Service performed well in forecasts and services, there is room for improvement. The Assessment Team made 16 recommendations, most of which concern the infrastructure of the NWS such as electrical power, communications, computing systems, and data gathering systems. During extremely difficult working conditions, the ingenuity, dedication, and sheer will of NWS employees enabled the provision of products and services as infrastructure and back-up systems failed.

6 Relying on NWS employees to overcome infrastructure failure is not an ideal solution. The recommendations in this report will be addressed and the 13 best practices will be considered nationwide. David L. Johnson Brigadier General, USAF (Ret.) Assistant Administrator for Weather Services June 2006 ii Table of Contents ii Service Assessment iv v Acronyms .. vi Executive Summary .. 1 Service Assessment Report 4 Event Overview ..5 NWS Forecast and Warning 9 National Centers for Environmental 9 Florida Weather Forecast Offices.

7 15 Gulf Coast Weather Forecast Offices .. 16 Operations Coordination .. 23 Continuity of 26 Support Activities ..32 Outreach and Preparedness .. 34 Best Practices .. 36 Conclusion .. 37 Appendices The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale .. A-1 Best Track Analysis for Hurricane Katrina .. B-1 Tornado Reports Associated with Hurricane Katrina .. C-1 iii Service Assessment Team This Service Assessment Team was assembled on September 9, 2005 and initially convened at the National Centers for Environmental Prediction s Tropical Prediction Center on September 12-13, 2005.

8 The Team conducted 20 NWS field office visits/reviews over a six-week period to evaluate NWS performance during Katrina . During its field office visits, the Team met with more than 40 representatives from the emergency management community and the mass media. The Team was comprised the following individuals: John L. Guiney Team Leader, Chief, Meteorological Services Division, NWS Eastern Region Headquarters (ERH), Bohemia, New York Curtis D. Carey NWS Communications Office, NWS Headquarters, Silver Spring, Maryland Dennis M.

9 Decker Warning Coordination Meteorologist, Weather Forecast Office (WFO) Melbourne, Florida Lew Fincher Vice President, Hurricane Consulting, Inc., Friendswood, Texas William J. Gery NWS Systems Manager, NWS Central Region Headquarters, Kansas City, Missouri Scott C. Kiser NWS Tropical Cyclone Program Leader, Office of Climate, Water, and Weather Services (OCWWS), NWS Headquarters, Silver Spring, Maryland Steven Piltz Meteorologist-in-Charge, WFO Tulsa, Oklahoma Anthony Siebers Meteorologist-in-Charge, WFO Wakefield, Virginia Larry Vannozzi Meteorologist-in-Charge, WFO Nashville, Tennessee Other valuable contributors include: Laurie G.

10 Hogan Hydrometeorologist, NWS ERH, Bohemia, New York Billy Olsen Hydrologist-in-Charge, Arkansas-Red Basin River Forecast Center, Tulsa, Oklahoma Aimee Devaris Chief, Performance Branch, OCWWS, NWS Headquarters, Silver Spring, Maryland Wayne Presnell National Service Assessment Program Leader, OCWWS, NWS Headquarters, Silver Spring, Maryland iv Acknowledgements The team would like to thank our partners in emergency management, the media, and individuals from all of the NWS offices who took time to talk and share their thoughts and experiences with us.