Keohane, AFTER HEGEMONY - Olivia Lau

1 Keohane, AFTER HEGEMONY1. realism , INSTITUTIONALISM, AND takes the existence of mutual interests (as well as conflict) as given across specificscenarios and examines the conditions under which mutual interests will lead to cooperation. Evenwhere common interests exist, cooperation frequently international environment is anarchic in that is lacks an authoritative government (Keohaneaccepts the realist assumption). Institutionalists , argues Keohane, are often naive about theconcepts of power and conflict; they are overly optimistic about ideals or the prospects for statelearning. Rather, one should argue that interests are malleable and that interdependence creates apropensity for cooperation. At the point of decline of American HEGEMONY (mid-1960s and onward), US involvement in the world economy actually accelerated.

2 This led realists to predict that morediffuse national power should undermine the ability of any one state to create order, whereasinstitutionalists predicted that increased interdependence would prompt a greater need for defines cooperation as mutual adjustment rather than simply common interests :Discord can prevail even in the case of common interests. Keohane accepts that states are rationalegoists, but that realism s pessimism is not warranted in all situations - regimes do matter (Chapter5). Institutions do not change state behavior strictly by implementing and enforcing rules, but bychanging the context in which states reach decisions based on self-interest. Rather than inenforceability, the value of regimes lies in their enabling qualities - they assist and empowergovernments in concluding mutually beneficial agreements (Chapter 6).

3 Institutionalism modifies realism : Institutions are a function of the distribution of power, sharedinterests, and prevailing expectations and practices. They form against the background of earlier,sometimes failed, attempts at cooperation. Most importantly, institutionalism explains thecontinuation of regimes AFTER the initial, favorable conditions for their creation have disappeared:Regimes perform important functions and they are difficult to create or reconstruct. Even though anumber of international regimes came under pressure in the 1970s, the advanced states continuedto engage in policy continues to provide valuable insights - we need to go beyond it, not abolish it (does thisring any bells?).4. COOPERATION AND INTERNATIONAL and HEGEMONY are not antithetical. HEGEMONY suggests asymmetrical cooperation is valuable, it is difficult to organize.

4 Keohane insists on a distinction betweenthe creation and maintenance of regimes. When interests converge sufficiently and other keyconditions are met (Ch. 5), cooperation can ensue without HEGEMONY . At the same time, regimesare easier to maintain than create (Ch. 6): Cooperation AFTER HEGEMONY is related to the fact that theconditions for maintaining existing regimes are less demanding than those for creating exists under conditions where the actions of states (as manifestations of their self-interest)automatically facilitate the achievement of the goals of other states (eg. the hypothetical competitivemarket world. ). Under conditions of harmony, cooperation (mutual adjustment) is requires that the actions of various entities, which do not pre-exist in a state ofharmony), are brought into conformity with one another.

5 A useful distinction between harmony andcooperation is that harmony is apolitical, while cooperation is highly political. Cooperation requiresthe alteration of patterns of behavior. Lindbergh defines policy coordination as follows:A set of decisions is coordinated if adjustments have been made in them, such that theadverse consequences of any one decision for other decisions are to a degree and in somefrequency avoided, reduced, or counterbalanced or adds:Intergovernmental cooperation takes place when the policies actually followed by onegovernment are regarded by its partners as facilitating realization of their own objectives, asthe result of a process of policy concept of discord is crucial to Keohane s argument: Discord prompts others to make effortsto change their policies.

6 If these attempts are resisted, policy conflict results. Negotiation andbargaining may or may not take place in this context. Cooperation is typically mixed with conflict;it reflects the efforts to overcome conflict. Trade relations, for example, are not per se harmonious(steel!). Governments tend to respond to domestic demands for protection (liberal argument), bycushioning the burdens of trade liberalization borne by influential domestic groups. These types ofunilateral measures shift the adjustment costs to other actors, and discord poses a continuing Marxist-Leninist critique is that mutual policy adjustments cannot eliminate systemiccontradictions, because they are attributable to capitalism (quest for increasing profit) rather than tocoordination problems suffered by egoistic actors operating under does not examine cooperation atomistically as sets of isolated acts, but want tounderstand patterns of cooperation in IPE.

7 While Ruggie defined regimes as sets of mutualexpectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitmentsaccepted by a group of states, we should focus on Krasner s definition, which continues to beaccepted near-universally ( memorize):International regimes are sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors expectations converge in a given area ofinternational relations. Principles are beliefs of fact, causation and rectitude. Norms arestandards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specificprescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practicesfor making and implementing collective expands on Krasner s definition of norms, arguing that a second usage of norms woulddistinguish norms from rules and principles by stipulating that participants in a social system regardnorms, but not rules and principles, as morally binding regardless of considerations of narrowlydefined self-interest.

8 But if we included this definition of norms, the conception of regimes basedstrictly on self-interest would be a contradiction in terms. Keohane thus treats norms simply asstandards of behavior, whether adopted on rational (self-interest) or other (constructivist) the margin, rules and norms merge. Rules tend to be more specific than norms, in that they setout the details of rights and obligations. Rules can be altered more easily than norms or principles(eg. of international monetary relations, Ruggie s embedded liberalism ). However, it is not easyto distinguish an implicit rule of broad significance from a well-understood, relatively specificoperating principle. Rules and principles can affect expectations and values, and strong regimes willlikely display tight linkages between rules and of it in terms of injunctions : Some injunctions are important and rarely change, while othersmay be very technical and can be changed without significant political impact.

9 Then there is a setof intermediate injunctions that are both specific enough that violations of them are identifiable andthat changes can be observed, but also sufficiently significant that changes in them have an impacton state behavior and the nature of IPE. These intermediate injunctions are the essence of uses the oil-regime example: An exclusive focus on the avoidance of competition wouldhave resulted in the observation of continuity ( the trend towards cartels), but this would havemissed the momentous changes that occurred. Focusing on the minute, specific arrangements, onthe other hand, would have revealed continuous flux. Keohane claims that Only by focusing on theintermediate level of relatively specific but politically consequential injunctions, whether we callthem rules, norms, or principles, does the concept of regime help us identify major changes thatrequire explanation.

10 A political (international) system based on the concepts of sovereignty and self-help means that theprinciples and rules of international regimes will be weaker than in domestic society. Cooperationoccurs when states have sufficiently converging interests that mutual suspicion can be are thus not part of a new international order, but expressions of self-interest; sovereigntyremains a constitutive principle of the system. International regimes are thus consistent withdifferentials in power and a sophisticated view of self-interest. They can be seen as interveningvariables between structural qualities of the international system (distribution of power) and non-state actors (like MNCs).5. RATIONAL-CHOICE AND FUNCTIONAL interests do not determine world events: Rational individuals who would benefit fromcooperating may still fail to do so (game theory; collective action debate).