Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence

1 DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES. IZA DP No. 2313. lobbying , Corruption and Political Influence Nauro F. Campos Francesco Giovannoni September 2006. Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit Institute for the Study of Labor lobbying , Corruption and Political Influence Nauro F. Campos Brunel University, CEPR and IZA Bonn Francesco Giovannoni CMPO, University of Bristol Discussion Paper No. 2313. September 2006. IZA. Box 7240. 53072 Bonn Germany Phone: +49-228-3894-0. Fax: +49-228-3894-180. Email: Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the institute.

2 Research disseminated by IZA may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit company supported by Deutsche Post World Net. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its research networks, research support, and visitors and doctoral programs.

3 IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. IZA Discussion Paper No. 2313. September 2006. ABSTRACT. lobbying , Corruption and Political Influence *.

4 Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting Political Influence in rich countries and Corruption the preferred one in poor countries. Analyses of their joint effects are understandably rare. This paper provides a theoretical framework that focus on the relationship between lobbying and Corruption (that is, it investigates under what conditions they are complements or substitutes). The paper also offers novel econometric evidence on lobbying , Corruption and Influence using data for about 4000 firms in 25. transition countries.

5 Our results show that (a) lobbying and Corruption are substitutes, if anything; (b) firm size, age, ownership, per capita GDP and Political stability are important determinants of lobby membership; and (c) lobbying seems to be a much more effective instrument for Political Influence than Corruption , even in poorer, less developed countries. JEL Classification: E23, D72, H26, O17, P16. Keywords: lobbying , Corruption , transition, institutions Corresponding author: Nauro F. Campos Department of Economics and Finance Brunel University Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH.

6 United Kingdom E-mail: *. We thank Toke Aidt, Laszlo Bruszt, G rard Duch ne, Timothy Frye, Bard Harstad, Elisabetta Iossa, Mathilde Maurel, Branko Milanovic, Boris Najman, Richard Pomfret, Jakob Svensson, John Wildman, an anonymous referee and seminar participants at Brunel and Paris 1 Sorbonne Universities and at the 2006 European Economic Association Meetings in Vienna for valuable comments on earlier versions. The usual disclaimer applies. 1. Introduction What is the relationship between lobbying and Corruption ? In a general sense, both are ways of obtaining help from the public sector in exchange for some favor.

7 Indeed one could argue that lobbying is just a special form of Corruption focused on legislative bodies or some other rule-making There are, however, several important differences. One first difference is that lobbying does not always take the form of bribes or even of campaign contributions. In many cases, lobbyists have expertise that politicians don't have and can Influence politicians by strategically sharing this expertise with them (see Austen-Smith and Wright 1994 for an example). In other cases, lobbyists can Influence politicians by providing endorsements or by threatening to provide voters with damaging information about them or their policies (Grossman and Helpman 1999 and 2001).

8 These differences have received little attention in the theoretical literature: two exceptions are Bennedsen and Feldmann (2005) and Dahm and Porteiro (2004), who compare the choice of lobbying with monetary payments or bribing to the choice of strategic provision of information to politicians. The fact that lobbying is mainly aimed at policy-making institutions rather than the bureaucracy brings up a second difference since legislatures both set the policies that lobbyists care about and the rules that make it either easier or more difficult to bribe.

9 Thus, lobbying can be both an activity that makes bribing irrelevant if it succeeds in influencing policy and an activity that makes bribing easier if it succeeds in undermining law enforcement. In other words, lobbying can be a substitute for, or a complement to, Corruption . These two alternative interpretations of lobbying as a substitute or a complement to bribes have been investigated by two recent papers by Harstad and Svensson (2005) and Damania et al. (2004) respectively. 1. Much of the theoretical literature on lobbying seems to adopt this position.

10 In many models, Grossman and Helpman (2001), lobbying is modeled as monetary transfers from lobbyists to politicians and these transfers could equally be interpreted as campaign contributions or bribes. See Coate and Morris (1999) or Yalcin and Damania (2005) for examples of the latter interpretation. 1. In this paper, we focus on this distinction and bring some empirical evidence to bear on the Although the literature on lobbying is large and growing, the attendant empirical evidence is scarce, mostly limited to developed countries and either focuses on firm characteristics ( , size and sector)