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M/V BALSA 37 THE TUG SEAFARER AND T/B OCEAN 255, …

UNITED STATES COAST GUARDINVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE COLLISION BETWEEN THEM/V BALSA 37 THE TUG SEAFARER ANDT/B OCEAN 255,AND THE TUG CAPT. FREDBOUCHARD AND T/B NO. 155ON AUGUST 10, 1993, WITH NO LOSS OF LIFECONTENTS1. COMMANDANT'S ACTIONC omments on ConclusionsAction on Recommendations2. MARINE BOARD OF investigation REPORT FINDINGS OF FACTS ummaryVessel DataPersonnel License DataNarrative DescriptionsWeather ConditionsThe ChannelThe Voyage of the BALSA 37 The Voyage of the SEAFARER towThe Voyage of the BOUCHARD towFire FightingLife Saving and RescueInjuriesDrug TestingPersonnel Histories Recording of Radio Communications Marine Board Visits CONCLUSIONS RECOMMENDATIONSIii1126666910121415161617 171718231 3 4 7 8 ILLUSTRATIONSFire aboard the T/B OCEAN 255 Tug CAPT FRED BOUCHARD and the T/B M/V BALSA 337 Chart showing the area of the collisionPosition of the vessels prior to collisionCommandant Washington, 20593-0001 United States Coast Guard Staff Symbol: G MMI 1 Phone.

united states coast guard investigation into the circumstances surrounding the collision between the m/v balsa 37 the tug seafarer and t/b ocean 255,

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Transcription of M/V BALSA 37 THE TUG SEAFARER AND T/B OCEAN 255, …

1 UNITED STATES COAST GUARDINVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE COLLISION BETWEEN THEM/V BALSA 37 THE TUG SEAFARER ANDT/B OCEAN 255,AND THE TUG CAPT. FREDBOUCHARD AND T/B NO. 155ON AUGUST 10, 1993, WITH NO LOSS OF LIFECONTENTS1. COMMANDANT'S ACTIONC omments on ConclusionsAction on Recommendations2. MARINE BOARD OF investigation REPORT FINDINGS OF FACTS ummaryVessel DataPersonnel License DataNarrative DescriptionsWeather ConditionsThe ChannelThe Voyage of the BALSA 37 The Voyage of the SEAFARER towThe Voyage of the BOUCHARD towFire FightingLife Saving and RescueInjuriesDrug TestingPersonnel Histories Recording of Radio Communications Marine Board Visits CONCLUSIONS RECOMMENDATIONSIii1126666910121415161617 171718231 3 4 7 8 ILLUSTRATIONSFire aboard the T/B OCEAN 255 Tug CAPT FRED BOUCHARD and the T/B M/V BALSA 337 Chart showing the area of the collisionPosition of the vessels prior to collisionCommandant Washington, 20593-0001 United States Coast Guard Staff Symbol: G MMI 1 Phone.

2 ( 202)267-1430 Commandant's ActiononThe Marine Board of investigation convened to investigate thecircumstances surrounding the collision of the BALSA 37, Lloyd'snumber 8511794; the tug SEAFARER , 532672 and T/B OCEAN 255, 534910; and the tug CAPT FRED BOUCHARD, 644119 and T/BNO. 155, 603622 on 10 August 1993 with no loss of lifeCOMMENTS ON CONCLUSIONSC onclusion 23: Recording the critical radio transmission made on channel 13 in theminutes leading up to the casualty would have assisted in this , had Channel 13 been recorded to correlate transmissions to theprecise time of day, the process of reconstructing events leading up to thecasualty would have been : I concur with this conclusion. In ports where Vessel Traffic Servicesare located, Channel 13 is monitored and recorded. These recordings have provenuseful in reconstructing events leading up to a marine 29: A Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) employing the latest technologymight have assisted in the prevention of this casualty.

3 It could have providedinformation as to the general vessel traffic situation including when, where andthe type of vessel that would be met during the transit. A VTS could havedetermined that the three vessels would meet at the turn and that the BALSA 37 wasproceeding down the center of the channel as it approached the turn. Radiotransmissions could have been monitored raising the question as to the BALSA 37pilot's awareness of the situation. Finally, a VTS could have initiated a call foremergency response at the instant it became apparent the collision was : I concur with this conclusion. A properly equipped VTS could haveintervened to prevent this accident. VTS interacts with marine traffic byproviding accurate and complete information to all mariners. VTS watchstanders inthe vessel traffic center respond to developing situations in the waterway andadvise mariners of potentially dangerous conditions.

4 Watchstanders ensure thatmariners have timely, relevant and accurate information to support theirindependent decisionmaking. If watchstanders determine that proper action is not beingmade to alleviate a dangerous situation, they are empowered todirect vessel movements. A "watchstanderless" system would not havethe capability to interact with traffic or provide third party,independent assessment of the traffic situation. Independentassessment and monitoring of the waterway are critical elements inavoiding future accidents in Tampa ON RECOMMENDATIONSR ecommendation 1: That Commandant develop and implement a merchantmariner's license and document revocation procedure based upon ahistory of confirmed improper actions and/or violations. A system ofpoints should be assessed for violations of the Code of FederalRegulations, proved findings of charges in suspension and revocationproceedings, and civil and criminal convictions.

5 When theaccumulated points exceed a specified level, the Coast Guard shouldautomatically initiate revocation proceedings. It is furtherrecommended that the State of Florida develop a similar system forpilots under its : I concur with this recommendation. The Coast Guard will seeklegislative authority to establish the recommended "points system."The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) gave the Coast Guardadditional authority which also addresses the intent of thisrecommendation. OPA 90 requires renewal of certificates of registryand merchant mariner's documents every five years, thus ensuringthat the Coast Guard has interaction with the holders of credentialson a more frequent basis. OPA 90 also authorizes the Coast Guard toreview the National Driver Register for vehicular offenses(including drug and alcohol involvements), to conduct criminalrecord checks, and to revoke the credentials of holders withcriminal convictions or convictions of offenses of the NationalDriver Register Act of 1982.

6 When these OPA 90 authorities areimplemented in regulation, the Coast Guard-will have significantlymore interaction with mariners, will have access to more backgroundinformation on them, and will be in a significantly better positionto protect life, property, and the marine environment throughoversight of merchant 2: That Commandant develop a new license anddocument application and renewal procedure which will determineand list all prior suspension and revocation actions, and othercriminal convictions and Driving Under the Influence (DUI)convictions. If additional statutory authority is necessary toperform such checks, it should be : I concur with the intent of this recommendation. Although the existingapplication and renewal procedures allow for the consideration of priorsuspension and revocation actions, criminal convictions, and DUI convictions,Commandant (G-MVP) has initiated several projects to improve theeffectiveness of these regulatory initiative is underway to provide for verification ofinformation that mariners provide on their applications regardingDUI convictions by obtaining information from the National DriverRegister.

7 Initiating spot checks of criminal records during licenseand Merchant Mariner Document renewals and upgrades will help verifyinformation regarding criminal convictions and may serve as an addedincentive to mariners to include all relevant information on theirapplications. Finally, implementation of the Merchant MarinerLicensing and Document system will allow for the review of anapplicant's history of administrative actions reported byinvestigating officers and will help to verify the information thatmariners provide on their the license application, Form CG-866, specifically requestsinformation regarding suspensions and criminal convictions,Commandant (G-MVP) will revise and clarify portions of theapplication. The question regarding suspensions will be revised toinclude all types of administrative actions, not just question regarding criminal convictions will be reworded toemphasize that DUI convictions are serious offenses that must beincluded on the 3: That the Tampa Bay Pilots Association educatemember pilots on the requirements for post-accident 4: That the Tampa Bay Pilots Association contractwith a qualified facility to expedite the collection of samples fordrug testing its members on a 24-hour : I concur with the intent of these recommendations.

8 Existingregulations at 46 CFR (e) require marine employers to ensurethat all individuals engaged on board a vessel are fullyindoctrinated in the requirements of serious marine incidentchemical testing, and 46 CFR (c) requires marine employers toensure specimens for drug and alcohol testing are collected as soonas possible. Commandant (G-MMI) will forward a copy of this reportto the Tampa Bay Pilots Association for their information andreview, and will request a written response to 5: That the Marine Safety Office, Tampa MarineFire Fighting Contingency Plan be reviewed and revised asnecessary to improve communications during such : I concur with this recommendation. Review and revision ofunit contingency plans following a major incident is standardprocedure. The importance of the review and revision process will beemphasized in a revision to the Marine Safety Manual, Volume VI,Chapter 6: That, nationwide, Commandant establish means forrecording Channel 13, or the designated bridge-to-bridge channel, incritical waterways where such recording is not currently being doneby VTS or other system.

9 Such recordings frequently are of great valuein casualty : I concur with the intent of this recommendation. Recordings ofthe voice radio exchanges between vessels have proven valuable inreconstructing the events leading up to marine casualties. However,this benefit of monitoring and recording Channel 13 must be comparedwith the costs of incorporating the additional recording capabilityinto the National Distress and Safety System. The cost of addingChannels 13 and 67 guard receivers, data links and recording capacityis appreciable. These costs are not readily justified when consideringthat the majority of bridge-to-bridge transmissions are "businesstransactions" between vessels and that shore stations have little needto communicate on bridge to bridge 7: That Commandant explore alternative or additionalnoisemaking devices on Personal Flotation Devices whose operationwould be unaffected by oil or chemicals in the : I partially concur with this recommendation.

10 Whistles areinexpensive, lightweight, inherently maintenance-free, and normallyeffective. The alternatives to whistles that are currently availableinvolve some sort of power source and are significantly more bulky andexpensive. Therefore, noisemaking devices other than whistles areunlikely to be practical. Whistle manufacturers often bring theirproducts to the attention of the Coast Guard. As they do, we will alertthem to the possible problems of 8: That Commandant initiate a review of the marinefirefighting capability in the nations ports, on its waterways, andoffshore. Included in a national review should be the consideration ofthe use of portable, high capacity foam , prime movers, and foam stocks could be strategically located inport areas and transported by land, sea, or air to areas within a port, toremote waterway sites, or offshore. Within certain small ports, suchequipment could substitute for fireboats, precluding a major deployable, high capacity, portable firefighting equipment could be thedeciding factor in preventing or minimizing the further release of pollutants tothe environment in any number of casualty : I concur with the intent of this recommendation.


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