MAGTF Intelligence Production and Analysis ...

1 MAGTFI ntelligenceProductionandAnalysis-------- ------------5-9/Bn =restrictedareas"/'----~/BnBn/Bn=mobilit y/"corridorOBJ= = ,r--o::~~~;;JG:favorsInsurgents~ -- :politlcalboundary~= ~ ,orsituationrequires,analystsalsoidentif ypotentialassemblyanddispersalar-eas,obs ervationposts,artilleryandairde-fensepos itions,LZs, ,depth, , , 'sstaffinthecompletionoftheirestimatesan dplans,analystsconstructa com-binedobstacleoverlay(COO)ora modifiedcombinedobstacleoverlay(MCOO),wh icharegraphicproductsthatdepictbattlespa ceeffectsonmilitaryoperations( ).WeatherCommanderscantakeadvantageofthe weatherorminimizeitseffectsthroughplanni ngbasedona ,weatheris studiedtodeterminehowitaffectsfriendlyan denemycapabilitiestomove,shoot, particularmissiondependsonthemission,the forces,theterrain, <------xxIENyt'"V"V'\ENv!= !es~=restrlcted~=BeVBrely~restricted;;;; =urbanareasf<,~.

2 ~;:I=vegetatlon.~. 'seffectsonpersonnel,equipment(toinclude allsensors), foranexampleofa coveredinmoredetailinchapter6 andinMarineCorpsWarfightingPublication(M CWP) , ' : Temperatureandhumidity. Precipitation. Wind. Visibility. ' Temperatureinversionsthatmightcausesomeb attlepositionstobeatrisktotheef-fectsofc hemicalwarfare. Localconditionsofvisibility,suchasfog,th atmightmakesomepotentialengagementareasa ttractive. Hot,dryweatherthatmightforcea , Logisticinfrastructure( ,landusepatterns,sourcesofpotablewater,b ulkfuelstorage,naturalresources,industri esandtechnologies,chemicalandnuclearfaci lities). Populationdemographics( ,livingcondi-tions,culturaldistinctions, religiousbeliefs,politicalgrievances,pol iticalaffiliation,edu-cationlevels). Navalapproaches. Economics. Local,regional,andinternationalpolitics( ,treaties,agreements,legalrestrictions,u nofficialsystems,gangs).

3 Althougheffectsofothercharacteristicsare usu-allydiscussedintextormatrixform, (HVTs) 12-----------~~~-------------MCWP2-3 DescribetheBattlespaceEffectsonThreatand FriendlyCapabilitiesandBroadCoursesofAct ionIntelligenceanalystscombinetheevaluat ionoftheeffectsofterrain,weather, ' ,intelli-genceanalystsprovidetheoperatio nsofficerorplanningstaffwiththefollowing IPBproducts: AnevaluatedandprioritizedsetofAAstoas-si stinthedesignationofaxisofadvance,di-rec tionofattack,orzoneofattackforeachsubord inateunitinoffensiveoperations. SetsofdefensibleterrainalongthreatAAstoa ssistinthedevelopmentofstrongpoints,bat- tlepositions,orsectorsforeachsubordinate unitindefensiveandretrogradeoperations. , , ,vehicles, ,andculturalbiasesmaycausethreatpersonne ltoviewlegal,political,economic, ,intelligenceanalystsmust- Evaluatethebattlespacefromtheperspective ofthethreat.

4 ExpresstheevaluationintermsofCOAs,notdet aileddescriptionsoftheanalyticalfactorst hatledtotheconclusions. Focusthecommanderbyrelatingspecificthrea tactivitiesin bothtimeandspace. Backtheirconclusionswiththedetailedanal- ysisperformed. Communicatefinalconclusionsinwrittenre-p ortssuchastheanalysisoftheAOorintelli-ge nceestimate. Disseminategraphicproducts todeterminethethreatforcecapabilitiesand thedoctrinalprin-ciples,tactics,techniqu es,andproceduresit detailedstudyofthethreat'scomposition,ta cticaldoctrine,pro-cedures,weaponsandequ ipment, 'snormalordoctrinalorganization,equipmen t,tactics,techniques, , ,a descrip-tionofpreferredtacticsandoptions , ' particulartypeofstandardopera-tion,sucha sa battalionmovingtocontactoraninsurgentamb ush( ). ' ,timing,distances,relativelocations,grou pings, whole,whileothersfocusona descriptionofthethreat' listingordescriptionoftheoptions(branche s)avail-abletothethreatshouldtheoperatio nfail,or"",,:::::::::&;::2:~~;:::::::::" ,,"~"V'~.

5 "MainBody"'..~~~A~0~'VI~i&..~~rsecu~CSG= corpssupportgroupDSG= (sequels)ifit 'spreferredtacticscanbedepictedgraphical ly,thethreatmodelincludesa ,pointswhereunitstransitionfromoneformat iontoanother,decisioncriteria,andeachbat tlefieldfunction'scontributiontotheopera tion' ,relatedintimeandspace, (s)ofGravityMarineCorpsDoctrinalPublicat ion(MCDP)1,Warfighting,definesa centerofgravity(COG) ,moralorphysicalstrength, :stra-tegic,operational, , threat'sCOGsatalllevelsisuseful, , ,ifexploited,willdothemostsignificantdam agetoanadversary' ' ,analystsmustfocusona vulnerabilitythatwilldothemostdamagetoth eenemy' , Intelligence ,firesupport,communications andinformationsystems,airdefenses,engine ers, ,intelligenceanalystsmust- IdentifyHVTsfromanevaluationofthedatabas e,thedoctrinaltemplate,thetemplate'ssupp ortingnarrative,andtheuseoftacticaljudgm ent. DeveloptheinitiallistofHVTsbymentallywar gamingandthinkingthroughtheopera-tiontoi dentifyassetsthatarecriticaltotheoperati on'ssuccess,particularlyatcriticaljunctu resorphases.

6 Identifyassets,whicharekeytoexecutingthe primaryoperation,particularlythosethatar ekeytosatisfyingdecisioncriteria. Grouptheidentifiedkeyassetsintooneof13ca tegoriesusedtodeveloptargetsets,thusassi st-inginthedevelopmentoftargetingstrateg ies. Determinehowthethreatmightreacttotheloss ofanHVT;considerhisabilitytosub-stituteo therassetsormodifyhisplantocompensate. RanktheidentifiedHVTswithregardtotheirwo rthtothethreat'soperation. IdentifyHVTvaluechangesbyphasebe-causeth atvalueusuallyvariesoverthecourseofanope ration. TailorIPBproductstothecommand' : Attack. Defend. Reinforce. ,penetration, ,a withdrawal,ora ,including- Deceptionoperations. Riverineoperations. Psychologicaloperations. Intelligenceoperations. Nuclear,biological,andchemicalweaponsemp loyment. Espionage,sabotage,subversive, ,suchas- Theenemyhastheabilitytoinsertuptotwoinfa ntrybattalionsina singleliftoperation.

7 Theenemycanestablisha prepareddefenseby14 May. ,intelli-genceanalysts- Startwithdevelopedthreatmodels. ConsiderothertypesofoperationsandbroadCO Asat otherlevelsofwarandduring oper-ationsotherthanwar. Considerthethreat'sabilitytoconducteacho perationbasedonallfactorsrelatedtothecur rentsituation.(Thethreatmaybeunder-stren gthinequipmentorpersonnel,shortoflo-gist icsupport,lackingairsupport,orhistroopsm aybeinexperiencedorpoorlytrained.) 'sLikelyObjectivesandDesiredEndStateDepe ndingonMETT-T, ,ensuringthateachthreatlevel' ,analystsmayberequiredtostartmorethanone levelabovetheircommand( ,thegovernmentormajorclanleadershiplevel ).Usually,analystsstatethethreat' , alsotrueat higherlevelsofcom-mandwherethethreat'spo liticalandeconomicobjectiveshavea ,analystsmust- ConsidertheCOAsthatthethreathistoricaldo ctrineandtactics,techniques,andproce-dur es(TTP) 'sdecisionmakingprocessaswellas5 16----------------------------MCWP2-3ana ppreciationforhowheperceivesthecur-rents ituation.

8 ConsiderthethreatCOAsthatcouldsignifi-ca ntlyinfluencethecommand'smission,evenift hethreat'sdoctrineandTIPindicatetheseasi nfeasibleundercurrentconditions;andcon-s ideranyindirectCOAsthatthethreatiscapa-b leofexecuting. ,considerallpossibleex-planationsforthet hreat' ConsidereachCOA'ssubsetindependentlytoav oidformingbiasesthatrestricttheanalysisa ndevaluation. Combinethesubsetstoeliminateredundancyan dminorvariations. ComparetheconsolidatedlistofCOAstothreat capabilitiesidentifiedinstep3oftheIPBpro cessandeliminateanyCOAsthatthethreatisin capableofexecuting. Selectthreatmodelsthatwillaccomplishthet hreat'slikelyobjectivesbasedontheevalua- tionofthethreat'scapabilities. Examinehowtheeffectsofthebattlespacede-s cribedinstep2oftheIPBprocessinfluencethe applicationofCOAs( ). DefineCOAsopentothethreat,suchasdelib-er ateattack,hastyattack,defend,anddelay.

9 (Threatmodel)~~----'::'--~~:::C~-AENVIRO NMENT(Weather,terrain,population,etc.)Fi gure5 EnsureeacheGAidentifiedissuitable,fea-si ble,acceptable,unique,andconsistentwitht hreatdoctrineorTTPandrecentlyob-servedac tivitiesandpatterns( ).EvaluateandPrioritizeEachCourseofActio nAnalystsmustevaluateeachidentifiedthrea teGAandprioritizeit <::==:=contlrmedavenueof,~;J}approach'.. _;= friendlyCOA, , devel-opedis basedonitsprobabilityofadoptionandthecom mander' ,eachCOAmustanswerthefollowingfivequesti ons: What(typeofoperation)? When(timetheactionwillbegin)? Where(sectors,zones,axisofattack)? How(methodbywhichthethreatwillem-ployhis assets)? Why(objectiveorendstateofthethreat)?When developingeachCOA, ,a battalionS-2 ' ,analystsconsiderthreatCOAstwolevelsofco mmandbelowtheirowncommandwhentheMAGTFis intheoffenseandatleastonelevelbelowtheir commandwhentheMAGTFis situationtem-plate;a COAdescription,COGs,criticalvulner-abili ties,andoptions;anda ( ).

10 Tem-platesusuallydepictthemostcriticalpo intintheoperationasagreeduponbytheG-2/S- 2 andG-3 ,startingwiththethreat' ,placeswherethethreatisespeciallyvulnera ble, situationtem-plateby- Beginningwiththethreatmodelrepresentingt heoperationunderconsideration. Overlayingthedoctrinaltemplateontheprodu cts(generally,COOorMCOO)thatdepictthebat tlespaceenvironment'seffectsonoperations . Adjustingthedispositionsportrayedonthedo ctrinaltemplatebasedonthebattlespaceenvi ronment'seffects. Viewingthesituationfromthethreatcom-mand er'spointofviewwhenselectingfromamongava ilableoptions. Checkingthesituationtemplatetoensurethat allthethreat'smajorassetshavebeenac-coun tedfor,particularlythelocationsandac-tiv itiesoftheHVTslistedin thethreatmodel. Evaluatingtimeandspacefactorstodevelopti mephaselines(TPLs) ( ).MAGTFI ntelligenceProductionandAnalysis-------- ------_5-19-------IC>;;;;estimaled"avenu eof\\approach'.