MCWP 3-16 Fire Support Coordination in the Ground Combat ...

1 MCWP 3-16 FIRE Support Coordination IN THE Ground Combat ELEMENT Marine Corps PCN 143 000059 00 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public; distribution is unlimitedTo Our ReadersChanges: Readers of this publication are encouraged to submit suggestions and changes thatwill improve it. Recommendations may be sent directly to Commanding General, MarineCorps Combat Development Command, Doctrine Division (C 42), 3300 Russell Road, Suite318A, Quantico, VA 22134-5021 or by fax to 703-784-2917 (DSN 278-2917) or by E-mail Recommendations should include the following information:l Location of changePublication number and titleCurrent page numberParagraph number (if applicable)Line numberFigure or table number (if applicable)l Nature of changeAdd, deleteProposed new text, preferably double-spaced and typewrittenl Justification and/or source of changeAdditional copies.

2 A printed copy of this publication may be obtained from Marine CorpsLogistics Base, Albany, GA 31704-5001, by following the instructions in MCBul 5600,Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications Status. An electronic copy may be obtained from theDoctrine Division, MCCDC, world wide web home page which is found at the following uni-versal reference locator: otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are OF THE NAVYH eadquarters United States Marine CorpsWashington, 20380-177528 November 2001 FOREWORDM arine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-16, Fire Support Coordina-tion in the Ground Combat Element, is a framework for coordinating and em-ploying supporting arms in consonance with maneuver elements . While thispublication covers many aspects of fire Support , it focuses on fire Support coor-dination in the infantry division, regiment, and battalion.

3 The doctrine appliesacross the full range of military operations from humanitarian assistance to amajor theater war. Fire Support doctrine is based on a common understanding of the nature of warand on our warfighting philosophy as described in Marine Corps Doctrinal Pub-lication (MCDP) 1, Warfighting. This doctrine provides for fast, flexible, anddecisive action in a complex environment characterized by friction, uncertainty,fluidity, and rapid change. This publication is a field reference guide for commanders, their staffs, and firesupport Coordination personnel. It forms the basis for specific fire Support coor-dination tactics, techniques, and procedures. This publication supersedes Fleet Marine Force Manual (FMFM) 6-18, Tech-niques and Procedures for Fire Support Coordination , dated 27 March and approved this DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPSEDWARD HANLON, General, Marine CorpsCommanding GeneralMarine Corps Combat Development CommandDISTRIBUTION: 143 000059 00 CHAPTER 1.

4 FUNDAMENTALSFire Support is fires that directly Support land,maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces toengage enemy forces, Combat formations, andfacilities in pursuit of tactical and operational ob-jectives (JP 1-02). Fire Support Coordination is theplanning and executing of fires so that targets areadequately covered by a suitable weapon or group ofweapons (JP 1-02).The Marine air- Ground task force (MAGTF) is theMarine Corps principal organization for all missionsacross the full spectrum of military consist of a command element (CE), aground Combat element (GCE), an aviation combatelement (ACE), and a Combat service Support element(CSSE). The MAGTF principally employs fire supportprovided by the GCE and the ACE, but may alsoreceive external fire Support from other joint,combined, and coalition CORPSWARFIGHTING PHILOSOPHYThe Marine Corps warfighting philosophy is based onrapid, flexible, and opportunistic maneuver capa-bilities.

5 Maneuver warfare is a warfighting philosophythat seeks to shatter the enemy s cohesion through aseries of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions whichcreate a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situationwith which he cannot cope (MCDP 1). Fire Support inmaneuver warfare produces Combat power and isapplied through combined MAGTF and GCE are combined arms teams bythe nature of their organization. The GCE s ability todeliver fire is most effectively employed when itcreates a combined arms effect. Combined arms is thefull integration of arms in such a way that in order tocounteract one, the enemy must make himself morevulnerable to another. It pairs firepower with mobilityto produce a desired effect upon the enemy (MCDP 1).In addition to the typical example of combined armswhere indirect fire suppresses an enemy, enablingeither maneuver or attack by direct fire, multiplesupporting arms can create a combined arms raids in the Gulf War intentionally attractedenemy counterfire to enable air attack of enemy radarand artillery units.

6 The enemy had to suffer the effectsof indirect fire or risk losing its own artillery 3d Marine air wing used a similar technique whenconducting attacks against the Iraqi integrated airdefense system (IADS). Suppression of enemy airdefenses (SEAD) packages accompanied Marineaircraft conducting strikes against Iraqi positions andequipment. When Iraqi fire control radars wereactivated, the aircraft from the SEAD package at-tacked the radars with high-speed antiradiationmissiles (HARMs). Once again, the Iraqis were placedin a dilemma. To defend against the air attacks, theyplaced their fire control radars in power is the total means of destructive and/ordisruptive force which a unit can apply against theenemy at a given time. Combat power consists oftangible factors such as the destructive effect ofavailable firepower.

7 But, just as importantly, itconsists of intangible factors such as surprise, tempo,and Support TASKS Fire Support functions are performed in relation to l Supporting forces in Supporting the commander s concept of Integrating fire Support with the scheme of Sustaining fire of the unit supported, these tasks give thecommander and his fire Support representatives aframe of reference to evaluate the overall effectivenessof fires. They serve as unifying factors for supportingarms. The four tasks do not change or replacetraditional missions, roles, and operations. Theyprovide a common point of departure for all sup-porting arms. For example, naval surface fire support1-2_____ MCWP 3-16(NSFS) in general Support of a regiment does notconsciously plan to perform the four tasks.

8 It ac-complishes its mission by furnishing a continuousvolume of naval gunfire that supports forces in contactand the commander s concept of operation. It in-tegrates its Support with the scheme of maneuverthrough liaison officers who plan fire Support areas(FSAs) to Support the scheme of maneuver. Supporting Forces in ContactPrerequisite to this task is the ability to immediatelyrespond to and meet the fire Support needs of forcesengaged with the enemy. This task enhances thefriendly force s survivability and increases theirfreedom of maneuver. Individual fire Support assetssupport forces in contact in many ways; , artillerysupports forces in contact by performing its traditionalroles of close Support and the Commander sConcept of OperationThis task enables the force commander to influencethe battle with firepower.

9 It gives him the means tocreate effects on enemy forces or functions that con-tribute to his mission accomplishment. Fires can shapethe battlespace by attacking the enemy s center ofgravity (COG) through enemy critical vulnerabilitiesand creating decisive Combat power with a combinedarms Fire Supportwith the Scheme of ManeuverIntegrating fire Support with the scheme of maneuverrequires precise arrangement of coordinated activitiesin time, space, and purpose to produce the most ef-fective fires. It provides the right attack meansdelivered on the right target at the right time, creatinga combined arms effect. Integration must occur withinthe supporting arms and the other warfightingfunctions (maneuver, intelligence, command andcontrol, logistics, and force protection).

10 Sustaining Fire SupportThis task ensures fire Support endurance and con-tinuity in providing fires. It involves the actions toachieve logistics sustainment and technical Support forsupporting arms available to the OF THE GROUNDCOMBAT ELEMENTEach MAGTF element has specific roles in co-ordinating fire Support . The CE implements theMAGTF commander s intent and normally focuses ondeep operations to shape the battlespace for the majorsubordinate commands (MSCs). The ACE is a majorprovider of fire Support through offensive air Support (OAS), electronic warfare (EW), and unmanned aerialvehicle (UAV) Support . The CSSE commander isnormally assigned responsibility for the conduct ofrear area operations. Since no formal supporting armscoordination agency exists within the CSSE s reararea operations center (RAOC), the CSSE may beaugmented with fire Support representatives.