MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD From: …

1 MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORDFrom: Commander in Chief, Pacific FleetSubj: COURT OF INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THECOLLISION BETWEEN USS GREENEVILLE (SSN 772) AND JAPANESEM/V EHIME MARU THAT OCCURRED OFF THE COAST OF OAHU,HAWAII ON 9 FEBRUARY 2001 Ref: (a) JAGMAN(b) JAGINST (c) CINCPACFLT ltr of 17 Feb 01 Ser N00/269 (OriginalAppointing Order)Encl: (1) Court of Inquiry Report of 13 Apr 011. On 9 February 2001, USS GREENEVILLE (SSN 772) collided withthe Japanese Motor Vessel EHIME MARU approximately nine milessouth of Oahu, Hawaii. The GREENEVILLE was performing anemergency main ballast tank blow demonstration for 16 embarkedcivilians at the time. The collision resulted in the loss ofnine EHIME MARU crew members and the sinking of the ship after the GREENEVILLE returned to port, a preliminaryinvestigation was initiated that ultimately led to the conveningof a Navy Court of Inquiry on 5 March Pursuant to references (a) and (b), I have completed myreview of the Court of Inquiry's report into the collisionbetween USS GREENEVILLE (SSN 772) and the EHIME MARU.

2 As theEchelon II commander exercising general court-martialjurisdiction over the commands involved in reference (c), Ihereby approve and concur with the findings of fact, opinions,and recommendations in enclosure (1), subject to the I have determined that the following corrective action iswarranted:Subj: COURT OF INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THECOLLISION BETWEEN USS GREENEVILLE (SSN 772) AND JAPANESEM/V EHIME MARU THAT OCCURRED OFF THE COAST OF OAHU,HAWAII ON 9 FEBRUARY 20012a. I specifically concur with the Court's recommendationthat Commander Scott D. Waddle, Navy, be ordered toAdmiral's Mast. At a hearing held on 23 April 2001, and for thereasons elaborated upon below in paragraphs 5 and 6, I foundCommander Waddle committed violations of Article 92, UCMJ(Dereliction in the Performance of Duties) and Article 110, UCMJ(Negligent Hazarding of a Vessel). I issued him a punitiveletter of reprimand and forfeited one-half of his pay for twomonths (with forfeitures suspended for six months).

3 B. I specifically concur with the Court's recommendationthat Lieutenant Commander Gerald K. Pfeifer, Navy, beadmonished by Commanding Officer, USS GREENEVILLE for lack ofadministrative oversight and execution of the enlistedwatchbill. By copy of this MEMORANDUM , I forward thatrecommendation to Commander, Submarine Force, U. S. PacificFleet, for further action as he deems The Court recommended that Lieutenant (Junior Grade)Michael J. Coen, Navy, be admonished by Commanding Officer,USS GREENEVILLE for failure to stand an attentive watch asOfficer of the Deck on board USS GREENEVILLE on 9 February recommendation is modified to reflect that Lieutenant(Junior Grade) Michael J. Coen, Navy, was ordered toAdmiral's Mast before Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleetfor a violation of Article 92, UCMJ (Dereliction of Duty) forfailing to ensure safe navigation of the ship and propersupervision of personnel in the Control Room. At Admiral'sMast, I admonished Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Coen to ensure heunderstands the critical responsibilities of a strong andattentive Officer of the Deck who is relied upon by theCommanding Officer for forceful I specifically concur with the Court's recommendationthat the Chief of the Boat, MMCM(SS) Douglas Coffman, Navy,be admonished by Commanding Officer, USS GREENEVILLE for lack ofadministrative oversight and execution of the enlistedwatchbill.

4 By copy of this MEMORANDUM , I forward thatrecommendation to COMSUBPAC for further action as he I specifically concur with the Court's recommendationthat STS1(SS) Edward McGiboney, Navy, the ship's SonarSupervisor, be admonished by Commanding Officer, USS GREENEVILLEfor poor execution of the enlisted watchbill by allowing anSubj: COURT OF INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THECOLLISION BETWEEN USS GREENEVILLE (SSN 772) AND JAPANESEM/V EHIME MARU THAT OCCURRED OFF THE COAST OF OAHU,HAWAII ON 9 FEBRUARY 20013unqualified watchstander to stand watch in sonar without properoversight. By copy of this MEMORANDUM , I forward thisrecommendation to COMSUBPAC for further action as he I specifically concur with the Court's recommendationthat Captain Robert L. Brandhuber, Navy, be admonished forfailing to professionally carry out his duties on 9 February, aselaborated upon in paragraphs 10 and 11 below. By copy of thismemorandum, I forward that recommendation to COMSUBPAC forfurther action as he deems The Court's recommendation that Lieutenant CommanderDavid Werner, Navy, be admonished for improper oversightand supervision of COMSUBPAC's Distinguished Visitor Embarkation(DVE) program is disapproved.

5 As the Court noted in CourtOpinion 71, Navy guidance on embarkation of civilians is"internally inconsistent and conflicting." In CourtRecommendations 14, 15, and 16, the Court suggested that thechain of command review policy and issue new guidance that isinternally consistent, clear and more specific. In such a case,it is incumbent upon leadership to provide appropriate directionregarding the proper management and implementation of thisextremely valuable Public Affairs program. Furthermore, inCourt Opinion 72, the Court indicated it was not unreasonable toput the GREENEVILLE to sea under the particular circumstances ofthe 9 February I note the Court's recommendation that Fire ControlTechnician First Class(SS) Patrick Seacrest, Navy, be takento Captain's Mast by Commanding Officer, USS GREENEVILLE forviolation of Article 92, UCMJ (Dereliction in the Performance ofDuties) for failing to maintain a contact evaluation plot and byfailing to report a closing sonar contact (EHIME MARU) within4000 yards of USS GREENEVILLE in accordance with standingorders.

6 By copy of this MEMORANDUM I forward thisrecommendation to COMSUBPAC for further action as he I specifically concur with the Court's opinion thatCommander Waddle's disregard of his own standing orders andguidance provided by Naval Warfare Publications was a cause ofthe collision. The Commanding Officer's departure from standardoperating procedure led to an inadequate target motion analysissolution and an insufficient periscope search prior toSubj: COURT OF INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THECOLLISION BETWEEN USS GREENEVILLE (SSN 772) AND JAPANESEM/V EHIME MARU THAT OCCURRED OFF THE COAST OF OAHU,HAWAII ON 9 FEBRUARY 20014surfacing. In addition, his failure to follow his ownestablished guidelines resulted in deficient watchbillassignments with the outcome of an unqualified Sonarman standingwatch without proper oversight. It is my belief that on 9 February, operational standards on board USS GREENEVILLE,starting with the Commanding Officer and permeating throughoutthe crew, were relaxed and casual.

7 Conformance with properprocedure would certainly have enhanced contact management,improved the quality of the periscope and acoustic searches, andcould have prevented this tragic I also concur with the Court's opinion that the collisionwas caused by Commander Waddle's perceived desire to hurry theevolutions in the afternoon to prevent a late arrival at the"Papa Hotel" entrance to Pearl The Commanding Officer directed Lieutenant (JuniorGrade) Coen, the Officer of the Deck, "to be at periscope depth(P/D) in five minutes", in violation of his own standing orderto take at least eight minutes to properly come to P/D. Thisled to an unsatisfactory target motion analysis leg, ultimatelyresulting in unreliable sonar data. This sense of urgencyplayed a significant part in the contact management team'sfailure to develop an accurate sonar picture on the surfacewithout properly identifying that EHIME MARU was on a collisioncourse with USS The haste of operations shortly before the collisionaffected communications between the Commanding Officer, Officerof the Deck, and watchstanders in the control room.

8 The contactmanagement team never passed valuable information regarding thecontact situation on the surface to either the CommandingOfficer or the Officer of the Deck. By effectively taking theConn from the Officer of the Deck, Commander Waddle relegatedhis chief watchstander to a passive role on the deck. The FireControl Technician of the Watch, unaware that the CommandingOfficer had an inaccurate contact picture, also failed to passvital information regarding a closing surface contact within4000 yards of the ship, that might have prevented the In addition, Commander Waddle's order resulted in theOfficer of the Deck failing to conduct a standard periscopebrief with his watchstanders and led to a curtailed periscopesearch, by the Commanding Officer and Officer of the Deck, ofthe surface once the ship came to : COURT OF INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THECOLLISION BETWEEN USS GREENEVILLE (SSN 772) AND JAPANESEM/V EHIME MARU THAT OCCURRED OFF THE COAST OF OAHU,HAWAII ON 9 FEBRUARY 200157.

9 I specifically do not concur with the Court's Opinion 30 is modified to read: "On 9 February, GREENEVILLE wasfully trained and prepared to perform her assigned mission forthat day's evolutions. Her training had been documented and herperformance recently observed by the SUBPAC Deputy Chief ofStaff for Logistics and Maintenance, the Squadron's Engineer,and the SUBPAC Combat Systems Training Team during EASTPAC inJanuary 2001. USS GREENEVILLE's state of training wassatisfactory on 9 February and in accordance with her expectedstate of readiness at this stage of her pre-deploymenttraining." (FF 22-29, 33)8. The Court's Recommendation 26 essentially calls for improvedand clearer internal communications within the Pacific submarineforce with regard to succession to command in the absence of theCommander. In this case, COMSUBPAC staff officers were unawareof the actual succession to command by Captain Kyle. I concurwith the basic point of that recommendation and direct COMSUBPACto ensure command procedures clearly notify the Force wheneverthere is a COMSUBPAC succession to command under I note the Court's opinion that Captain Brandhubermaintained poor oversight of COMSUBPAC's Distinguished VisitorEmbarkation (DVE) program.

10 The Court opined that he failed toensure that submarines embarking civilians were primarilyscheduled to get underway for training purposes and did notprovide adequate guidance to his Public Affairs Office regardingproper criteria for scheduling civilian embarks for units thatdid not otherwise require specific at-sea training. I find,however, the "internally inconsistent and confusing" Navyguidance regarding civilian embarks to be a mitigating factor inthis I concur that Captain Brandhuber should have counseledCommander Waddle about the propriety of taking his submarine toa classified test depth and flank speed with civilians on addition, I believe he should have questioned the CommandingOfficer when he believed that preparations for going toperiscope depth were proceeding too quickly. As an embarked,experienced senior officer, Captain Brandhuber was in a positionto have played a more forceful role on board : COURT OF INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THECOLLISION BETWEEN USS GREENEVILLE (SSN 772) AND JAPANESEM/V EHIME MARU THAT OCCURRED OFF THE COAST OF OAHU,HAWAII ON 9 FEBRUARY 2001611.