Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction: Third Edition

1 MetaphysicsA Contemporary introductionThird editionMichael J. LouxContentsPrefacexPreface to second editionxiiPreface to Third editionxiiiIntroduction1 Overview1 The nature of metaphysics some historical reflections2 Metaphysics as category theory10 Notes16 Further reading161 The problem of universals I: metaphysical realism17 Overview17 Realism and nominalism18 The ontology of metaphysical realism19 Realism and predication21 Realism and abstract reference26 Restrictions on realism exemplification30 Further restrictions defined and undefined predicates36 Are there any unexemplified attributes?40 Notes43 Further reading452 The problem of universals II: nominalism46 Overview46 The motivation for nominalism46 Austere nominalism52 Metalinguistic nominalism62 Trope theory71 Fictionalism79 Notes82 Further reading833 Concrete particulars I.

2 Substrata, bundles, andsubstances84 Overview84 Substratum and bundle theories85An objection to the bundle theory subject-predicate discourse92 Another objection to the bundle theory the Identity ofIndiscernibles97An argument for the substratum theory101 Problems for the substratum theory104 Aristotelian substances107 Notes117 Further reading1204 Propositions and their neighbors121 Overview121 The traditional theory of propositions121 Nominalism about propositions130 Facts, states of affairs, and events142 Notes150 Further reading1525 The necessary and the possible153 Overview153 Problems about modality154 Possible worlds158 Possible worlds nominalism162 The metaphysics of possible worlds nominalism David Lewis166 Actualism and possible worlds Alvin Plantinga173 Notes184 Further reading1856 Causation187 Overview187 Hume s account of causation187 The response to Hume192 Neo-Humean approaches195 Notes203 Further reading2047 The nature of time205 Overview205 McTaggart s argument205 The B-theory212 The A-theory217 The new B-theory224 Notes228 Further reading2298 Concrete particulars II.

3 Persistence through time230 Overview230 Two theories of persistence endurantism and perdurantism230 Persistence and the nature of time234viii ContentsThe ontology of perdurantism238An argument for perdurantism change in properties242A second argument for perdurantism change in parts247 Notes256 Further reading2589 The challenge of anti-Realism259 Overview259 Two views about the nature of reality259 Dummett s anti-Realist265 The inscrutability of reference272 Putnam s anti-Realism279 Realism or anti-Realism?284 Notes293 Further reading295 Bibliography296 Index303 Contents ixPrefaceMetaphysics is a discipline with a long history; and over the course of thathistory, the discipline has been conceived in different ways.

4 These differentconceptions associate different methodologies and even different subject mat-ters with the discipline; and anyone seeking to write an introductory text onmetaphysics must choose from among these different conceptions. For reasonsI try to make clear in the introduction , I have chosen to follow a very oldtradition (one that can be traced back to Aristotle) that interprets metaphys-ics as the attempt to provide an account of being qua being. On this concep-tion, metaphysics is the most general of all the disciplines; its aim is toidentify the nature and structure of all that there is. Central to this project isthe delineation of the categories of being. Categories are the most general orhighest kinds under which anything that exists falls.

5 On this conception ofmetaphysics, what the metaphysician is supposed to do is to identify therelevant kinds, to specify the characteristics or categorial features peculiar toeach, and to indicate the ways those very general kinds are related to eachother. It turns out, however, that metaphysicians have disagreed about thecategorial structure of reality. They have disagreed about the categories themetaphysician ought to recognize; and even where they have agreed aboutthe categories to be included in our metaphysical theory, they have disagreedabout the characteristics associated with those categories and about the rela-tions of priority that tie the various categories together.

6 These disagreementshave given rise to debates that lie at the very core of the philosophicalenterprise; those debates are the focus of this the first two chapters, we examine one of the oldest and most funda-mental of the debates over categories, the debate over the existence and natureof universals. Here, the central question is whether our metaphysical theorymust include among its basic categories things which can be common to orshared by numerically different objects. In Chapter One, we examine theviews of those (called metaphysical realists ) who answer the questionaffirmatively, and in Chapter Two, we consider the accounts provided bythose (called nominalists ) who defend a negative answer to the question.

7 InChapter Three, we turn to an examination of the nature and structure offamiliar concrete particulars. Again, the question is whether the objects inquestion constitute a basic or irreducible metaphysical category. In ChapterFour, we examine debates about the existence and nature of a family ofcomplex entities. The emphasis here is on what philosophers have called propositions, but we also consider debates over what appear to be thingsfrom other categories facts, states of affairs, and events. Next, we considerone feature of propositions, the fact that they can be said to be possible,necessary, impossible, or contingent, the fact that they are subject to what arecalled the modalities.

8 This feature of propositions has been the focus ofmuch recent work in metaphysics. A central theme in this work has been theclaim that the concept of a possible world enables us to shed light on thenature of modality. In Chapter Five, we discuss the different accounts recentmetaphysicians have given of the concept of a possible world and the waysthese accounts have figured in their theories of modality. In the final chapter,we return to the notion of familiar concrete particulars. Here, we focus on thetemporality of familiar objects. Ordinary objects are things that persistthrough time; the interesting metaphysical question here is how we are tounderstand this feature of ordinary objects.

9 In Chapter Six, we consider twoopposing accounts of temporal persistence and explore the relationshipbetween metaphysical accounts of the nature of time and metaphysicalaccounts of the nature and structure of temporal topics considered in this book represent only a selection from theissues that prove central when philosophers attempt to identify the categoriesof being. They are, however, all important issues. Hopefully, our discussion ofthese topics will give the reader a good sense of what metaphysics understoodas category theory want to thank the students in various metaphysics classes at Notre Dameon whom I tried out this book. I want to thank as well Trenton Merricks andMichael Rea, who read sections of the book and gave helpful Jackson and Jonathan Lowe, who read the book for Routledge, savedme from a number of mistakes.

10 I owe them my gratitude. Most of all, I wantto thank Marian David and Dean Zimmerman who gave me line-by-linecriticism of an early draft of the manuscript. I am fortunate to have colleaguesas talented and generous as they. Thanks, finally, to Margaret Jasiewicz whoseskills so artfully conceal my computer xiPreface to second editionThis Edition involves modest revisions in the text of the original Edition , andthere is an expanded bibliography; but the most important change is theaddition of a new chapter on the debate between Realists and chapter takes the notion of truth as its focus. I approach the issue bylaying out the central themes in a traditional view about the relationshipbetween thought/language and the world.