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1 AD-A279 709 ONNAVAL WAR COLLEGEN ewport, R. : PLANNING FOR OPERATIONAL FAILUREby DLf nlJOHN D. SN IVELYIA,2 Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy GA paper submitted to the Faculty of the NAVAL War COLLEGE inpartial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and arenot necessarily endorsed by the NAVAL War COLLEGE or the Departmentof the March 1994 Paper directed byH. Ward ClarkCaptain, NavyChairman, Department of Military OperationsMilan Vego Date .Professor, Operations DepartmentFaculty Research Advisor94-1535494 IC Q 2 JU94~2o130 UNCLASSIFIEDSECU EY1N" I" O THIS PAGE_REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Fo m Appoved!a REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION lb. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGSUNCLASSIFIED2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY 3.

2 DISTRIBUTION IAVAILABILITY OF REPORTDISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR2b. DECLASSIFICATION IDOWNGRADING SCHEDULE DISTRIBUTION IS RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) S. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 6b OFFICE SYMBOL 7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORCANIZATION(if applicable)OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT C6c. ADDRESS (City, State. and ZIP Code) 7b. ADDRESS(City, State, and ZIP Code) NAVAL WAR COLLEGENEWPORT, RI 02841ea. NAME OF FUNDING ISPONSORING 8b. OFFICE SYMBOL 9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT iDEN1 IFICATION NUMBERORGANIZATION (if applicable)Bc. ADDRESS (City, State. and ZIP Code) 10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERSPROGRAM PROJECT TASK UNITELEMENT NO NO NO I-CCESSION NO11. TITLE (Include Security Classification)BARBAROSSA: PLANNING TOR OPERATIONAL FAILURE (U)12.

3 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)LIEUTENANT COMMANDER JOHN D. SNIVELY13a. TYPE OF REPORT 13b TIMJE COVERED It. DATE OF REPOt (Year. Monh, Day) PAGE COU;.TFINAL FROM TO 1 QQ_ 3 -516 E--PFMETARY paper submitted to the Facult of' the NAVAL War COLLEGE in partialsatsa ictlon of-the requirements of the Department o Operations. The contents of thispaper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NAVAL or the Department of the COSATI CODES 18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block numbnr)FIELD GROUP SUB-OUP Operation Barbarossa; World War II19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse it necessary and identify by block number)The German planning process for the 1941 invasion of Soviet Russiais analyzedthrough the presentation of the major plans developedfrom 1940 until June 1941.

4 The final plan is then critiqued withinthe context of the applicable principles of war. A set of conclusio sis presented which argues that the planning process was faulty dueto a number of assumptions which were generally held by theofficers who were involved in the DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT 21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATIONINUNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED 0 SAME AS RPT. D OTIC USERS unclassified22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL 22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) ?2c OFFICE SYMBOLCHAIRMAN, OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT (401) 841-3414 CDD Form 1473, JUN 86 Previous editions are obsolete. SECURITY CLASSIFICATiON OF THIS jL'j_S/N 0102-LF-014-6603 Abstract ofBARBAROSSA: PLANNING FOR OPERATIONAL FAILUREThe German planning process for the 1941 Invasion of Soviet Russia Isanalyzed through the presentation of the major plans developed from July1940 until June 1941.

5 The final plan Is then critiqued within the contextof the applicable Principles of War, The planning process wascharacterized by significant disagreements between Hitler, the GermanHigh Command and the Army High Command. The major points ofcontention relate to the selection of primary objectives and forcedeployment patterns. A set of conclusions Is presented which argues thatthe planning process was faulty due to a number of assumptions whichwere generally held by the officers who were involved in the ForNTIS CRAMIDTIC TABU nannouncedJustification ..By ..Distribution IAvailability CodesAvail and I orDist Speciali iiPREFACEIt Is essential for students of operational art to examine the planningprocess of Operation Barbarossa. The lessons involved have not lost theirrelevancy through the years.

6 Although the literature varies on why theGermans failed to achieve their goals, there is a general consensusregarding the incorrect assumptions held by the planners as theyprogressed through the reader should be aware that not all of the Principles of War arediscussed during the critique portion of the study. Only the most relevantprinciples are discussed In order to provide proper analysis. The campaignplanners utilized a number of these principles to their benefit, and othersthey chose to ignore (or so it seems).It should also be pointed out that scholars disagree on the exactpersonal interactions which took place during the planning and executionphases of the campaign. It is at times difficult to ascertain how muchinfluence a particular actor had upon Hitler during the process.

7 There isalso disagreement on the motives which resulted in Hitler deciding tocarry out the invasion. Explanations include racism and economicmotivations. Whatever the reasons were, the decision to invade SovietRussia In 1941, initiated a sequence of events which finally resulted inthe destruction of the Third OF CONTENTSCHAPTER PAGEABSTRACT ..1 PREFACE ..liiLIST OF FIGURES IN APPENDIX I .. VI IN T R O D U C T IO N .. III HITLER'S STRATEGIC CHOICES .. 3 III PLANNING THE BARBAROSSA CAMPAIGN .. 6 The Marcks' Plan .. 8 The Lossberg Study .. 9 The Paulus Study .. 10 The Halder Plan .. 11 Order 21: Directive Barbarossa .. 12 The Final Plan .. 13IV BARBAROSSA, REALITY, AND PRINCIPLES OF WAR .. 16V CONCLUSIONS: FALSE ASSUMPTIONS .. 22 APPENDIX I--FIGURES .. 25VI ENDNOTES.

8 32 VII BIBLIOGRAPHY .. 34Iv* hLIST OF FIGURES IN APPENDIX IF I GURE PAGEI GERMAN COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS .. 262 THE MARCKS' PLAN .. 273 THE LOSSBERG STUDY .. 284 THE HALDER PLAN .. 295 DIRECTIVE BARBAROSSA .. 306 THE EXECUTION OF BARBAROSSA .. 31 VBARBAROSSA: PLANNING FOR OPERATIONAL FAILURECHAPTER IINTRODUCTIONThe 1941 German Invasion of the Soviet Union was a militaryundertaking of immense proportions. Perhaps the greatest assembly ofmen, machines and supplies for a singular purpose that the world had everseen. The elaborate and detailed planning process, which was required forsuch a massive operation, was characterized by both Intense military anddiplomatic there can be no question that Hitler was aware of the historicaldangers of Involving Germany in a two front war, his confidence of certainvictory against the Soviets Is well documented: "We have only to kick inthe front door," he once exclaimed," and the whole rotten Russian edificewill come tumbling downl" <1> Hitler's confidence was based upon anumber of observations and perceptions.

9 The German army had experiencedspectacular successes against Poland and France. Blitzkrieg warfare hadproven to be effective In each Instance, and there was no reason to doubtthat an offensive against Soviet Russia would not yield the same addition, Hitler took into account the purges of the Soviet militaryleadership during the late 1930s, and the poor performance of Russiantroops during their war with Finland from 1939-1940. These factors,I I i i i Iwhen combined with the exceedingly poor German net assessment ofSoviet strength and fighting capability, led Hitler to believe that successcould most certainly be accomplished in a short time. It was under theseperceived circumstances, that Hitler directed the planning for the invasionof Soviet Russia in the summer of purpose of this study is to examine the planning phases ofOperation Barbarossa from July 1940 until the campaign was begun In June1941.

10 The planning process will then be analyzed within the framework ofa number of the Principles of War. A set of conclusions will then bepresented which will emphasize the reasons for the failure of the planningprocess.(n a general sense, it can be maintained that the failure of thiscampaign was the result of the misapplication of operational art duringthe planning phase, and later during the execution phase of the is also the story of conflict, disagreement and struggles forpower Inside the military leadership circles of the Third Reich. It isImportant to understand that the option to invade Soviet Russia was notthe only one available to Hitler during 1940. The strategic background, anda brief discussion of these options shall first be IIHITLER'S STRATEGIC CHOICESBy the summer of 1940, Nazi Germany was clearly In a dominantposition vis a vis the European continent.)