Please note - Quo Jure

1 1234567891011121314151617181920212223242 52627281 POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ENFORCE settlement AGREEMENTP lease note:This sample document is redacted from an actual research and writing project we did for a customer some time ago. It reflects the law as of the date we completed it. Because the law may have changed since that time, Please use itsolely to evaluate the scope and quality of our you have questions or comments, Please contact Jim Schenkel at 415-553-4000, or email COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIACOUNTY OF OAKLEAFURSULA JONES,Plaintiff, JONES, JONES,Cross-Complainant, JONES, No. 12345 POINTS & AUTHORITIES INSUPPORT OF MOTION TO ENFORCESETTLEMENT agreement (CCP )Date:Time: Dept: Complaint filed:Trial date:12345678910111213141516171819202122 232425262728iiPOINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ENFORCE settlement AGREEMENTTABLE OF 1 ARGUMENT.

2 Court has the power to enforce settlement agreements under thesummary procedure set forth in Code of Civil Procedure Jones may properly invoke the procedure set forth in Code of CivilProcedure to enforce the terms of the Stock Purchase agreement , asorally modified by the parties.. of the oral modification of the Stock Purchase Agreementunder is proper because Ursula Jones signed an agreementincorporating all material terms of the March 1, 2001 closing date was not a material term of the settlementbecause of the scheduled trial date of June 1, doctrine of equitable estoppel bars Ursula from defending against theoral extension agreement on the ground that she did not sign the party cannot deny an oral modification to a written agreement if, byrepresentations or conduct, she led the other party to rely on its validity toher detriment.

3 The December 2000 status conference, the parties reached an enforceableoral agreement .. court should exercise its equitable power under Civil Code 128 torequest that the Presiding Judge assign the hearing of Agnes s to Commissioner White.. 12 CONCLUSION .. 1312345678910111213141516171819202122232 425262728iiiPOINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ENFORCE settlement AGREEMENTTABLE OF AUTHORITIESCASESA ccount Management Associates v. Sanglimsuwan (2001) 91 773 .. 3, 5, 6 Campbell v. Scripps Bank (2000) 78 8 Cottle v. Superior Court (1992) 3 12 Datatronic Systems Corp. v. Speron, Inc. (1986) 176 3In re Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7 3, 5 Kirby v. Southern Cal. Edison (2000) 78 2 Kohn v. Jaymar Ruby, Inc. (1994) 23 3, 12 Levy v. Superior Court (1995) 10 4-7 Pacific Grove-Asilomar Operating Corp.

4 V. Monterey (1974) 43 10 San Diego Mutual Credit Union v. Smith (1986) 176 8 Sutherland v. Barclays/American Mortgage Co. (1997) 53 7 Wagner v. Glendale Adventist Medical Center (1989) 216 8 Weddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 3, 10 STATUTESC ivil Code 10 Civil Code 7, 10 Civil Code 1698(c), (d).. 7 Code of Civil Procedure 12 Code of Civil Procedure 1-5, 7, 12 Evidence Code 623 .. 8, 1012345678910111213141516171819202122232 4252627281 POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ENFORCE settlement AGREEMENTINTRODUCTIONT hrough this motion, Agnes Jones seeks to enforce an oral agreement the partiesmade to extend the closing date of their written settlement agreement at a December 18,2000 status conference presided over by Commissioner John White.

5 Agnes Jones cross-complained in this action for, among other claims, her sister Ursula Jones s breach of acontract to convey ownership of the family business, Soeur Software. After eight pretrialconferences and several continuances of the trial date, on November 21, 2000, Agnes andUrsula Jones entered into a written settlement agreement under which Agnes would buyUrsula s stock in Soeur Software. At the status conference, the parties orally agreed to extend the closing date set inthe Stock Purchase agreement to allow Agnes to complete financing arrangementsnecessary to effect the purchase, and to continue the trial on Agnes s cross-complaint. Afull statement of the relevant facts, including the subsequent discussions between theparties, appears in the attached declarations of John Lee and Agnes Jones.

6 Just two days before the original closing date, on January 29, 2001, Ursula Jonesindicated for the first time that she did not view the oral extension to the settlementagreement as binding, and she ultimately refused to sign the writing memorializing thatoral agreement . Nevertheless, in reliance on Ursula s repeated representations throughher counsel that she would abide by the new, extended closing terms, Agnes investedsome $30,000 to finalize the financing commitments necessary for the stock set forth in detail below, the parties reached a valid oral modification to theirsettlement agreement at the December status conference. Even though the StockPurchase agreement s terms call for all modifications to appear in writing, the doctrine ofequitable estoppel bars Ursula from defending against enforcement of the oral modifica-tion on that basis.

7 Additionally, enforcement of the oral modification is proper underCode of Civil Procedure even though Ursula did not personally attend theDecember status conference because the parties included all the material terms of their12345678910111213141516171819202122 2324252627282 POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ENFORCE settlement agreement settlement in a writing. The facts surrounding this settlement agreement demonstrate thatthe closing date was not a material term, but was set for March 1, 2001, because of thescheduled trial date. Agnes agreed to continue the trial date as consideration for theadditional time to finalize the financing, based on the oral agreement . Ursula obtained theadvantage of the trial continuance, and thus must be deemed to have waived the right torely on the original closing , Agnes requests that, if possible, Commissioner White be assigned topreside over the hearing on this motion.

8 He witnessed the parties make the oralagreement, and is therefore in a unique position to ascertain its validity and terms. Hispresiding over the hearing of the motion would expedite the proceedings andserve the interests of court has the power to enforce settlement agreements under thesummary procedure set forth in Code of Civil Procedure the parties to pending litigation stipulate, in a writing they signed outside thecourt or orally before the court, for settlement of the case or any part of it, the court mayentertain a motion to enter judgment under the settlement agreement s terms. Code Section provides a summary procedure by which the trial court canspecifically enforce an agreement settling pending litigation without the need of a secondlawsuit.

9 Kirby v. Southern Cal. Edison (2000) 78 840, 843. On its face, appears to provide a vehicle by which parties who have settled their litigationmay move by stipulation to have judgment entered according to the settlement s statute does not particularly discuss an adversary proceeding. Nevertheless,sometimes parties appear to have reached on oral agreement at a judicially supervisedsettlement conference but then are later unable to reduce that agreement to writing,perhaps because one party is attempting to renege on the settlement . See, ,123456789101112131415161718192021222324 252627283 POINTS & AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ENFORCE settlement AGREEMENTW eddington Productions, Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 793, 796. In such a case, a motion is often brought by a party who wants to enforce the settlement against aparty who later claims there had been no meeting of the minds sufficient to create acontract.

10 See, , Datatronic Systems Corp. v. Speron, Inc. (1986) 176 , contrast with a motion for summary judgment, judgment under a motionmay be proper even if there are disputed facts regarding a settlement , provided the partieshad earlier agreed on the agreement s material terms, or had a meeting of the minds soas to make the settlement binding. See In re Marriage of Assemi (1994) 7 896,905. In determining whether the parties entered into a binding settlement , the trial courtshould consider: whether the parties explicitly defined the material terms; whether thesupervising judicial officer questioned the parties regarding their understanding of theterms; and whether the parties expressly acknowledged their understanding of, andagreement to be bound by, those terms.