The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s - Harvard University

1 THEUNITEDSTATENAVALWARCOLLEGEVIRAIBUS MRI VICTORIAS19 The Evolution of the Navy sMaritime Strategy, 1977 1986 19 John B. Hattendorf, D. WAR college newport PAPERSNAVAL WAR college newport PAPERSC overThis perspective aerial view of newport ,Rhode Island, drawn and published byGalt & Hoy of New York, circa 1878, isfound in the American Memory OnlineMap Collections: 1500 2003, of theLibrary of Congress Geography and MapDivision, Washington, The mapmay be viewed at Evolution of the Navy sMaritime Strategy, 1977 1986 John B. Hattendorf, D. J. King Professor of Maritime HistoryNaval War CollegeNAVAL WAR COLLEGE686 Cushing RoadNewport, RI 02841-1207 naval War CollegeNewport, Rhode IslandCenter for naval Warfare StudiesNewport Paper Number Nineteen2004 President, naval War CollegeRear Admiral Ronald A. Route, NavyProvost, naval War CollegeProfessor James F.

2 Giblin, of naval Warfare StudiesProfessor Alberto R. CollNaval War college PressEditor:Professor Catherine McArdle KelleherManaging Editor:Pelham G. BoyerAssociate Editor:Patricia A. GoodrichTelephone: : exchange: 948E-mail: in the United States of AmericaThe newport Papers are extended research projects that theNaval War college Press Editor, the Dean of naval WarfareStudies, and the President of the naval War Collegeconsider of particular interest to policy makers, scholars,and views expressed here are those of the author(s) and donot necessarily reflect those of the naval War college , theDepartment of the Navy, or the Department of concerning The newport Papers may beaddressed to the Dean of naval Warfare Studies. To requestadditional copies or subscription consideration, please directinquiries to the President, Code 32A, naval War college ,686 Cushing Road, newport , RI A.

3 Goodrich, Associate Editor, naval War CollegePress, edits and prepares The newport 1544-6824 ISBN 1-884733-32-8 ContentsForeword vGeneral Preface viiTHE Evolution OF THE NAVY S MARITIME STRATEGY, 1977 1986 xiPreface to the First Edition xiiiIntroduction 1 CHAPTER ONE The Evolution of naval Thinkingin the 1970s 3 CHAPTER TWO Thinking About the Soviet Navy,1967 1981 23 CHAPTER THREE From the CNO s Strategic Conceptsto the Work of the SSG, 1978 1986 37 CHAPTER FOUR The Work of the Strategic ConceptsBranch, (OP-603) 1982 1986 65 CHAPTER FIVE Further Developments, 1984 1986 83 Notes 93 APPENDIX I: SOVIET naval STRATEGY AND PROGRAMSTHROUGH THE 1990sCentral Intelligence AgencyNational Intelligence Estimate 11-15-82/D.

4 March 1983 101 Notes 183 APPENDIX II: THE MARITIME STRATEGY DEBATESA Bibliographic Guide to the Renaissance of NavalStrategic Thinking in the 1980sPeter M. Swartz 185 Notes 188 APPENDIX III: TIME LINEThe Evolution of the Navy s Maritime Strategyin the Context of Major Political and Military Eventsof the Cold War, 1964 1991 Yuri M. Zhukov 279 Index 305 About the Authors 331 Titles in the Series 333 ForewordOur pleasure in publishing John Hattendorf s newport Paper on maritime strategyarises from several sources.

5 The naval War college Press is pleased to republish andmake more broadly available an essay that had become a standard reference work forthose few fortunate enough to be both cleared for and fascinated by the Evolution ofpostwar American strategy. This edition reproduces the Hattendorf analysis as it wasfirst presented and published in 1989. The new elements the now declassified NIE,the comprehensive updating by Peter Swartz of his earlier bibliographies, and the selec-tive time line created by Yuri Zhukov under Hattendorf s direction only enhanceHattendorf s original analytic more important are the links between this essay and the Press s broader commit-ment to publishing and supporting the best work in maritime history. We have devel-oped a notable series of naval biographies, most recently a splendid volume of AdmiralH. Kent Hewitt s memoirs, edited by Evelyn Cherpak.

6 We look forward to working withthe materials developed by the project on the Cold War at Sea, a comprehensive effortled by John Hattendorf and Lyle Goldstein, with collaboration between the naval WarCollege, the Watson Institute of Brown University , and the Saratoga Foundation. Wealso hope for further historical efforts mounted by the new NWC Maritime appreciate the support we have received in declassifying the Hattendorf essay andobtaining the NIE from Peter Swartz and David Rosenberg, as well as the expert assis-tance of Ms. Jo-Ann Parks (JIL Information Systems) in the finalization of the manu-script. We express special appreciation also to Ms. Patricia Goodrich, guiding editor ofthe newport Papers throughout much of the last decade, for this, her last most important for the Press itself and for our readers, this essay sharpens ourown sense of history.

7 It recounts a fascinating story and also reflects the significant rolethat the naval War college , the Strategic Studies Group, and individual leaders, pastand present, played in this critical period of strategy making. It is rare to have as au-thoritative an account of the difficult, complex process of strategy making as thatwhich Hattendorf produced within a very short time after the events themselves. Muchhas changed in the international context since then; but the fundamental tasks ofconceptualization, assessment of ends and means, and focused implementation ofstrategy remain the challenges for all those who wish to secure their nation s safety andsecurity. This essay provides a valuable guide to this critical MCARDLE KELLEHERE ditor, naval War college PressApril 2004 General PrefaceTo understand a series of events in the past, one needs to do more than just know a setof detailed and isolated facts.

8 Historical understanding is a process to work out the bestway to generalize accurately about something that has happened. It is an ongoing andnever-ending discussion about what events mean, why they took place the way theydid, and how and to what extent that past experience affects our present or provides auseful example for our general appreciation of our development over time. Historicalunderstanding is an examination that involves attaching specifics to wide trends andbroad ideas. In this, individual actors in history can be surprised to find that their ac-tions involve trends and issues that they were not thinking about at the time they wereinvolved in a past action as well as those that they do recognize and were thinkingabout at the time. It is the historian s job to look beyond specifics to see context and tomake connections with trends that are not otherwise process of moving from recorded facts to a general understanding can be a longone.

9 For events that take place within a government agency, such as the Navy, theprocess can not even begin until the information and key documents become publicknowledge and can be disseminated widely enough to bring different viewpoints andwider perspectives to bear upon volume is published to help begin that process of wider historical understanding andgeneralization for the subject of strategic thinking in the Navy during the last phases ofthe Cold War. To facilitate this beginning, we offer here the now-declassified, full andoriginal version of the official study that I undertook in 1986 1989, supplemented by threeappendices. The study attempted to record the trends and ideas that we could see at thetime, written on the basis of interviews with a range of the key individuals involved and onthe working documents that were then still located in their original office locations, someof which have not survived or were not permanently retained in archival files.

10 We publish ithere as a document, as it was written, without attempting to bring it up to supplement this original study, we have appended the declassified version of theCentral Intelligence Agency s National Intelligence Estimate of March 1982, which wasa key analysis in understanding the Soviet Navy, provided a generally accepted consen-sus of American understanding at the time, and provided a basis around which to de-velop the Navy s maritime strategy in this period. A second appendix is by CaptainPeter Swartz, Navy (Ret.), and consists of his annotated bibliography of the publicdebate surrounding the formulation of the strategy in the 1980s, updated to includematerials published through the end of 2003. And finally, Yuri M. Zhukov has createdespecially for this volume a timeline that lays out a chronology of events to better un-derstand the sequence of events study and the three appendices are materials that contribute toward a future historicalunderstanding and do not, in themselves, constitute a definitive history, although they arepublished as valuable tools toward reaching that goal.