United States Strategic Bombing Survery: Summary Reports ...

1 THEUNITEDSTATESSTRATEGICBOMBINGSURVEYS(E uropeanWar)(PacificWar)s)t~'IEppfPgffR~~ aRCHR eprintedbyAirUniversityPressMaxwellAirFo rceBase, (Europeandthe Pacific)of , "BlueRibbon" , , ~Nim"51WC~54 TRUMANSPANGRUDL ieutenantGeneral,USAFC ommanderAirUniversity THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK THEUNITEDSTATESSTRATEGICBOMBINGSURVEYSUM MARYREPORT(EuropeanWar)September30,1945 THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK THEUNITEDSTATESSTRATEGICBOMBINGSURVEYFOR EWORDTheUnitedStatesStrategicBombingSurv eywasestablishedbytheSecretaryofWaronNov ember3,1944, theSurveywere:FranklinD'Olier, , , , ,SecretaryTheTableofOrganizationprovided for300civilians, ,citiesandareas,amassedvolumesofstatisti calanddocumentarymaterial,includingtopGe rmangovernmentdocuments;andconductedinte rviewsandinterrogationsofthousandsofGerm ans, ,whichwerefoundsometimes,butrarely,inpla ceswhere3theyoughttohavebeen;sometimesin safe-depositvaults,ofteninprivatehouses, inbarns,incaves;ononeoccasion,inahenhous eand,ontwooccasions, ,includinganOver-allReport, , ,itwasnecessary,inmanycases,tofollowclos elybehindthefront;otherwise, , three-dimensionalwarfarewaseventhen foreseenbyafewfarsightedmen, ,astagemarkedbyrapiddevelopmentinplanes, armament,equipment,tacticsandconceptsofs trategicemployment, ,Germany40percent, ,attheendofhostilitiesinEurope,weapons, , ,Alliedairpowerwascalledupontoplaymanyro les-partnerwiththeNavyoverthesealanes;pa rtnerwiththeArmyingroundbattle;partnerwi thbothontheinvasionbeaches;reconnaissanc ephotographerforall;moveroftroopsandcrit icalsupplies.

2 Andattackeroftheenemy' ,almost2,700,000tonsofbombsweredropped,m orethan1,440,000bombersortiesand2,680, numberofcombatplanesreachedapeakofsome28 ,000atthemaximum1,300, ,265 Americansand 79, ,000 Americanand22, ,3,600,000dwellingunits,approximately20% ofthetotal, ,000civilianskilledand780, ,500, , ofairpowercannotproperlybeconsidered,how ever, 'ssurvivingconfidantsand GeneralStaffandFieldGeneralsoftheWehrmac htconfirmstheviewthatpriortothewinterof1 941 HitlerhopedtorealizeGermany'sascendancyo verEurope,andpossiblytheworld, ' ,byexploitingthepoliticalandideologicals trainsthatheconceivedtoexistintherestoft heworld,andbyoverwhelmingseparatelyinlig htningcampaignssuchofhisenemiesaschoseto resist, ,inrawmaterialsandinbasicindustrialstren gth, ' ' ' ,primarily, 'sstrategy,untilthebattleofBritain,wasco mplete; ,accordingtoplan,wastobeabrieffourmonths ' ,ifnecessary, ,leavesnodoubtthatuntilthedefeatatMoscow Germanindustrywas', ; 'hefullmeaningofthereversesatMoscowbecam eapparentthe' !

3 PreviousyearshadgreatlystrengthenedGerma ny'seconomy;with,theexceptionofoilandrub ber,suppliesofvirtuallyallthe, ,theLowCountries, , ,suchincreasewasmoretheresultofimproveme ntsinindustrialefficiencythanof ,relativelyfewGermanwomen(lessthaninthef irstwar) 'searlycommitmenttothedoctrineoftheshort warwasacontinuinghandicap; 'sarmamentministerAlbertSpeer,whoassumed officeinearly1942, can ; ,ChiefofStaffofGermanHighCommand,toSurve yInterrogatorsBecausetheGermaneconomythr oughmostofthewarwassubstantiallyundermob ilized, consumers' theWehrmacht,theindustriallaborsupply,as augmentedbyforeignlabor, , ,however, theContinenttooccurinthespringof ' ,tobesure, ,theweightoftheRAFeffort,comparedwithton nageslateremployed,wasverysmall-16,000to nsin1940and46,000tonsin1941comparedwith6 76, ,replacementsforthenew(andstillsmall) ,targetselectionfortheEighthAirForceandt he FifteenthAirForce(basedontheMediterranea n) 1944,allairforcesbasedonEnglandwereusedt opreparethewayfor intendedthattheairattacksagainstGermanyp roperandtheGermaneconomywouldbea subordinateoperation,butratherapartof ,itattemptedtofindandattacksuchtargetsas oil, abandoned;withavailabletechniquesitwasno tpossibleto ,1942,itmounteditsfirst"thousandplane" ,000to100.

4 DocumentsshowthatGermanofficialswerethor oughlyalarmedandthereissomeindicationfro minterrogationofhighofficialsthatHitlerh imselfthoughtthatfurtherattacksofsimilar w~.ightmightforceGermanyout , , thefirsttimeorallytotheFuehrerthatifthes eserialattackscontinued,a ,aidedbynewnavigationaltechniques, ,did itselfisnotconclusive, , ,thetonnagedroppedoncityareas,plusspill- oversfromattacksontransportationandother specifictargets, ,Germany'ssteelindustrywasknockedout, thecollapseofproductionduringthisperiod, however, ,however, reactionof , , "blackradio"listening,tocirculationofrum orandfactinoppositiontotheRegime; ofthewar,theywouldhavedoneso well adeterminedpolicestate,however,thereis , ,dissatisfiedtheywerewiththewar, actualoccupationofGermanyitself, ;conceivablythatlesson,bothinGermanyanda broad, ,theFuehrerandmyself,of course,showedtothe outsideworldahappyface, ,andthey believedthatif12thesetargetsweretobehita ccurately, , highdegreeofprecisioninbombingundertarge trangeconditions,thusleadingtotheexpress ions"pinpoint"and"picklebarrel" , ;targetobscurationbyclouds,gof,smokescre ensandindustrialhaze.

5 Enemyfighteroppositionwhichnecessitatedd efensivebombingformations,thusrestrictin gfreedomofmaneuver;antiaircraftartillery defenses,demandingminimumtimeexposureoft heattackingforceinordertokeeplossesdown; andfinally, ,orbuilt-upareas, , ,themajorportionofbombingoperationsoverG ermanyhadtobeconductedunderweatherandbat tleconditionsthatrestrictedbombingtechni que, "thetargetarea" ,Surveystudiesshowthat,intheover-all,onl yabout20% thereadertokeepinmind, ,1942,withthebombingofmarshallingyardsat RouenandSottevilleinnorthernFrance, , ,atCasablanca,the objectiveofthestrategicairforceswasestab lishedasthe"destructionanddislocationoft heGermanMilitary,industrial,andeconomics ystemandtheunderminingofthemoraleoftheGe rmanpeopletothepointwheretheircapacityfo rarmedresistanceisfatallyweakened." 1943, ,includingAdmiralDoenitz, , ,thesupplierofan importantcomponent, , ,1943,about12,000tonsofbombsweredroppedo nthistarget-aboutone-halfofonepercent B-17'sonSchweinfurt,the (andsupplementedandcheckedbyinterrogatio n)showthatproductionofbearingsatthiscent erwasreducedsharply-Septemberproductionw as35%of ,1943,whentheplantswereagainseverelydama ged, another138damagedinvaryingdegree.

6 Deeppenetrationswithoutescort,ofwhichthi swasamongtheearliest, Germansmadegooduse , ,thereisnoevidencethattheattacksonthebal l-bearingindustryhadany ,heavilygunnedandflyinginwelldesignedfor mations, ,sofaras a smallforcewasconcerned, , ,theP-51(Mustang) ,insomerespectsthemostimportantadditiont oalliedairpowerduringtheEuropeanwar,augm entingtheP-47(Thunderbolt)escortswhichin themeantimehadmateriallyincreasedtheirra nge, , ,primarilybecauseLuftwafferequirementswe remodestin1941accordingtocapturedminutes ofGermanstaffconferences,GeneralJeschonn ek,thenchiefoftheair staff,opposedasuggestedincreaseinfighter planeproductionwiththeremarkthathewouldn ' , ,5,092tonsweredroppedon14plants, ,Germany'sstandardsingle-enginefighter, ' ; ,3,636tonsofbombsweredroppedonGermanairc raftplants(again,airframeratherthanengin eplants) ,asfarothers,weretakenbytheSurvey,andGer manairgenerals,productionofficials,andle adingmanufacturers,includingMesserschmit tandTank(ofFocke-Wulf) contrary,duringthewholeyearof1944theGerm anairforceisreportedtohaveacceptedatotal of39,807aircraftofalltypes-comparedwith8 ,295in1939,or15,596in1942beforethe ,acceptanceswerehigherinMarch,themonthaf tertheheaviestattack,thantheywereinJanua ry, ,asnoted, , (theJaegerstaborFighter-Staff)

7 Appearstohavedoneaneffectivejob ofmobilizingunusedcapacityandundamagedma chines,reorganizinginefficientmanagement s,reducingthenumberoftypesofplanesand,mo stimportantofall, ,theJaegerstabmayhavesacrificedqualityan danadequatecomplementofspareparts, attackontheaircraftplants,liketheattacko ntheball-bearingplants, priorityforstrategicattacks-thefirsttoma rshallingyards,andbridgesinFranceinprepa rationforinvasion, attackontheaircraftplantsinthat,although productionrecoveredquickly, 'sandP-47'sandwiththeappearanceofthesepl anesinforcea , ,115 Germanfighters,inFebruary1,118andinMarch 1, 1944,andacceptancesreachedapeakof3, ,theSurveyhasnoclearansweras towhathappenedtotheseplanes;thedifferenc esofopinionbetweenGermanairgenerals,itmi ghtbeadded,areatleastasgreatbetweenthose whohavesearchedfor ,destroyedonthefields,orgroundedbecauseo f moreIhavebeenaskedaboutthesethings, ,Germanaircraftproductiondeclinedgradual lyuntilDecember,when3,155planeswereaccep ted,andinJanuary191945,becauseoftheshort ageofgasoline, ,especiallytheME-262, ,theirproductionwasdelayedbecauseofthefa ilureof ,productionofficial,andairforcegeneralin terrogatedbytheSurvey,includingGoeringhi mself, ,1, ,thoughtheymightnothavealteredthecourseo fthewar,theywouldhavesharplyincreasedthe lossesofthe ,"WhenwilltheLuftwaffearrive?

8 " -KesselringtoSurveyInterrogatorsTheAttac konOilWiththereductionofGermanairpower, ,1944,followedbyanotheronMay28;themainbl owwasnotstruck,however, , addition, , ,andtheonlysourcefor aviationgasoline,was13syntheticplantstog etherwitha , ,beginningwitha ; ,togetherwithminingoftheDanube, ,Russianoccupationeliminatedthissourceof supplyanddependenceonthesyntheticplantsb ecameevengreaterthan , ,000tonsinJuneand17, ,000tonsinAprilto30,000tonsinJulyand5, ,butfor therestoftheyearwasbut aseriesofletterstoHitler,amongdocumentss eizedbytheSurvey, ,Speerwrote:"Theenemyhassucceededinincre asingourlossesofaviationgasolineupto90pe rcentby " ofball-bearingsandaircraft,theGermanstoo kthemostenergeticstepsto ,thistimeEdmundGeilenberg, ,000menfor therepair,rebuilding, , syntheticplantsandprotectedbya ,investigationofplantrecordsandinterroga tionofLeuna' onlyforthreedays; ,September11,September13, ,LeunagotstartedagainonOctober14andaltho ughproductionwasinterruptedbyasmallraido nNovember2, (largelyineffectivebecauseofadverseweath er),productionwasbroughtupto15 percentofcapacityinJanuaryand ,productionatLeunaaveraged9percentof ,20bytheEighthAirForceand2 of production, , ,552bombersortieswereflownagainsttheplan t,18, , ,pilottraining,previously-cutdown, ,themovementofGermanPanzerDivisionsinthe fieldwashamperedmoreandmoreseriouslyasar esultoflossesincombatandmountingtranspor tationdifficulties, ,accordingtoSpeer, ,1944, this,manypanzerunitswerelostwhentheyran , ,likeotherindustrialcountries, ,beforethesyntheticplantswereattacked,wa sabout75, , ,besidesbeingindispensableforexplosives, ;allocationfor1944-45wasfirstplannedat25 agriculture,butbytheendof amixtureof.

9 Unitsmanningflakgunswereinstructednottof ireonplanesunlesstheywereattackingtheins tallationswhichthegunswerespecificallyde signatedtoprotectandunless"theyweresureo fhittingtheplanes!"It isofsomeinterestthatafewweeksbeforethecl oseofhostilitiestheGermansreallocatednit rogento ,accordingtoProductionMinisterSpeer,of anindependentdecisionofhisownthatthewarw aslostandthenextyear' ,necessaryamongotherthingsforTNT,hexogen andotherhighexplosives, , ' ,oneofwhichwasa smallpilotplant; ,locatedatHuels,wasattackedasaprimarytar getbytheEighthAirForceinJune1943andclose dforamonth; ,itoperatedongasfromsyntheticoilplantsin theRuhr;whenthesewereknockedoutinthesumm erof 1944, ,thelargestofthesyntheticrubberplants, theindustryshowthatproductionofsynthetic rubberhadbeenreducedto2, ,Germany' ,however,thattherubbershortagehadbecomea limitingfactorof ,methanol,andrubberproduction,nopartsoft heGermanchemicalindustrywereaprioritytar getof ,apartfrommasteryoftheair,wasthegreatlyi ncreasedweightofthe attackthatcouldbebroughttobear.

10 Inthesecondhalfof 1944,481,400tonsofbombsweredroppedonGerm anyascomparedwith150, ,000,000metrictonsper year ofsteelcapacity, ,000,000tonsprincipallyinLorraine, ,officialrecordsandthoseoftheindustryfor thewaryears,supplementedbyinterrogation, showthatthe40,000, ,Germanythroughoutthewarcontinuedtobepri marilydependentonSwedish, ,Germanydid ,adetailedexaminationofthecontrolmachine rytogetherwithinterrogationofofficialsin theSpeerministryanditspredecessororganiz ations,revealsthatthetroublewaspartlyani nefficientallocationsystemandpartly,inth eearlyyearsofthewarespecially, ,infact,thatithadsomeeffect;productionin theRuhrdeclinedbyapproximately10percentd uringthe attackanddid notfullyrecoverduringtheremainderof the `NewYorkTimes' , , ,570,000metrictonsinJulyto1,000, , thesteelplantsshowedthat,althoughthe attackdamagedsomeblastfurnaces,openheart hsandrollingmills,itwasprimarilyeffectiv ethroughdamagetoutilities(electricity,ga sandwater)andcommunicationswithinthe plantsandtoutilitiesandtransportsupplyin gthe 1944andcontinuedtofalluntiltheendofthewa r,Surveystudiesdonotindicatethatthesteel shortage(unliketheoil27shortageoreventhe ammunitionshortage)