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COURNOT DUOPOLY: an example

COURNOT DUOPOLY: an example Let the inverse demand function and the cost function be given by P = 50 2Q and C = 10 + 2q respectively, where Q is total industry output and q is the firm s output. First consider first the case of uniform-pricing monopoly, as a benchmark. Then in this case Q = q and the profit function is (Q) = (50 2Q)Q 10 2Q = 48Q 2Q2 10. Solving d dQ = 0 we get Q = 12, P = 26, = 278, CS = 12(50 26)2 = 144, TS = 278 + 144 = 422. MONOPOLY Q P CS TS 12 26 278 144 422 Now let us consider the case of two firms, or duopoly.

COURNOT DUOPOLY: an example Let the inverse demand function and the cost function be given by P = 50 − 2Q and C = 10 + 2q respectively, where …

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