THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS OF SCIENTIFIC …

1 THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL STATUS OF SCIENTIFIC theories : AN INVESTIGATION OF THE STRUCTURAL REALIST ACCOUNT Ioannis Votsis LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE PhD Thesis 2 To my mother and father 3 ABSTRACT In this dissertation, I examine a view called Epistemic Structural Realism , which holds that we can, at best, have knowledge of the structure of the physical world. Put crudely, we can know physical objects only to the extent that they are nodes in a structure.

2 In the spirit of Occam s razor, I argue that, given certain minimal assumptions, epistemic structural realism provides a viable and reasonable SCIENTIFIC realist position that is less vulnerable to anti-realist arguments than any of its rivals. The first chapter presents an overview of the SCIENTIFIC realism debate, concentrating on the EPISTEMOLOGICAL dimension. The second chapter tracks the development of structural realism, differentiates between several versions, and outlines the objections that have been raised against it.

3 The third chapter provides answers to a large subset of these objections, namely those launched by Stathis Psillos, who spearheads the critique of epistemic structural realism. The fourth chapter offers an attempted solution to Newman s objection that the epistemic structural realist view, if true, trivialises SCIENTIFIC knowledge. The fifth chapter presents a historical case study of the caloric theory of heat. I utilise the study to answer the pessimistic meta-induction argument.

4 The sixth chapter addresses the argument from the underdetermination of theory by evidence. I argue that epistemic structural realism can potentially restrict the impact of the argument by imposing structural constraints on the set of all possible theories compatible with the evidence. The seventh and final chapter outlines briefly some promising avenues for future research. 4 CONTENTS 1. THE SCIENTIFIC REALISM DEBATE 1. Introduction 8 2. The Origins and Boundaries of the Debate 8 3.

5 SCIENTIFIC Realism 11 First Approximation Second Approximation Third Approximation General Formulation 4. Arguments in Support of SCIENTIFIC Realism 17 5. SCIENTIFIC Anti-Realism 20 Constructive Empiricism 6. Arguments in Support of SCIENTIFIC Anti-Realism 22 Underdetermination of Theory by Evidence The Damning Historical Record of Science 7. The Main Realist Obstacles 29 8. Conclusion 30 2. TRACING THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRUCTURAL REALISM 1. Introduction 32 2.

6 The Prehistory of Structuralism 34 3. The Early Years 35 Poincar Duhem Russell The Newman Objection 4. The Years in Between 47 5. Epistemic Structural Realism, Ramsey-Style 51 Maxwell Worrall and Zahar 6. Psillos' Objections 60 5 7. Ontic Structural Realism 61 8. Empiricist Structuralism 64 9. The Main Structural Realist Obstacles 65 10. Conclusion 66 3. RECENT OBJECTIONS 1. Introduction 68 2. Terminological Issues 70 3.

7 The Objections Against the Poincar an/Worrallian ESR 71 Objection PS1 Objections PS2 & PS3 Objection PS4 4. The Objections Against the Russellian ESR 84 Russell s Principles Revisited Percepts, Phenomena and Observation Sentences Objection PS5 The First Horn of the Dilemma The Second Horn of the Dilemma Objection PS6 Objection PS7 5. Conclusion 103 4. THE NEWMAN OBJECTION 1. Introduction 106 2. Newman's Bifurcated Challenge 106 The First Fork: ESR Knowledge Claims are Trivial The Second Fork: ESR cannot be Salvaged A Note on the Ramsey-Sentence 3.

8 Various Replies to the Objection 112 Psillos Redhead French and Ladyman Worrall and Zahar 6 4. Overcoming Newman's Objection 122 5. Conclusion 128 5. HISTORICAL CASE STUDY: THE CALORIC THEORY OF HEAT 1. Introduction 130 2. The Rise and Fall of the Caloric Theory of Heat 131 The Pre-Caloric Era The Caloric Theory of Heat The Vibratory Theory of Heat The Demise of the Caloric Theory 3. SCIENTIFIC Realism and the Caloric 146 Is Caloric a Referential Term?

9 Is Caloric Central to the Caloric Theory? 4. Structural Realism and the Caloric 162 The Phenomenological Character of L1-L5 5. Structural Realism and the History of Science 169 Is Everything Structural Preserved? Does Structure Always Survive Intact? The Criterion of the Maturity of Science 6. What the History of Science Cannot Teach Us 175 7. Conclusion 178 6. UNDERDETERMINATION 1. Introduction 181 2. Does Every Theory have Empirically Equivalent Rivals?

10 182 Algorithmically Produced Rivals 3. Can we Justifiably Choose between Empirically Equivalent theories ? 188 Evidential Equivalence 4. Structural Realism and Underdetermination 195 The Inverse Relation of Epistemic Commitments to Underdetermination 7 Epistemic Warrant: Structural Realism vs. Rivals Historical Considerations Other Considerations Taking Stock 5. Conclusion 209 7. SOME PROMISING AVENUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 1. Introduction 213 2.