Search results with tag "Repeated game"

Introduction to Game Theory Lecture 5: Repeated Games

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Unraveling in ﬁnitely repeated games • Proposition (unraveling): Suppose the simultaneous-move game G has a unique Nash equilibrium, σ∗. If T < ∞, then the repeated game GT has a unique SPNE, in which each player plays her strategy in σ∗ in each of the stage games. • If there are more than one Nash equilibria in the stage game,

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A Course in Game Theory - Jun Zhang's Website

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8 Repeated Games133 8.1 The Basic Idea133 8.2 In nitely Repeated Games vs. Finitely Repeated Games134 8.3 In nitely Repeated Games: De nitions136 8.4 Strategies as Machines140 8.5 Trigger Strategies: Nash Folk Theorems143 8.6 Punishing for a Limited Length of Time: A Perfect Folk Theorem for the Limit of Means Criterion146

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Microeconomic Theory: Basic Principles and Extensions

edisciplinas.usp.br

Repeated Games 259 Incomplete Information 268 Simultaneous Bayesian Games 268 Signaling Games 273 Experimental Games 281 Evolutionary Games and Learning 282 Summary 283 ... CHAPTER 12 The Partial Equilibrium Competitive Model 391 Market Demand 391 Timing of the Supply Response 395 Pricing in the Very Short Run 395

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Chapter 12 Repeated Games - MIT OpenCourseWare

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Chapter 12. Repeated Games. In real life, most games are played within a larger context, and actions in a given situation aﬀect not only the present situation but also the future situations that may arise. When a player acts in a given situation, he …

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Political Game Theory - Princeton University

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Chapter 9. Repeated Games 199 1. The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma 200 2. The Grim Trigger Equilibrium 202 3. Tit-for-Tat Strategies 203 4. Intermediate Punishment Strategies 204 5. The Folk Theorem* 206 6. Application: Interethnic Cooperation 208 7. Application: Trade Wars 213 8. …

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Repeated Game - UCLA Econ

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Repeated game is a model about such long-term relationships. Obara (UCLA) Repeated Game March 1, 2012 2 / 33. Introduction A list of questions we are interested in: I When can people cooperate in a long-term relationship? I How do people cooperate? ... Repeated Game Ichiro Obara ...

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