19970520 153 - Defense Technical Information …

1 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, Rl Defining a Desirable, Achievable End State in Military Operations Other than War: The Role of The Operational Commander by Elisabeth J. Strines Major, Air Force A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy. Signature: {.l^SJ&\\ A^- ~**V Oft, , Paper Directed by ^ 41i?j| 4 Jackson, Captain, Navy Chairman, Joint Military Operations Department 19970520 153 Security Classification This Page REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED 2. Security Classification Authority: 3.}

2 Declassification/Downgrading Schedule: 4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED. 5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT 6. Office Symbol: NWC Code 1C Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207 8. Title (include Security Classification) : Defining a Desirable, Achievable End State in Military Operations Other than War: The Role of the Operational Commander O) 9. Personal Authors: Elisabeth J. Strines, Maj, USAF of Report: FINAL 11. Date of Report: 7 Feb 97 Count: ^ Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.

3 14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: MOOTW end state politico-military exit strategy committing military forces MOE operational commander : In conventional wars the desired outcome is normally quite straightforward, with victory over the enemy solidly indicating a successful conclusion. In military operations other than war (MOOTW), however, it is often difficult to pin down just what the outcome, or end state, is expected to be. Although our joint doctrine states that the National Command Authorities should define a desired end state before committing troops to action, the reality is that military forces are often committed to MOOTW before an end state or even an exit strategy has been outlined. If an end state/exit strategy is to be defined before commencement of an operation, it is quite probable that the operational commander will be the principal catalyst in making this happen.

4 This paper examines the role of the operational commander in defining a desirable, achievable end state, both before and after forces have been committed to a MOOTW. Since the operational commander is in the best position to advise political leaders on specific military capabilities as well as limitations, a framework is enumerated to assist the operational commander in preparing credible, concrete recommendations regarding the potential use of force, and to what end. / Availability of Abstract: Unclassified Same As Rpt DTIC Users Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT : 841-6461 Symbol: Security Classification of This Page Unclassified ABSTRACT In conventional wars the desired outcome is normally quite straightforward, with victory over the enemy solidly indicating a successful conclusion.

5 In military operations other than war (MOOTW), however, it is often difficult to pin down just what the outcome, or end state, is expected to be. Although our joint doctrine states that the National Command Authorities should define a desired end state before committing troops to action, the reality is that military forces are often committed to MOOTW before an end state or even an exit strategy has been outlined. If an end state/exit strategy js to be defined before commencement of an operation, it is quite probable that the operational commander will be the principal catalyst in making this happen. This paper examines the role of the operational commander in defining a desirable, achievable end state both before and after forces have been committed to a MOOTW. Since the operational commander is in the best position to advise political leaders on specific military capabilities as well as limitations, a framework is enumerated to assist the operational commander in preparing credible, concrete recommendations regarding the potential use of force, and to what end.

6 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract '' I. It's a Brave New World 1 II. MOOTW and War-Key Differences 4 III. Before the MOOTW Begins--A Framework for Decision-Making 6 1. What Is the Political Objective?. 6 2. What Is the Military Objective?. 7 3. Are Military Capabilities Sufficient to Achieve the Military Objective?.8 4. How Will Progress Be Assessed? 9 5. What Is the Desired End State? What Is the Exit Strategy? 9 IV. During the MOOTW 12 V. Conclusion 14 Notes 16 Bibliography 17 /// I. It's a Brave New World Back in the days of yore, war was simple. The good guys in white hats fought the bad guys in (you guessed it) black hats until the latter cried uncle, earning the good guys the right to live happily ever after, often after reforming the bad guys and thereby earning extra credit.

7 Well, perhaps it was not quite as easy as all that: the truth is, winning took far more than simply squeezing out a high pitched cry of uncle. People died, sometimes millions, before the white-hatted ones could claim victory, and certainly the paths taken to obtain said victory were fraught with friction and fog, to list a few obstacles. Still, it is fair to say that when the operational commander took to the field, he* had a dang good idea of his objective-to fight and win-and defeat of the enemy spelled success and earned entry into the happily ever after stage, at least in the broad sense. Even as recently as World War II, these truths remained intact. With the advent of the Korean War, however, this clarity of vision concerning desired outcome (or end state) became hazy (notwithstanding Gen MacArthur's prounouncement that there was no substitute for victory), and the Vietnam War made it murkier The "Weinberger Doctrine" attempted to require a renewed clarity of mission with its second tenet, "Intervention must occur wholeheartedly with a clear intention of winning,'^ as a prerequisite to committing troops to an operation, but this approach has not been conclusively followed since the Gulf War.

8 In the current age of military operations other than war (MOOTW) as the rule rather than the exception, the desired end state is sometimes not defined at all before American soldiers are committed to action. This vacuum in no way lessens the responsibility placed on the shoulders of the operational "For the purposes of this paper, the words "he" and "his" should be taken to include both genders. commander, however, to whom the old expectation of victory is still applied even if it is undefined. One needs only to look at recent MOOTW in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia to understand that it is easier to enter than to exit, easier to commit military forces than to withdraw. Even the successfully executed Gulf War, which had clear objectives and a solidly defined end state, continues to retain "dangling participles" in the way of US- maintained no-fly zones-with no anticipated end in sight.

9 Madeline Albright, our newly appointed Secretary of State, has "pushed for what she calls the 'doability doctrine' that America should use its military power in flexible ways to achieve practical, if limited goals."3 Given that the Secretary of State is the one principally responsible for recommending when and where military force should be used,4 this potential methodology for the commitment of forces spells increased muddlement for the future, at least from a military perspective. This becomes even more unsettling when one considers a past comment of Ms. Albright's to Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General Colin Powell during a discussion centering around the Bosnian conundrum, "What's the point in having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?

10 "5 Every good war college student knows those famous Clausewitzian dictums: "War is a continuation of policy by other means,"6 and "The aim of war should be .. to defeat the enemy."7 But what if we are not precisely going to war? What if our aim in using military forces is not exactly "to defeat the enemy"? Although Clausewitz was never exposed (or subjected) to the term "MOOTW," he did note, "Only if statesmen look to certain military moves and actions to produce effects that are foreign to their nature do political decisions influence operations for the worse which demonstrates that a certain grasp of military affairs is vital for those in charge of general policy.' What Clausewitz does not address is the serious quandry in which an operational commander (and his troops) is placed if statesmen do not have this "certain grasp of military affairs.