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1 DEOnDT "r.""'UMENTATION PAGE IM f " AD)-A283 132 :~ J> ~I 0BN 74eMto-2 8 a1eag Ito ho ite=ewn. incldin the time for reviewing inhtructions.,edln existing data pnII lating r n m--t rgrding ths burden em or 0 a 1101 otfe taiscg th i burden. to Washington Headquarters Sevicesiretorate orr Operetonoe and pt 121s jefleftona to the Offke of Management and Sudget. Paperwork Rleduction Project ( ). Washington. 3C REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVEREDAL IIIL9 AMU 4 U6 IIL9I 5. FUNDING NUMBERSRul~je5 OF ~ ;e e / Plc ,'.

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4 WAR COLLEGEAIR UNI VERSITYRULES OF ENGAGEMENT, POLICY, AND MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS:THE TIES THAT BINDbyStephen P. RandolphLt Col, USAFA RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTYIN Accesfion ForNTIS CRA&IFULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM DTIC TAB_0 Unannounced 03N REQUIREMENT Justification ..___ By ..-Distribution IAdvisor: Dr. Alexander Cochran Availability Codes_-D- Avail and I orDist SpecialMAXWELL AFB, ALABAMAAPRIL 199394 8 10 064 TABLE OF CONTENTSD ISCLA IM ER .. 11A B S T R A C T .. I1lBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .. IvSectionIn trod u c tio n.

5 II. ROE: Their Definition and Their Role .. 2II. The Air War in Southeast Asia .. 4 III. Vietnamese Air Operations Post Rolling Thunder .. 12IV. The Air War In Laos .. 14V. Beirut, 1982-83 .. 18VI. Epilogue and Conclusions .. 23 BIBLIOGRAPHY .. 26 DISCLAIMERThis study represents the views of the author and does not necessarilyreflect the official opinion of the Air War college or the Department of theAir Force. In accordance with Air Force Regulation 1 10-8, it is notcopyrighted, but is the property of the United States copies of this document may be obtained through the interlibraryloan desk of the Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama36112-5564 (telephone [2051 953-7223 or DSN 493-7223).]

6 LiABSTRACTT itle: ROE, Policy, and Military Effectiveness: The Ties That BindAuthor: Stephen P. randolph , Lt Col, USAFR ules of Engagement (ROE) are a topic much discussed and littleanalyzed. They can be the key to a successful implementation of nationalpolicy; they can equally be the basis of military disaster. A study of the USmilitary experience in Southeast Asia and Beirut illustrates therelationships among policy, military requirements, legal constraints, publicopinIon, and the mission that must be balanced to define effective ROE.

7 Italso sheds light on the criteria for effective ROE, and on theresponsibilities of planners and operators In defining ROE to execute thetransition from policy to military SKETCHLt Col Stephen P. randolph (BS, US Air Force Academy, 1974; MA, JohnsHopkins University, 1975) has flown fighter aircraft since 1976, In tours atRamstein AB, Germany, Luke AFB, AZ, and Bltburg AB, Germany. From 1990to 1992 he commanded the 22 FS, an F- 15 squadron at Bltburg; under hiscommand the unit won the CINCUSAFE Trophy as the outstanding fightersquadron In the command for Col randolph deployed to Al Kharj, Saudi Arabia, in February 1991, andflew fourteen combat missions In operation Desert Storm.

8 He commandedthe F- 15 unit establishing the postwar residual force, as It executed thetransition from combat to peacetime operations and rules of his one staff tour to date, Lt Col randolph served as an action officerIn the DCS/Plans and Operations at the Air Staff from 1985 to 1987, andthen as a member of the Chief of Staff's Staff Group from 1987 to the great variety and development of modern war its major linesare still laid down by governments,; in other words, if we are to betechnical about it, by a purely pol/tical and not a military body That ;s asit should be -- ClausewitzThrough the Cold War, American military action has been carefullygoverned by political considerations.

9 That harnessing of military force hasbeen done well on some occasions, very poorly on rules of engagement (ROE) under which forces employ comprise oneprincipal means by which policy is translated into military action. ROE havereceived their share of attention over the last few years. Every militarydisaster of the past decade -- from the terrorist bombing of the Marinebarracks in Beirut, to the Stark incident in which an Exocet slammed into aUSN ship, to the Vkhcennes tragedy in which an American warship shotdown a civilian airliner -- has resulted In intense, though unsystematic andshort-lived, popular attention to the ROE under which those forces professional press has likewise paid some attention to ROE, with theattention in the past coming primarily from the naval services.

10 Thatdifference in focus has been a natural result of the respective roles of theservices in the postwar military. The Navy and the Marine Corps have beenexpeditionary forces, frequently used in situations requiring military forceshort of war. They have suffered casualties, and failed, on occasion, tomeet their mission requirements, because of failures to define effectiveROE, or to execute those defined. As the role of the Air Force evolves, AirForce officers will increasingly face the sorts of ambiguous, lethalsituations that naval task force commanders have faced for the past fivedecades -- witness, for example, Provide Comfort and Southern Watch, twooperations short of war, full of political complexity, where lethal force hasrecently been historical view of ROE clarifies the crucial relationships among , and military action, and illuminates some of the critical errors in ourpast experience.