CLAUSEWITZ ON

1 ,seldomread, classical strategy,aainterpretedbyClaueewitz,asaKa f-kaesquelandacapeofviolenceandbrutality ,when,inactuality, ,andafterhisdeathhiscollectedworkewerepu b-lishedin10volumes, ,hisinfluencehadbecomesopervasivethathis ideas,andavenhiaphrases, showtherecanbenosingle, ; ,and,duringNapoleonBonaparte eretreatfromMoscow, , ,perhaps, ..warisanactofforce,andtotheapplicationo ftheforcethereisnolimit. , continuationofpoliticalintercourse,acarr yingoutofthesamebyothermeans. ,Te$waTranspor-tationInstitute,TexasA&MV niver-sitg,CollegeStation, ~its, Maokin&r aHeartlandandEaeafationRatchet ,andhisthe-orieshaveexertedtremendousinf lu-enceonalmostallmajorstrategicthought ,therefore, , ,Clausewitsthought,oratIeaetnowarshouldb ebegunifpeopleactedwisely withoutfirstfindingananswertothequestion ofwhatwastobea~ , ,andthusalsomakeprep-arationsbeforeband, ,tobesure,itsowngrammar, ,inreality, , ,states,classes,passions, ,nevertheless,alwayscaughtAmericansunpre paredintel-lectually,emotionally, ,unfortunately,doesnotcorrelatewiththeha rshfaceofreality.

2 Claueewitzgoesoutofhiswaytoaxplainthatwa risnotmadewithanabstraction, ~tione-theGreekcity-stetezno1sssthattheI taSiancitiesoftheRenaissanceorthenation- statesofEurope- Theoryhas,therefore, saysClausewitz, tocon-siderthenatureofmeansandends. Wkhthepossessionofthermonu-clearweaponsa ndmeansfortheirdeliveW,victory,inoneeens eoftbeword, ,whichinvolvesnuclearpowereevenindirectl y,isimpossiblebecauseeachside,ratherthan loee, \thescopeandcharacterofthecon- ;flictuntilitwouldendinmutualnu-~ + ,accordingtoitsinception, ,ifouropponentistodoourwill, ,thatactionwill,ingeneral, , ,accordingtoClausewitz, ,mustcontemplateavaetspectrumofviolence- etoneend,thedestructionwhichonethermonuc learpowermayhurlatanother, , seffectismoreakill-ingoftheenemy scouragethanoftheenemy ssoldiers, ,buttodosowithoutlosingvitalpositions,wi thoutallow-IICB1* ,inpractice, ; ,therefore, sexpenditureofstrength thatistosay, ;thesee-ondwastodirectenterprieesprefer- ablyatthoeepointswhichdotheen-emythemeet harm;andthird,andbyfarthemostimportantto Clauee-witz, ,andthattheeidewhichiswillingtooutwaitit sopponent.

3 Perativetofind,amodeofoperationand , ,UScommanderofmilitaryforcesinVietnam, ]etCongmain-forceandNorthVietnam-eseArmy uniteinSouthVietnam;supportofthegovernme ntof%iet-nam snationbuildingprocess, , Theenemythinksintermsofprotractedconflic t. Hegiveeafur-therindicationofneo-C1aueewi tzianconceptsofawearingoutoftheen-emybya dding, ..Iamconfidentthatwemustgearourselvesfor thelongpull. , ,liketheprocessofevaporation,dependsonth eextentoftheeurfaceexposed;thegreaterthi sie, :MilitergRsvkl,.. ,orbyreasonofwoodsandmarshes,orfromthepe culiarmodeofculth+ ,Clausewitzob-servedthat apoorpopulationaccus-tomedtohard~orkandp rivationusu-allychowsitselfmorevigorousa ndbettersuitedtowar. Hedrawsapicturethatcouldalmostbeviewedwh oleclothasthatexistinginsouth-eastAsiato day,Heillustratesthead-vantagesandlimita tionsofwhathecallstbe people swar :Massesofarmedpeaaantscannot,and8houldno t,beemployedagainstthemainbodyoftheenemy earmy,oreven-againetanyconsiderablefarce e;thegmustnotattempttocrunchthecore; beliefthatarmedpeasantamuetseizetheenemy Withoutsuchsupportofafewregulartroopsasa nencouragement:saidClausewitz, Thisisthethinkhghehindthemilitaryopera-t ionsinVietnam.

4 IfthesupportoftheregulararmyunitsfromNor thVietnamcanbecurtailed,theinnerconflict willgraduallyabate, , ,therefore, ,thedikesofaswamp,andthepassageaoverariv er, ,hefeltthattheyshoulddisperse,andcon-tin uetheirdefensebyunexpectedat- tacksratherthanconcentrateandal-lowthems elvestobeshutupinsomenarrow, tionalcharacteristicsofarmedciviliangrou pesuggesttoClausewitzthat,al-thoughtheyf ormaweaponofstra-tegicdefense, , Theabilitytorunawayistheverycharacterist icoftheguerrilla. ;rather, , War~wroteNikolaiLenin, Lenin,likeFriedrich EngelsandMarx,wasfascinatedbyClausewitz ,ifwarieacontinuationofpoliticsbyotherme ans, ,ineffeet,lesserpointsontheconflictspect rum namely,subversion,eabotage,colonialrebel lion, incombin-ingandoperatingvariousnonmilita ryformeofwar political,economic, , ,Marxists,perhaps, , , ,however, ,asunder-stoodbycivilizedsociety,wasafat terinsociallife.