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REVISED EDITION Clausewitzian Friction an dFuture …

MCNAIR PAPER68 Institute for National Strategic StudiesNational Defense UniversityClausewitzianFriction andFutureWarREVISED EDITIONBARRY D. WATTS Clausewitzian Friction and future WarWATTSR ecent titles in the McNairPaper series:67 Oil for the Lamps ofChina Beijing s 21stCentury Search for EnergyBernard D. Cole66 Europe s New SecurityVocationMichael J. Brenner65 Agricultural Bioterrorism:A Federal Strategy toMeet the ThreatHenry S. Parker64 The Strategic Implicationsof a Nuclear-Armed IranKori N. Schake andJudith S. Yaphe63 All Possible Wars?Toward a Consensus Viewof the future SecurityEnvironment, 2001 2025 Sam J. TangrediClausewitzianFriction and FutureWarREVISED EDITIONF riction is an inevitable impedi-ment to effective action and wasa significant factor in war longbefore Clausewitz popularizedthe term. Modern observers,however, have speculated thattechnological advances willreduce, if not eliminate, Watts addresses threequestions about Friction in theinformation age: Could it beamenable to solutions?

MCNAIR PAPER 68 Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University Clausewitzian Friction an dFuture War REVISED EDITION BARRY D. WATTS Clausewitzian Friction and Future War

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Transcription of REVISED EDITION Clausewitzian Friction an dFuture …

1 MCNAIR PAPER68 Institute for National Strategic StudiesNational Defense UniversityClausewitzianFriction andFutureWarREVISED EDITIONBARRY D. WATTS Clausewitzian Friction and future WarWATTSR ecent titles in the McNairPaper series:67 Oil for the Lamps ofChina Beijing s 21stCentury Search for EnergyBernard D. Cole66 Europe s New SecurityVocationMichael J. Brenner65 Agricultural Bioterrorism:A Federal Strategy toMeet the ThreatHenry S. Parker64 The Strategic Implicationsof a Nuclear-Armed IranKori N. Schake andJudith S. Yaphe63 All Possible Wars?Toward a Consensus Viewof the future SecurityEnvironment, 2001 2025 Sam J. TangrediClausewitzianFriction and FutureWarREVISED EDITIONF riction is an inevitable impedi-ment to effective action and wasa significant factor in war longbefore Clausewitz popularizedthe term. Modern observers,however, have speculated thattechnological advances willreduce, if not eliminate, Watts addresses threequestions about Friction in theinformation age: Could it beamenable to solutions?

2 If it is infact enduring, could the effectsof Friction be reduced in futureconflicts? And do advances inwarfighting demand revision ofClausewitz s original concept?To answer these questions, Wattsclarifies the notion of Friction inClausewitz by reviewing its evo-lution and extending the matureconcept. He then subjects theconcept to the test of empiricalevidence, using the Persian GulfWar to show the persistence offriction in recent times. To ex-plore the more complex issue offriction in future conflicts, theauthor offers three indirect argu-ments for its undiminished per-sistence. Finally, he exploits thenotion of nonlinearity to recon-struct Clausewitz s concept inmodern McN 10/13/04 2:57 PM Page 1 About the AuthorBarry D. Watts is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and BudgetaryAssessments, where he specializes in air power issues, Air Force transformation,and the military use of space.

3 From 2001 to 2002, Watts headed the Office of ProgramAnalysis and Evaluation in the Department of Defense. Previously, he directed theNorthrop Grumman Analysis Center, where he had served after retiring from the AirForce with the rank of lieutenant colonel. From 1991 to 1993, Watts headed a study ofoperations and effectiveness as part of the Gulf War Air Power Survey. His publica-tions include The Foundations of Air Doctrine: The Problem of Friction in War(Air University Press, 1984) and The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment(Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2001). NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITYP resident:Lieutenant General Michael M. Dunn, USAFVice President:Ambassador Johnnie CarsonINSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIESD irector:Stephen J. FlanaganPUBLICATION DIRECTORATED irector of Publications and Editor,Joint Force Quarterly : Robert A.

4 SilanoDeputy Director and Managing Editor, NDU Press:COL Debra O. Taylor, USAS upervisory Editor, NDU Press:George C. MaerzWriter-Editor, NDU Press:Lisa M. YambrickWriter-Editor, NDU Press:Jeffrey D. SmothermanNational Defense University PressATTN: NDU NSS PD300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62)Fort Lesley J. McNairWashington, 20319 5066 Telephone: (202) 685 4210 Facsimile: (202) 685 4806 About INSS PublicationsPrint PublicationsFor general information on publications and other programs of the Institutefor National Strategic Studies, consult the National Defense University Website at To request a complimentary copy of availableNDU Press titles, contact e-mail or leave a voicemessage at (202) 685 4210. Most NDU Press titles can be purchased from Government Printing Office; call (202) 512 1800 or order on-line PublicationsNumerous titles published by NDU Press are available on-line Force Quarterly (JFQ)The journal publishes articles, reviews, professional notes, and other featuresby military officers, defense analysts, and scholars on the integrated employ-ment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations forces.

5 JFQfocuses onjoint doctrine, coalition warfare, contingency planning, combat operationsconducted by unified commands, and joint force development. For currentand back numbers of the journal, visit the JFQHome Page maintained on theJoint Doctrine Web site National Defense University (NDU) is a joint professional military education institutionoperating under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its purpose is toprepare military and civilian leaders for service at the highest levels of national defenseand security. The principal operating elements of NDU are the Industrial College of theArmed Forces, National War College, Joint Forces Staff College, Information ResourcesManagement College, Institute for National Strategic Studies, and Center for HemisphericDefense Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) is a policy research and strategicgaming organization within the National Defense University (NDU) serving the Departmentof Defense, its components, and interagency partners.

6 The institute provides seniordecisionmakers with timely, objective analysis and gaming events and supports NDUeducational programs in the areas of international security affairs and defense an active outreach program, including conferences and publications, INSS seeksto promote understanding of emerging strategic challenges and policy Publication Directorate of INSS publishes books, monographs, reports, andoccasional papers on national security strategy, defense policy, and national militarystrategy through National Defense University Press that reflect the output of universityresearch and academic programs. In addition, it produces Joint Force Quarterly, aprofessional military journal published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of McN 10/13/04 2:57 PM Page 2 ClausewitzianFriction and future WarRevised EditionBarry D. WattsMcNair Paper 68 INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIESNATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITYWASHINGTON, opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied withinare those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the Federal Government.

7 Thispublication is cleared for public release; distribution of this work may be quoted or reprinted without further permis-sion, with credit to the Institute for National Strategic Studies. A courtesy copy ofany reviews and tearsheets would be printing, October 1996, McNair Paper 52 REVISED EDITION , August 2004 For sale by the Government Printing Office. To order, contactSuperintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, 20402 9328(ISSN 1071-7552)ContentsPreface to the REVISED to the First 1 The Once and future Problem ..1 Chapter 2 Development of the Unified 3 Clarity about War as It Actually 4 The Mature Clausewitzian Concept ..17 Chapter 5 Friction and Desert 6 The Intractability of Strategic 7 Dispersed 8 Evolutionary Biology as an 9 Situation Awareness in Air-to-Air 10 Nonlinearity and a Modern Taxonomy ..67 Chapter 11 Implications for future 113ivCLAUSEWITZIAN Friction AND future WARP reface to the REVISED EditionSince this paper first appeared in 1996, I have had little reason todoubt my original hypothesis that Clausewitzian Friction is a basicstructural feature of combat interactions between opposing General Tommy Franks said of the fighting at Takur Ghar,Afghanistan, during Operation Anacondain 2002, that battle showedheroism, it showed fog, uncertainty, it showed Friction elements com-mon to every war I think we ve ever fought.

8 He is right; Friction has beena consistent, recurring feature of wars, not only in our own time but alsoas far back as the wars of Greek city states and the Persian empire. Thefurther realization that every actor in war from polities and nations toindividual combatants and military forces are complex adaptive systemsonly underscores my central argument: Friction is unlikely to be elimi-nated from future war regardless of technological debate over the power of technology to eliminatefriction from war confirms that military theory in the United States is im-mature. Not only is a broad theory of war and combat lacking, our volu-minous literature on technologies in particular wars offers little in theway of a defensible schema to explain the general role of technology incombat interactions. My working hypothesis is that technological advan-tages, like frictional ones, increase the options of their possessor in possi-bility space, decrease those of the opponent, or some combination of thetwo.

9 If this hypothesis continues to escape decisive falsification as I be-lieve it will it would certainly imply that progress toward a mature, em-pirically based theory of war is suggest in the afterword to this paper that tools such as geneticalgorithms and other applications of agent- and rule-based mathematicsalong the lines pursued by Andrew Ilachinski at the Center for NavalAnalyses could help in this endeavor. I am also strongly inclined to adoptevolutionary biology as a better model for military theory than physics,whether classical or quantum. Regardless of whether these suggestionsbear fruit, if war is about what Hayek termed essentially complexvphenomenain his Nobel lecture, then our theories of war will seldom, ifever, permit us to predict precise outcomes with any certainty. Instead,we will be limited to Hayek s mere pattern predictions that is, predic-tions of some of the general attributes of war s emergent structures, but not containing specific statements about the individual elements ofwhich the structures will be made up.

10 This is an important caveat thatmilitary theory should emulate and one that is wholly consistent withthe view that Friction cannot be regard to achieving a mature and sophisticated theory ofwar as a whole, however, it is doubtful that we have reached even the endof the beginning. Again, one must decide whether general Friction willpersist in future war or can be overcome by technological advances. Thatgenuine disagreement persists on such a basic point suggests how far mil-itary theory must advance to achieve a solid empirical 1990, Colin Gray observed, The defense community is notthe beneficiary of a mature and sophisticated theory of war as a whole. Worse, most involved in military affairs in the United States seem quitecontent with this situation. Few in the Armed Forces are exercised over thedearth of theory even when it is focused on coping with real-worldproblems.


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