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MCMAP and the Marine Warrior Ethos

17 MILITARY REVIEWlNovember - December 2004 DURING THE 1970s, after the Vietnam War,a self-identity malaise befell the ArmedForces. Pacifism, self-indulgence, and egalitarianmulticulturalism supplanted selfless patriotism ascore values across thespectrum of Americansocial institutions. Keysegments of societypublicly expressed con-tempt for any notion ofservice as an obligationof citizenship, includingpatriotic service in themilitary. This view be-came commonplacethroughout the Nation seducational system,religious organizations,institutions of higherlearning, and among in-fluential members ofsociety, including politi-cal figures, members ofthe media, and enter-tainment-industry lumi-naries.

20 November-December 2004 l MILITARY REVIEW was, “Every Marine an Infantryman.” Jones wanted to take the training further, however. He would train all Marines to be one-on-one warriors—masters of

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Transcription of MCMAP and the Marine Warrior Ethos

1 17 MILITARY REVIEWlNovember - December 2004 DURING THE 1970s, after the Vietnam War,a self-identity malaise befell the ArmedForces. Pacifism, self-indulgence, and egalitarianmulticulturalism supplanted selfless patriotism ascore values across thespectrum of Americansocial institutions. Keysegments of societypublicly expressed con-tempt for any notion ofservice as an obligationof citizenship, includingpatriotic service in themilitary. This view be-came commonplacethroughout the Nation seducational system,religious organizations,institutions of higherlearning, and among in-fluential members ofsociety, including politi-cal figures, members ofthe media, and enter-tainment-industry lumi-naries.

2 In the then-pre-vailing environment, the military and the warriorethos it represented were publicly ridiculed andblamed. Marxist revisionist historians, then dominat-ing the Nation s campuses, laid the world s socialand economic inequalities and injustices at thePentagon s of the unpopularity of military serviceand the dominant influence 1960s counterculture at-titudes had on social and political agendas, themilitary shied from publicly identifying themselves aslegitimate and necessary instruments of violence un-der authorized state control, adopting recruiting strat-egies that avoided appeals to the Warrior spirit, pa-triotism, or the obligations of citizenship.

3 Theyemphasized personalself-advancement andpromotion. As a result,the public did not seethe military as a nobleinstitution standingguard over the Nation,but as the employer oflast resort for mem-bers of society whohad no other optionsfor employment apublic-works programfor America s least-tal-ented adverse influ-ence of these viewsrippled through themilitary. Military train-ing regimens came toreflect the watered-down values of training standards were lowered, dressstandards were relaxed, and disciplinary problems,including rampant drug abuse, were virtually tendency of dominant political leaders toview military intervention as pass exacerbated theproblem.

4 The military was seen more as an instru-ment of social engineering than an instrument of na-tional power that should be kept finely maintainedand and theMarine Warrior EthosCaptain Jamison Yi, Marine CorpsSynergy of DisciplinesCHARACTERDISCIPLINEW aterSurvival18 November - December 2004lMILITARY REVIEW The 1970s were onerous and bitter for the Ameri-can Samurai the career men and women in uni-form who viewed their service in the military anddevotion to country as a calling, not just an occupa-tion. Among them were those who had fought withvalor in Vietnam and other conflicts and who, withbitterness and resentment, saw the dry rot of the megeneration s shallow hedonism eating away at so-ciety and their service s bedrock values.

5 The pre-dictable consequence was that such individual val-ues translated into a failure to maintain militaryreadiness and, ultimately, the failure to accomplishmilitary missions on the field of Eagle ClawOperation Eagle Claw, the infamous DesertOne Iranian Hostage rescue attempt that occurredin 1979, was a disaster. The operation involved anad hoc force of brave, well-intentioned but ill-equipped and ill-trained personnel from the , Air Force, Army Special Forces, and the Ma-rine Corps. In congressional testimony, Chief of Staffof the Army General Edward Shy C. Meyerdeclared he was presiding over a hollow leaders were shocked into recogniz-ing that the military had fallen into a state whereit was no longer capable of performing many ofits basic the new administration s leadership, con-gressional and military leaders began restoringthe Nation s military capabilities by appointingunvarnished warriors , notably short on politi-cal correctness, to positions of high authority.

6 In1980, General Alfred M. Gray became the newUSMC commandant. His appointment signaled arenaissance of the Warrior ethic throughout , a warriors Warrior , began immediately torevitalize the USMC Warrior ethic by reintroducingbayonet training as part of the basic package for allMarine recruits, supplementing this training withphysically demanding martial skills that simulatedone-on-one combat. The purpose of this bruising,demanding training was to reemphasize the impor-tance of physical and competitive aggressiveness asa core element of the Warrior also introduced measures aimed at moldingthe USMC s intellectual and spiritual established a required-reading program onsubjects related to the art of warfare, challengingMarines to think deeply and broadly about the fu-ture environment in which they would have to plymartial skills.

7 He directed the reprinting and distri-bution of the USMC s 1940 Small Wars manual thatdealt with insurgencies of the type Gray believedwould be the most likely kind of conflicts MarinesUSMCM arines demonstrateMCMAP take -downtechniques.(Inset) A Marine exe-cutes the techniqueduring operations nearthe Diyala Canal Bridgeleading into REVIEWlNovember - December 2004would face in the In addition, he establishedthe USMC School of Advanced Warfare andbegan the accreditation process for the USMCC ommand and General Staff College and theUSMC War commandants continued to build andexpand Warrior - Ethos initiatives and innovations, andin 1991, General Carl E.

8 Mundy, Jr., took what Grayachieved one step further by framing the USMC core values as honor, courage, and commitment,which have become the bedrock of a Marine s char-acter. In 1999, building on the foundation Gray andMundy laid, Commandant General James L. Jonesintroduced the Marine Corps Martial Arts Program( MCMAP ), modeled in part after martial arts sys-tems that form the core physical training componentof many East Asian armed services. The vision forthe program originated during Jones s tour of dutyas a lieutenant in Vietnam where he served along-side Republic of Korea (ROK) marines and ob-served with keen interest how challenging physicalcombative training and a national military martial artssystem unified these extremely skilled and fearsomeMarines around a shared Warrior and foe alike knew ROK marines wereindividually trained masters of close quarters com-bat black belts in Tae Kwon Do able to deal per-sonally and ruthlessly with any enemy.

9 To highlighttheir mystique and reputation, ROK marines worea unique uniform (tiger-striped fatigues) distin-guishing them from other observed that the ROK marines repu-tation so intimidated Viet Cong and North Viet-namese Army units they actively avoided ROKforces during combat. This insight profoundly af-fected Jones and shaped his vision of the course theUSMC should follow. He concluded that insti-tuting a training program to instill the same close-quarters combat Warrior Ethos the USMC had whenit was first organized was again essential if itwas to fully prepare to fight the intensely per-sonal, low-intensity, expeditionary, small wars thatmilitary strategists were predicting would domi-nate the 21st Marital Arts ProgramSince its introduction, MCMAP has been tested,evaluated, and refined.

10 It combines the best com-bat-tested martial arts skills and time-honored, close-combat training techniques with proven USMC corevalues and leadership training . MCMAP has its rootsin the USMC s formative days when continentalMarines were renowned for their skills as sharp-shooters operating from the rigging of Navy shipswhen the tools of the trade of boarding and landingparties were the sword and bayonet. Early on, theMarines martial culture and Warrior spirit were whatmade them effective, not their World War I, the USMC trained Marinesto be expert riflemen first and foremost. The mottoUSMCMARTIAL ARTS PROGRAMC lose quarterscombat - December 2004lMILITARY REVIEWwas, Every Marine an Infantryman.


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