NPR15.3: The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence

1 THEMYTHOFNUCLEARDETERRENCEWardWilsonNucl eardeterrenceissometimestreatedasaknownq uantity* ,however, (includingrecentreinterpretationsofthebo mbingofHiroshima) , , :Nucleardeterrence;nuclearweapons;United States;SovietUnionItisoftenassertedasfac tthatnucleardeterrenceworks,thatitkeptus safeforfiftyyearsduringtheColdWar,andtha tbecauseofthepeculiarcharacteristicsofmu tualassureddestruction, ,theconventionalwisdomalsoholdsthatnucle ardeterrenceprovidesthreespecificbenefit s:1)protectionagainstattackswithnuclearw eapons,2)protectionagainstattackswithcon ventionalforces,and3) ,ifnucleardeterrenceisaswelldefinedandsu ccessfulasissometimesassumed, ,however, , ,threepracticalargumentsputtheefficacyof nucleardeterrenceintodoubt:1)thecharacte risticattackthreatenedinmostnucleardeter rencescenarios*cityattack*isnotmilitaril yeffectiveorlikelytobedecisive;2)thepsyc hologyofterrorthatissupposedtoworkinnucl eardeterrence sfavoractuallycreatesthecircumstancesfor unremittingresistance;and3)eventhoughthe fieldismostlyconjectural, shockandawe , , ,November2008 ISSN1073-6700print/ISSN1746-1766online/0 8/030421-19 2008 TheMontereyInstituteofInternationalStudi es, (theargumentgoes) ,evenifonlyafewweaponsareusedagainstciti es(theargumentalsoasserts), ,however, , ,however,historianshavecometodoubttheinf luenceofHiroshimaandNagasakiandincreasin glyascribetheJapanesesurrendertotheSovie tdeclarationofwaronAugust9, , *ifnuclearweaponsmightnotdeternuclearatt acks,donotdeterconventionalattacks,anddo notreliablyprovidediplomaticleverage*the nthecasefordisarmament,nonproliferation, thepowertodissuade.

2 1 AlexanderGeorgeandRichardSmokedefineitas , simplythepersuasionofone 2 ThomasSchellingcallsdeterrence (nottoosurprisinglyafterHiroshima) ,inhisseminalchaptersonnuclearstrategyin TheAbsoluteWeaponin1946,madetheexpectati onof ,inhisaward-winningessayexploringformerl yclassifiedplansfornuclearwar,reported, From1947through1949,theseparatetargetsys temswithintheSovietUniongrewlessimportan t,whilegovernmentalcontrolcentersand urbanindustrialconcentration ,whenSAC[StrategicAirCommand]preparedits firstoperationsplan, saimpointswere selectedwiththeprimaryobjectiveoftheanni hilationofpopulation,withindustrialtarge tsincidental. 5 Schelling,oneoftheforemostnuclearstrateg ists,assertedin1966that, Inthepresenteranoncombatants422 WARDWILSON appeartobenotonlydeliberatetargetsbutpri marytargets. 6 RobertJerviswroteaslateas1980that, Deterrencecomesfromhavingenoughweaponsto destroytheother scities. , , theprincipalmilitaryobjectives, ,shouldbethedestructionoftheenemy sforces,notofhiscivilianpopulation.

3 8 Therearefourreasons,however, ,anation ,cityattacks,eveniftheyareabsentfromthee arlystagesofnuclearwarscenarios, ,therefore, , ,forexample, , nocities (andthemajorityarebelievedtohavefewertha n200)wouldnotemphasize nocities ,whetherintheearlystagesorthelater, ,inpart, ,however, ,inotherwords, (andthereforewouldworkasathreat) ,despitethefactthatairplaneswereanewtech nologythathadneverbeenusedinwar,itseemed obvioustosomeobserversthataerialattackso ncivilianswouldhaveacatastrophiceffecton anation (nineyearsaftertheWrightbrothers firstflight) ,forexample,positedanaerialattackonLondo natthebeginningofawar: Whatwouldtheresultsbe?ImaginetheStockExc hange,thechiefbanks,thegreatrailwaystati ons,andourmeansofcommunicationdestroyed. SuchablowattheveryheartoftheEmpire,.. Wouldbelikeparalysingthenervesofastrongm anwithasoporificbeforehehadtofightforhis life;themuscularforcewouldremainbutthebr ainswouldbepowerlesstodirect. 10 Despitetheseandotherwarnings, , ,however*eventhoughpredictionsaboutWorld WarIhadbeenwrongandthetechnologyforbombi ngcitieswasnewanduntested* ,GiulioDouhet,whosebasicthesishasbeensum medupinthisway:1)Aircraftareinstrumentso foffenceofincomparablepotentialities, ) )Theprimaryobjectivesofaerialattackshoul dnotbethemilitaryinstallations, :Andifontheseconddayanotherten,twenty,or fiftycitieswerebombed,whocouldkeepalltho selost,panic-strickenpeoplefromfleeingto theopencountrysidetoescapethisterrorfrom theair?

4 ,toputanendtohorrorandsuffering,thepeopl ethemselves,drivenbytheinstinctofself-pr eservation,wouldriseupanddemandanendtoth ewar*thisbeforetheirarmyandnavyhadtimeto mobiliseatall! ,saying, Itisunnecessarythatthesecitiesbedestroye d, ,thefirstcountrysubjectedtosustainedcity bombinginWorldWarII,neithersurrenderedno rever,thatIamaware, , ,thebombingofcitiesappearstohavehadlittl eimpactontheUnitedKingdom smilitaryeffortinthewar.(Infact,farfromb eingafraidthatcityattacksmightdriveEngla ndfromthewar, ,whichwereclosetobreakingtheRoyalAirForc e, , Churchilladmitshisdesire,inlateAugust,fo ranimmediateshiftingofthemassiveLuftwaff eoffensivefromtheRAFairstripstoLondon,an dheadmitshispersonalresponsibilityforthe bombingsofBerlinbegunonAugust25;itseemsq uitelikelythathewasawareoftheprobablecon nectionbetweenthetwo. ) , ,Germancivilianmoraleremainedstrong, *stilltheworstsinglecitybombinginhistory (includingHiroshimaandNagasaki)*14square milesofthecityweredestroyedandanestimate d120, ,andthenthenextlargest,andsoonuntilpopul ationcentersnolargerthan30, ,Japan ,atthemeetingonAugust9!

5 10discussingsurrender, , Itisastonishingtonotethatthesecommentsby SuzukiandoneotherisolatedreferenceinMaya retheonlydocumentedreferencesbyamemberof theBigSixtothestrategicaircampaign. 17 Itisdifficulttoargue,ontheevidence,thatc itybombingmatteredtoJapan ,despitethepredictions, , ,butitseemsclearthattheloweredmoraleresu ltingfrombombingdidnotimportantlyaffectm ilitaryoperationsortheoutcomeofthewar. 18 THEMYTHOFNUCLEARDETERRENCE425 Althoughtheassertionthatkillingmillionso fcivilianswouldundoubtedlybedecisiveseem sintuitivelyobvious, *ifconductedwithferociousenoughweapons* ,afterall, , :whenyoudestroycities,docountriessurrend er?Itisdifficulttomakeacasethattheanswer isyes, ,whydidn tGermanyandJapansurrendersooner? ,theSovietinvasion(onthesamedayasthebomb ingofNagasaki),unlikethenuclearbombings, , ,acloseexaminationofdiaries,letters,ando fficialdocumentsmakesclearthattheSovieti nvasiontouchedoffacrisis, ,althoughJapan sleadersregularlysaidthattheatomicbombpr omptedthemtosurrender, (andtheirownpeople) :woulditbebettertosay, Wemademistakes,weweren tbraveenough,wewerefoolish, or, Ourenemiesmadeanunimaginablescientificbr eakthroughthatnoonecouldhavepredicted,an dthat swhywelost ?

6 Itwas,literally,aheaven-sent, , , [TheBomb s]associationwiththeterminationofthePaci ficWarsurroundeditfromthestartwithanaura ofdecisiveness. , ,whatdoesthatmeanfornucleardeterrence?Is itpossibletoshow,withoutHiroshima,thatbo mbingcitiesismilitarilydecisive?Attackin gCities:TheHistoricalRecordIfmisinterpre tingtheresultsofbombingHiroshimaandNagas akiwasacriticalmistake, ,HermanKahnaptlysummeduptheconventionalw isdomamongnuclearstrategistswhenhewrote: Despitethefactthatnuclearweaponshavealre adybeenusedtwice,andthenuclearswordhasbe enrattledmanytimes,onecanarguethatforall practicalpurposesnuclearwarisstill(andho pefullywillremain)sofarfromourexperience thatitisdifficulttoreasonfrom,orillustra teargumentsby, , ,say,Thermopylae,Trafalgar, ,Kahn , ,forinstance,callkillingsomeonewithagunm urder, ,cityattacksare,forthemostpart,cityattac kswhetheryouusenuclearweapons,convention albombs,artilleryshells, ,itmakesnosensetoignore2, ,presentthroughoutallages, ,forexample,duringhiscampaignintheCentra lAsianempireofKhwarazmin1220, ,Merv,Samarkand, , , , , ,however,despitethousandsofyearsofwar,in whichacity sdestructionledtoitscountry ,ofcourse, (thenthetwelfthlargestcityintheSouth).

7 Sherman,whohadsaid, Iwouldmakethiswarassevereaspossible,ands hownosymptomsoftiringtilltheSouthbegsfor mercy, ,afteryearsoffruitlesseffort,theNorthern armiesfinallycapturedtherebelcapitalofRi chmond, ( OntoRichmond! )voicedthesentimentthatifonlytherebelcap italcouldbecaptured, ,however, , ,some80,000warriorsgatheredatahillfortat thefootoftheJuramountains,alongwithasubs tantialnumberofwomen,children, ,attheheadofaRomanarmy,surroundedthefort ,examinedthestrengthofitsdefenses, , , (ourRomansourcesclaim) ,children,old, (notakindfate,butatleasttheywouldnotstar vetodeath).Instead,whentheyappliedatthee ncirclingfortification, , :forthemostpart,theydon , , ,forexample, , ,RussiaandChinainparticular, ,infact, , , *awarfoughtbetweenParaguay,Brazil,andUru guayfrom1865to1870* scivilianshadbeenkilled,butthewar ,fromhistory,thatmilitaryleaders,inwarti me, , ,outsidethecapabilitiesofnuclearweapons, , , ,however, ,Cambodia skillingfields,Rwanda* ,theeventwe ,thesolewarofexterminationisthewarwagedb ytheRomansagainsttheirage-oldenemy,theCa rthaginians, , ,buttheRomanswereparticularlydevastatedb ythefourteen-yearcampaignofCarthaginiang eneralHannibalBarcaduringtheSecondPunicW ar(218!)

8 201 BCE).HannibalinvadedItaly,peeledoffRoman allies,destroyedtownsandcrops, , , bledwhite andhavinglost anentiregeneration. France slossesinWorldWarIwereroughly1,380,000so ldiers, ,bycontrast,lostanestimated5percentofthe irpopulation, , , ,ideological,andreligiouswarsinthehistor yofmankind:FranceandBritainduringtheHund redYearsWar,orthewarsbetweenMuslimnation sandEuropeansthatincludedtheCrusades, , (becausenuclearweaponsaresoclumsy,evennu clearattacksaimedatmilitarytargetswouldl ikelykilllargenumbersofcivilians).Therei s,aswell, terrorbombing, , ,untilrecently, ,however,havedemonstratedthatterrorismra relyworks,thatitishardlymoreeffectivetha ntheleasteffectiveformsofcoercion, , ,Abrahmsfoundthatterroristgroupsweresucc essfulonly7percentofthetime. Withinthecoercionliterature, ,forexample,thaneventhesuccessrateofecon omicsanctions, 33 Inaddition,Abrahmsfoundthat thekeyvariableforterroristsuccesswasatac ticalone:targetselection.

9 34 Abrahmsdividesterroristgroupsintotwotype s:guerrillagroupsandcivilian-centricterr oristgroups. Guerrillagroups,bydefinition,mostlyattac kmilitaryanddiplomatictargets,suchasmili taryassets,diplomaticpersonnel,andpolice forces.[Civilian-centricterroristgroups] ,ontheotherhand,primarilyattackinnocentb ystandersandbusinesses. 35 Thechoiceoftarget,itturnsout, ,[civilian-centricterroristgroups]nevera ccomplishedtheirpolicygoals. 36 Abrahmsfoundthatthereasonattacksagainstc iviliansseemednottoworkisthatnomatterwha ttheactualgoaloftheterroristorganization , targetcountriesinferfromattacksontheirci viliansthatthegroupwantstodestroytheseco untries values,society,orboth. 37 Ifyouattackcivilians,inotherwords,nomatt erwhatsortofmessageyouintendtocommunicat e, :thetendencytodrawextremeconclusionsabou tone *evenifitwereonlyasingleweaponusedagains tasinglecity,andevenifitwereaccompaniedb yastronglywordeddiplomaticmessage* , , ,ifyourenemyintendstoexterminateyouTHEMY THOFNUCLEARDETERRENCE431underanycircumst ances, *farfrommotivatingnationstoconcede* intentionwastodestroytheircity,theyelect edtofight, ,theyshouldhavesurrendered, ,only55,000, , ,andifterroristattacksrarelysucceed,what basisisthereforconfidencethatnucleardete rrencewillsucceed?

10 ,itisargued, , ,forexample, , , diddeterrencework? ,particularlytheintentionofworldleaders* whoaretypicallyreluctanttoadmitbeingthwa rtedinalmostanycircumstances*arerarelydo cumented,andwhendocumentaryevidenceispre sent, , ,sometimesquitelong432 WARDWILSON periods, warweariness, economicexhaustion, or domesticpoliticaldistraction, butthepeaceafterWorldWarIItonucleardeter rence?Consider,forexample, ,Germany,England,France,Italy,Russia,the UnitedStates,andotherspossessedthemeansn ecessary(industrialcapacitytomassproduce thechemicalagents,bomberswithsufficientr angeandcarryingcapacity,navalshipscapabl eoffiringlargeshellsoverlongranges) ,properlyplannedandexecuted, !WorldWarIeraascribethepeacethatwasmaint ainedduringthoseyearstoa delicatebalance ,whyisitthatchemicalweaponsarenotseenash avingpreventedwarforthesevenyearsfrom191 8to1925?41 Locatingthereasonwhyanactionorphenomenon didnotoccur,findingthecauseofanabsence, , ,Isay,isthatnovampireshave,asyet, , ,agreedto, , , , , ,asthewindhasanunfortunatetendencytoblow inunexpecteddirections,andthebiologicala gentscan,undercertaincircumstances, , , ,however, ,difficulttoaim, ,nuclearweaponsaredangerous(andinducecau tion) , , ,theSovietswereverytoughinpost-warnegoti ations, ,despitepossessingthe ultimateweapon.