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Operational Lessons Learned in the Korean War

Operational Lessons Learned in the Korean War A Monograph by MAJOR Dale B. Woodhouse Army School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas AY 2011-002. Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 0704-0188. Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302.

Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited Operational Lessons Learned in the Korean War A Monograph by MAJOR Dale B. Woodhouse U.S. Army

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Transcription of Operational Lessons Learned in the Korean War

1 Operational Lessons Learned in the Korean War A Monograph by MAJOR Dale B. Woodhouse Army School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas AY 2011-002. Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 0704-0188. Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302.

2 Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS. 1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From - To). 01-12-2011 Monograph JAN 2011 DEC 2011. 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER. 5b. GRANT NUMBER. Operational Lessons Learned in the Korean War 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER. 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER. Major Dale B. Woodhouse, United States Army 5e. TASK NUMBER. 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER. 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8.

3 PERFORMING ORG REPORT. School of Advanced Military Studies NUMBER. 250 Gibbon Avenue Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134. 9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S. Command and General Staff College ACRONYM(S) CGSC. 731 McClellan Ave 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT. Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2134 NUMBER(S). 12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT. Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES. 14. ABSTRACT. More than 60 years since the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula, the United States Armed Forces continue to stand by the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines of the Republic of Korea in an effort to deter further North Korean aggression.

4 The purpose of this monograph is capture Operational Lessons Learned during the Korean War that should be taken into consideration by Operational planners as they prepare for future conflict on the peninsula. Looking at the Korean Peninsula's geography, weather and terrain, and place in the world highlight unique challenges Operational planners will face. The strategic context of North Korea's proximity and alliance to China is important to understand and take into consideration during any operation in the region. China considers North Korea as a buffer protecting its region of Manchuria. Encroachment of this border by foreign forces is a threat to Chinese sovereignty. China's continued support of the North Korean regime is essential to their survival and must always frame the Operational environment.

5 The Korean Peninsula is subject to weather extremes, such as monsoons and harsh winters that have a direct impact on operations. During the winter of 1950-1951, marines and soldiers faced sub-zero temperatures and heavy snowfall that blocked mountain passes and clogged main supply routes. Fifty years later, soldiers and airmen serving in Korea experienced another such harsh winter that limited operations because of heavy snowfall and had an impact their ability to respond to threats from the north. The reason that weather has such an Operational impact is because of the restrictive terrain found on the peninsula. The Korean Peninsula is primarily mountainous, with most valleys running north to south, and having limited east west cross mobility corridors.

6 In the north, limited infrastructure, such as road networks and expressways, compounds the problem. Add to this, population centers based around crossroads along the valley floors, and the terrain becomes even more restrictive to ground maneuvers. By examining combat operations during the Korean War, it becomes apparent that Operational planners must consider force structure. The allocation of force multipliers to enable independent brigade operations without the possibility of mutually supporting maneuver units is critical in Korea's restrictive terrain. 15. SUBJECT TERMS. Korean War, Operational Art 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON. OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES Thomas C.

7 Graves COL, Army a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 19b. PHONE NUMBER (include area code). (U) (U) (U) (U) 913-758-3302. Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98). Prescribed by ANSI Std. 2. SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES. MONOGRAPH APPROVAL. MAJ Dale B. Woodhouse Title of Monograph: Operational Lessons Learned in the Korean War Approved by: _____ Monograph Director Dan C. Fullerton, _____ Second Reader Jack A. Kelly, COL, FA. _____ Director, Thomas C. Graves, COL, IN School of Advanced Military Studies _____ Director, Robert F. Baumann, Graduate Degree Programs Disclaimer: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author, and do not represent the views of the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, the US Army Command and General Staff College, the United States Army, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.

8 Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. 3. Abstract More than 60 years since the outbreak of war on the Korean Peninsula, the United States Armed Forces continue to stand by the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines of the Republic of Korea in an effort to deter further North Korean aggression. The purpose of this monograph is capture Operational Lessons Learned during the Korean War that should be taken into consideration by Operational planners as they prepare for future conflict on the peninsula. Looking at the Korean Peninsula's geography, weather and terrain, and place in the world highlight unique challenges Operational planners will face. The strategic context of North Korea's proximity and alliance to China is important to understand and take into consideration during any operation in the region.

9 China considers North Korea as a buffer protecting its region of Manchuria. Encroachment of this border by foreign forces is a threat to Chinese sovereignty. China's continued support of the North Korean regime is essential to their survival and must always frame the Operational environment. The Korean Peninsula is subject to weather extremes, such as monsoons and harsh winters that have a direct impact on operations. During the winter of 1950- 1951, marines and soldiers faced sub-zero temperatures and heavy snowfall that blocked mountain passes and clogged main supply routes. Fifty years later, soldiers and airmen serving in Korea experienced another such harsh winter that limited operations because of heavy snowfall and had an impact their ability to respond to threats from the north.

10 The reason that weather has such an Operational impact is because of the restrictive terrain found on the peninsula. The Korean Peninsula is primarily mountainous, with most valleys running north to south, and having limited east west cross mobility corridors. In the north, limited infrastructure, such as road networks and expressways, compounds the problem. Add to this, population centers based around crossroads along the valley floors, and the terrain becomes even more restrictive to ground maneuvers. By examining combat operations during the Korean War, it becomes apparent that Operational planners must consider force structure. The allocation of force multipliers to enable independent brigade operations without the possibility of mutually supporting maneuver units is critical in Korea's restrictive terrain.


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