PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF ON WAR

1 PREPAREDUNDERTHEAUSPICESOFTHECENTEROFINT ERNATIONALSTUDIESPRINCETONUNIVERSITYALIS TOFOTHERCENTERPUBLICATIONSAPPEARSATTHEBA CKOFTHEBOOKCARLVONCLAUSEWITZONWARE ditedandTranslatedbyMICHAELHOWARDandPETE RPARETI ntroductoryEssaysbyPETERPARET,MICHAELHOW ARD,andBERNARDBRODIE;witha CommentarybyBERNARDBRODIEI ndexbyROSALIEWESTPRINCETONUNIVERSITYPRES SPRINCETON,NEWJERSEY-CHAPTERONEWhatIsWar ? proposetoconsiderfirstthevariouselements ofthesubject,nextitsvari-ouspartsorsecti ons, ,I ;forheremorethanelsewherethepartandthewh olemustalwaysbethoughtoftogether. shallnotbeginbyexpoundinga pedantic,literarydefinitionofwar,butgost raighttotheheartofthematter,tothedueLWar isnothingbutaduelona ,buta pictureofitasa wholecanbeformedbyimagininga ; ,tocounteropposingforce, ,imperceptiblelimita-tionshardlyworthmen tioning,knownasinternationallawandcustom , ,physicalforce,formoralforcehasno existencesaveasexpressedinthestateandthe law-isthusthemeansofwar; ;andthat,intheory, , , ,itisa fallacythatmustbeexposed:warissucha , ,whiletheothersiderefrains,thefirstwill~ ain~he,upperhand,Thatsidewillforcetheoth ertofollowsuit;eachWilldnveI~Sopponentto ward extremes, 'ITh.

2 't'totryandshutone' 'thIfwarsbetweencivilizednationsarefarle ss, , ' ;renotpartofwar;theyalreadyexistbeforefi g~ :h~stl! ~hngsan~ , ~ ,almostinstinctive,passi? ~ ,civili~edpeoplesbyth'ndThedifferencehow everliesnotintherespectivenaturesofeml." .,,savageryandcivilization, ,mstItutIons, ,therefore, ,butit ,mshort, ,itwouldbeanobviousfallacytoImagmewarbet wee~civilizedpeoplesasresultingmerelyfro ma rational, ~hepartof0elfgovernmentsandtoconceiveofw arasgraduallynddmgItse~fo~paSSion,sothat intheendonewouldneverreallyneedtousethep hYSicalImpactofthefightingforces-compara tivefiguresoftheirstrengthwouldbeenough, Thatwouldbea kindofwarbyalgebra,.Theoristswerealready beginningtothinkalongsuchhneswhen,therec entwarstaughtthema , ,buttheywiDstillaffectit tosomedegree,andtheextenttowhichtheydo~ ~butonhowimportanttheconfhctmgmterestsar eandonhowlongtheirconflictlasts.,.Ifthen ,civilizednationsdonotputtheirpnsonersto deathord~vasta~citie~andcountries, ~:nothingpracticaltoalterordeflecttheimp ulsetodestroytheenemy, ,then,mustberepeated:warisanactofforce, ,therefore,compels'~sopponenttofollowsui t;a reciprocalactionisstartedwhichmustlead,: ntheory, "extreme" THEAIMIsToDISARMTHEENEMYI havealreadysaidthattheaimofwarfareistodi sarmtheenemyanditistimetoshowthat,atleas tintheory, ,atleastintheory,beofa ,ifyouaretoforcetheenemy,bymakingwaronhi m,todoyourbidding,youmusteithermakehimli terallydefense-lessoratleastputhimina ,then,thattoovercometheenemy,ordisarmhim -callitwhatyouwill-mustalwaysbetheaimofw arfare,War,however,isnottheactionofa livingforceuponalifelessmass(totalnonres istancewouldbenowaratall)butalwaysthecol lisionoftwolivingforces,Theultimateaimof wagingwar,asformulatedhere, , amnotincontrol:hedictatestomeasmuchasI "extreme.

3 "5 THEMAXIMUMEXERTIONOFSTRENGTHI fyouwanttoovercomeyourenemyyoumustmatchy oureffortagainsthispowerofresistance,whi chcanbeexpressedastheproductoftwoinsepar ablefactors, , reasonablyaccurateestimateoftheenemy'spo werofresistance,youCanadjustyourowneffor tsaccordingly;thatis,youcaneitherincreas ethemuntiltheySUrpasstheenemy'sor,ifthis isbeyondyourmeans, ;competitionwillagainresultand,inpurethe ory, "extreme," , ;butifyoudidsotheCOn-tinuousinteractionw ouldlandyouinextremesthatrepresentednoth ibuta playoftheimaginationissuingfromanalmosti nvisiblesequence~ ,wecouldavoideverydifficultybya strokeofthepenandproclaimwithinflexiblel ogicthat,sincetheextrememustalwaysbetheg oal, ,onemustadmitthatthehumanmindisunlikely1 0consenttobeingruledbysucha , , , , ,itwouldif:(a)warwereawhollyisolatedact, occurringsuddenlyandnotproducedbypreviou seventsinthepoliticalworld;(b)it consistedofa singledecisiveaelora setofsimultaneousones;(c)thedecisionachi evedwascompleteandperfectinitself,uninfl uencedbyanypreviousestimateofthepolitica lsitua ,it-mustberememberedthatneitheropponenti sanabstractpersontotheother,noteventothe extentofthatfactorinthepowerofresistance ,namelythewill, whollyunknownfactor; , largeextentbywhatheisanddoes,insteadofju dginchimbywhathe,strictlyspeaking, ,however,arealwayssomethingshortofperfec tandwillneverquiteachi~ :Ifwarconsistedofonedecisiveact,orofa setofsimultaneousdecisions,reparationswo uldtendtowardtotality,fornoomissioncould everbe~.

4 'fthedecisioninwarconsistsofseveralsucce ssiveacts,theneachofthem,~eenincontext,w illprovidea , ,ofcourse,if allthemeansavailablewere,orcouldbe,simul taneouslyemployed,allwarswouldautomatica llybeconfinedtoa singledecisiveactorasetofsimultaneousone s-thereasonbeingthatanyadversedecisionmu streducethesumofthemeansavailable,andifa llhadbeencommittedinthefirstacttherecoul dreallybenoquestionofa , ,asI showedabove,assoonaspreparationsfora warbegin,theworldofrealitytakesoverfromt heworldofabstractthought;materialcalcula tionstaketheplaceofhypotheticalextremesa nd,if fornootherreason, , ~ghtingforcesproper,thecountry,withitsph ysicalfeaturesandpop-ulation, ~-ismorethanjustthesourceofallarmedforce sproper;itisinitselfanintegralelementamo ngthefactorsatworkinwar-thoughonlythatpa rtwhichistheactualtheaterofoperationsorh asa , nodoubt,touseallmobilefightingforcessimu ltaneously;butwithfortresses,rivers,moun tains,inhabitants,andsoforth,thatcannotb edone;not,inshort,withthecountryasa whole, ,alliesdo~ ;,mternationalrelationsbeingwhattheyare, suchcooperationisoftenf~mlshedonlyatsome laterstageorincreasedonlywhena balancehasbeendIsturbedandneedscorrectio n.

5 ,Inmanycases, , 2------------~ , maximumefforttoobtainthefirstdecision, defeatISalwaysa ~the~rstclashisnottheonlyone,theinfluenc eit~ ,andthetendencythereforeisalwaystop~e~ ~forthefirst~ real,objectivereasonfortheothertoreducei tsefforts,~ ,eventheultimateoutcomeofa remedymaystillbefoundinpoliticalconditio nsatsomelate~ ,too, , ; , ~1affairbuta seriesofactionsobeyingitsownpeculiarlaws , 'scharacter,fromhisinstitutions,thestat: , ,eachside,usingthelawsofp~obablllty,fo~s anestimateofitsopponent' ~ ,thewillto?vercometheene~ ~lna tionwanes, ~17ulaho~01probabilitiesbasedongivenindi vidualsandcondition~, !.whichwastheoriginalmotive,mustbecomean essentialfactormtheeqUl' ,thelessyou~nexpecthimtotryanddenyittoyo u;thesmallertheefforthemakes, ,themoremodestyourownpoliticalaim, ~simportancey~ ,however, ,notwithabstractions, , particularaction, ,sucha massofinflammablematerial, politicalobjectisexpectedtoarouseineithe rstate, ,theconquestofa ,anothermilitaryobjectivemustbeadoptedth atwillservethepoliticalpurposeandsymboli zeit ,too, ,ifthepoliticalobjectistobeachieved, , ,a militaryobjectivethatmatchesthepolitical objectinscalewill,ifthelatterisreduced,b ereducedinproportion; ,rangingfroma differentquestion, ,howeversmallthemeansemployed,howeverlim itedthemilitaryobjective,cantheprocess81 BOOKONE ofwareverbeinterrupted,evenfora moment?

6 , taskinhisownway;a slowman,however,doesnoidoit moreslowlybecausehewantstospendmoretimeo verit, ,then,isdeterminedbysubjectivecausesandi sa everyactioninwarisalloweditsappropriated uration,wewouldagreethat,atleastatfirsts ight, ,ANDITSEEMSTHATITCANNEVERBEPRESENTONMORE THANONESIDEI ftwopartieshavepreparedforwar, (donotnegotiatea settlement) :adesiretowaitfora ,theother' standstill,forifsucha ,however,conceiveofa stateofbalanceinwhichthesidewiththeposit iveaim(thesidewiththestrongergroundsfora ction) , ,however,somealterationweretobeforeseen, ,therefore,thatoneofthetwostateshasa positiveaim-say,theconquestofa partoftheother'sterritory, ,thepoliticalobjecthasbeenachieved;there isnoneedtodomore, , ~it mustdosomething;andifitthinksitwillbebet terorganizedforaction8:zCHAPTERONE infourweeks'timeit ,logicwouldseemtocallforactionbytheother 'de-theobjectbeingtodenytheenemythetimeh eneedsforgettings~dY,ThroughoutallthisI haveassumed,ofcourse,thatbothsidesunder- 'sfeelingsandinjectthemwithmorepassionan delementalstrength,buteventswouldfollowm orecloselyoneachotherandbegov-ernedbya , ,ofcourse, verysmallpartofthetimeisoccupiedbyaction , ;inotherwords,itisnota , ,wehaveassumeda , , battleeachsideaimsatvictory;thatisa caseoftruepolarity, ,however,wearedealingwithtwodifferentthi ngsthathavea commonrelationexter-naltothemselves, ,POLARITYCANNOTBEApPLIEDTOTHEMI fwarassumedonlya singleform,namely,attackingtheenemy,andd efensewerenonexistent.

7 Or,toputit inanotherway,if theonlydifferencesbetweenattackanddefens elayinthefactthatattackhasapositiveaimwh ereasdefensehasnot,andtheformsoffighting wereidentical; , ,then,doesnotlieinattackordefense, ,theothermustwanttohastenit, 'sinterestnottoattackBnowbuttoattackhimi nfourweeks,thenitisinB'sinterestnottobea ttackedinfourweeks'time, ;butitdoesnotfollowfromthisthatitwouldal sobetoB' ,ANDTHISEXPLAINSTHESUSPENSIONOFMILITARYA CTIONA sweshallshow,defenseisa ~ ~neveritisnot,it ,then,thattheimpulsecreatedbythepolarity ofinterestsmaybeexhaustedinthedifference betweenthestrengthofattackanddefense, ,ifthesidefavoredbypresentconditionsis?o t~ufficientlystrongtodowithouttheaddedad vantagesofthedef~~se,I~willhavetoacceptt heprospectofactingunderunfavorablecondlh ~ ~ defensivebattleundertheselessfavorableco nditions~ amconvmcedthatthesuperiorityofthedefensi ve(ifrightlyunderstood)isverygreat, ,themorewilltheybeoverlaidandneutralized bythisdisparitybetweenattackanddefense.

8 Hisopponent'shecanknowonlyfromunreha~ ,therefore, ~ ~ timedactionastoill-timedinaction, ,it mustrankamong84 CHAPTERONE thenaturalcauseswhich,withoutentailing inconsistency, 'sstrengthtoohighthantoolow, ,onem~ ~tialignoranceofthesituationis,generally speakIng,a furthermoderatingeffectontheprogressofth ewarbydilutingit,sotospeak,intimebydelay ingdanger, ,andthegreatertheconsequentwareffort, ,theweakerthemotiveforconflict, ,andwillpower,asweknow, FREQUENTPERIODSOFINACTIONREMOVEWARSTILLF URTHERFROMTHEREALMOFTHEABSOLUTEANDMAKEIT EVENMOREAMATTEROFASSESSINGPROBABILITIEST heslowertheprogressandthemorefrequentthe interruptionsofmilitaryactiontheeasierit istoretrievea mistake,thebolderwillbethegeneral'sasses sments, , ,ANDTHATELEMENTIsNEVERABSENT[ , ~sto?efought-itwilllookmorethaneverlikea '. Ig , ,ontheotherhand,boldness,rashness,trusti ninluckareonlyvariantsofcourage, ,absolute,so-calledmathematical,factorsn everfindafirmbas' ~bilities,probabilities,goodluckandbadth atweavesitswaythroughoutth~ gameofcards.]

9 ' , ,itcanrevelinawealthofpossibilities;whic hinspirecouragetotakewinganddiveintothee lementofdaringanddangerlikea ,andcheerfullygoonelaboratingabsolutecon clusionsandprescriptions? ,itmustalsotakethehumanfactorintoaccount ,andfindroomforcour age,boldness, ,itcannotattaintheabsolute,orcertainty;i tmustalwaysleavea marginforuncertainty,inthegreatestthings as~ , , confidenceareessentialinwar,andtheorysho uldproposeonlyrulesthatgiveamplescopetot hesefinestandleastdispensableofmilitaryv irtues, ;butheretheyaremeasuredbya :AMOREPRECISEDEFINITIONOFWARS uchiswar,suchisthecommanderwhodirectsit, ;itisnomerejoyindaringandwinning, seriousmeanstoa seriousend,andallitscolorfulresemblancet oa gameofchance,allthevicissitudesofpas-sio n,courage,imagination,andenthusiasmit ,andespecial~civilizedpeoples-thereasona lwaysliesinsomepoliticalsituation,andthe 86 CHAPTERONE occasionisal, ,therefore,isanactofpolicy,WereIt a complete,untrammeled,absolutemanifestati onofviolence(asthepureconceptwo~ldreqUir e),warwouldofitsownindependentwillusurpt hepl.

10 Itll'ouldthendnvepohcyoutofofficeandrule bythelawsofitsownnature,"ervmuchlikea ,infact, , ,ashasbeenshown, , ; pulsationofviolence, ;butitalwayslastslongenoughforinfluencet obeexertedonthegoalandforitso~ncoursetob echangedinonewayoranother-longenough,ino therwords,toremainsubjecttotheactionofa , ,however, ,~oits,chosenmeans,aprocesswhichcanradic allychangeit;yetthepoh~ ~ ,then,willper-meateallmlhtaryoperations, and,insofarastheirviolentnaturewilladmit ,itwillhavea +WARIsMERELYTHECONTINUATIONOFPOLICYBYOTH ERMEANSW esee,therefore,thatwarisnotmerelyanactof policybuta truepoliticalInstrument,a continuationofpoliticalintercourse, ,andthecommanderinanyspecificinstance,is entitledtorequirethatthetrenda? ,ofcourse,ISnosmalldemand;buthowevermuch it ,it ,,warISthemeansofreachingit, ~ebmo~ ,themoretheyaffectelhgerentnationsandthe fiercerthetensionsthatprecedetheout-87-- BOOKONE break,thecloserwillwarapproachitsabstrac tconcept,themoreimportawillbethedestruct ionoftheenemy,themorecloselywillthemilit aryai~andthepoliticalobjectsofwarcoincid e,andthemoremilitarya~ theotherhand,thelessintensethmotives,the lesswilIthemilitaryelement'snaturaltende ncytoviolen~ result,warwillbedrivenfurtherfromit~natu ral,cours,e,thepoliticalobject:-vill?