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1 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE Newport, THE EGYPTIAN STAFF SOLUTION: OPERATIONAL ART ANT) PLANNING FOR THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR by Edwin S. Cochran MAJ, Army A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Maritime Operations. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy. Signature: 13 February 1998 D SMEB TTON STATEMENT A Approved for public release; Distribution Unlimited GERALD COL, IN SENIOR ARMY ADVISOR MQ708 Q6J DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 1 Security Classification This Page REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED 2.

2 Security Classification Authority: 3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule: 4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR ' PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED. 5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT 6. Office Symbol: 7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207 8. Title (Include Security Classified ): THE EGYPTIAN STAFF SOLUTION: OPERATIONAL ART AND PLANNING FOR THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR (U) 9. Personal Authors: MAJ EDWIN S. COCHRAN, USA of Report: FINAL 11. Date of Report: 13 FEBRUARY 1998 Count: 42 Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department.

3 The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy. 14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: STRATEGIC CONTEXT; OPERATIONAL PLANNING; ANALYSIS; SPACE, TIME, FORCE; TACTICAL; TECHNOLOGICAL SURPRISE 15 Abstract* Operation BADR, the coordinated Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel which initiated the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, provides a clear historical example of a nation's 'use of a major military operation to achieve its strategic objective. Specifically, it ended the politically ambiguous relationship of "no peace", no war" between Egypt and Israel and set the conditions for the eventual negotiation of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.

4 Operation BADR also demonstrates that a relatively weak state is capable of reforming its military and overcoming a powerful adversary through skillful application of operational art and thorough planning. The paper first places the 1973 Arab-Israeli War in its strategic context. It defines Egyptian President Sadat's national policy objective, describes the historical background to the war, and explains the strategic alternatives available to Egypt. Next, it analyzes Egyptian operational planning, with emphasis on the analysis of Israel's critical factors and Egyptian analysis and balancing of the operational factors of space, time, and force.

5 It then briefly describes the execution of Operation BADR and finally draws a series of conclusions useful to operational level commanders. / Availability of Abstract: Unclassified Same As Rpt DTIC Users Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT : 841-6461 Symbol: Security Classification of This Page Unclassified J Abstract of THE EGYPTIAN STAFF SOLUTION: OPERATIONAL ART AND PLANNING FOR THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR Operation BADR, the coordinated Egyptian-Syrian attack on Israel which initiated the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, provides a clear historical example of a nation's use of a major military operation to achieve its strategic objective.

6 Specifically, it ended the politically ambiguous relationship of "no peace, no war" between Egypt and Israel, and set the conditions for the eventual negotiation of an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. Operation BADR also demonstrates that a relatively weak state is capable of reforming its military and overcoming a powerful adversary through skillful application of operational art and thorough planning. The paper first places the 1973 Arab-Israeli War in its strategic context. It defines Egyptian President Sadat's national policy objective, describes the historical background to the war, and explains the strategic alternatives available to Egypt.

7 Next, it analyzes Egyptian operational planning, with emphasis on the analysis of Israel's critical factors and Egyptian analysis and balancing of the operational factors of space, time, and force. It then briefly describes the execution of Operation BADR and, finally, draws a series of conclusions useful to operational-level commanders. Its primary conclusion is that the key to Egyptian success in 1973 was skillful, thorough operational planning which allowed them to neutralize many of Israel's critical strengths (especially firepower and mobility) and exploit its critical weaknesses. Conclusions also address the Egyptian ability to achieve operational, tactical, and technological surprise, and the political impact of Operation BADR on the international community.

8 CONTENTS Abstract List of Illustrations iv I. Introduction 1 II. The Strategic Context 2 III. Egyptian Operational Planning 5 IV. Execution 13 V. Conclusions 15 Illustrations 19 Appendix A: The Egyptian Order of Battle 27 Notes 29 Bibliography 36 in LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS FIGURE 1. Israeli Territorial Expansion 19 2. The Sinai Desert 20 3. Egyptian Dispositions, 6 October 1973 21 4. Egyptian Air Operations, 6 October 1973 22 5. Egyptian Consolidation on the East Bank 23 1. Reduction of the Bar-Lev Line 24 7. Israeli Counterattacks, 7-8 October 1973 25 8. Israeli Counterattacks and Final Positions at Cease-Fire 26 IV THE EGYPTIAN STAFF SOLUTION: OPERATIONAL ART AND PLANNING FOR THE 1973 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR I.

9 INTRODUCTION On 6 October 1973, the armed forces of Egypt and Syria executed Operation BADR,1 the coordinated attack on Israel which initiated the 1973 Arab-Israeli An understanding of the planning and execution of Operation BADR is important to operational-level commanders for two reasons. First, it provides a clear historical example of a nation's use of a major military operation to achieve its strategic objective. While the war ended in an Arab military defeat, it was also a partial Arab political and strategic victory, particularly for Egypt. Specifically, it ended the politically ambiguous relationship of "no peace, no war" between Egypt and Israel, and set the political conditions for the eventual negotiation of an Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty.

10 Operation BADR also demonstrates that a relatively weak state, even one which has previously experienced a decisive military defeat, is capable of reforming its military and overcoming a powerful adversary's significant advantages through skillful application of operational art4 and thorough planning. This paper presents an analysis of Egyptian planning for Operation It first places the 1973 Arab-Israeli War in its strategic context. Second, it analyzes Egyptian operational planning, with emphasis on the analysis of Israel's critical factors and Egyptian analysis and balancing of the operational factors of space, time, and force. It then briefly describes the execution of Operation BADR and, finally, draws a series of conclusions useful to operational-level commanders.