THE STAFFING AND EVALUATION OF CANADIAN …

1 THESTAFFING ANDEVALUATION OFCANADIAN deputy MINISTERS INCOMPARATIVE WESTMINSTERPERSPECTIVE:APROPOSAL FORREFORMP eter Aucoin11 IInnttrroodduuccttiioonnThere is mounting evidence that the existing CANADIAN model of aprofessional, non-partisan public service needs to be reformed if thepublic service is to have sufficient independence from the governmentof the day in order to secure its neutrality in the administration of existing model is one that has been reformed in many wayssince it was established in the early part of the 20th mostimportant missing piece in reforms to the model is the STAFFING andmanagement of the deputy minister cadre that constitutes the297professional leadership of the public conventions respectingthe STAFFING and management of the deputy minister cadre that onceserved to secure the required neutrality of the public service havediminished in their this paper.

2 I first outline the basic elements of the CANADIAN modeland its conventions as they relate to the STAFFING and management ofthe deputy minister cadre. I then introduce the political pressures onthe public service from what I call the New Public Governance. I seekto distinguish this development from the New Public Management, amore loosely defined and internationally applied potpourri of publicmanagement reforms that has introduced another set of pressures onthe public service but which has a different kind of impact on the issuesof public service independence and neutrality. Third, I analyze theCanadian experience within a comparative westminster perspective inorder to highlight the extent to which the CANADIAN experience is notunique and to identify possible avenues of reform. Finally, I propose aset of reforms that builds on the traditional CANADIAN and Westminsterconventions while establishing a firmer base of public serviceindependence and thus neutrality in the administration of public TThhee CCaannaaddiiaann MMooddeell aanndd CCoonnvveennttiioonnssThe most recent reforms to the CANADIAN public service system havesought to reinforce the professional and non-partisan characteristics ofthe public authority to staff the public service is vested inthe Public Service Commission (PSC), an independent executive agency,headed by a President and two (or more) part-time commissioners.

3 Itis independent insofar as the authority to staff the public service isvested with the commission and not with ministers. Ministers, in otherwords, are deprived of what is usually considered a fundamental executivefunction, namely, STAFFING the executive s : PARLIAMENT,MINISTERS ANDDEPUTYMINISTERSH owever, not all those who are conventionally regarded as publicservants are appointed by or under the authority of the twohighest ranks in the public service deputy ministers and associatedeputy ministers are appointed instead by the Prime Minister usingthe authority of the Governor in most senior deputyminister is the Clerk of the Privy Council, who is also Secretary toCabinet and Head of the Public Service, and who serves as the deputyminister to the Prime Minister. The Clerk leads the deputy ministercommunity, and chairs the Committee of Senior Officials (COSO) thatassists in managing the deputy minister cadre.

4 The Clerk, assisted bythis committee, advises the Prime Minister on deputy minister staffingand performance EVALUATION (Canada, Privy Council Office 2003). Independent Public Service STAFFING The most recent reforms did not alter this traditional structure ofauthority. STAFFING authority remains with the commission, even thoughthe new regime is designed to have the commission delegate staffingauthority to deputy commission then holds deputies toaccount for their use of this authority, with sanctions that the commissioncan apply if it decides they are necessary. STAFFING is to be based on merit and merit is defined in ways that are meant to guard against bothpartisan considerations and bureaucratic the same time, the neutrality of the public service has beenstrengthened by the personal decision of the first President followingthe reform to position the PSC more explicitly at arm s length fromthe deputy minister community.

5 For many years the President of thecommission participated as a member of the deputy minister communityin regard to corporate responsibilities for human resources managementacross the public service, notwithstanding the commission s unique statusas an independent executive agency. Some were subsequently appointedThe STAFFING and EVALUATION of CANADIAN deputy Ministers in 299 comparative westminster perspective : a proposal for Reformto other positions in the public service, including the position of deputyminister. These presidents were treated, in other words, as akin to adeputy present, the President of the commission no longerparticipates as a member of the deputy minister President of the commission is now appointed by the Governorin Council with the approval of Parliament, serves a seven-year termduring good behavior, and can be removed only on address to theHouse of Commons and conditions of the position clearlydistinguish it from those of deputy ministers who are appointed andserve at the pleasure of the Prime Minister.

6 What is new in theseconditions is the requirement that the government s appointee beapproved by the two houses of Parliament. More importantly, both thePresident of the commission and the Clerk have agreed that a newrelationship is in order. It was noteworthy that the first president underthis new regime was appointed from the Office of the Auditor General,and not from the deputy (or associate deputy ) minister cadre or fromthe public service appointed under the authority of the PSC, and shewill have reached retirement age at the conclusion of her new relationship between the President of the commission and theClerk and the deputy minister community was needed because thePresident had increasingly become viewed as a member of the seniorpublic service executive team. This raised concerns about theindependence of STAFFING in the public service insofar as the seniorexecutive of the public service has been seen by some to be toopolitically responsive to the government of the some observerssee it, deputy ministers now function with less independence fromministers than is required for them to ensure the neutrality of thepublic service.

7 As Donald Savoie puts it, the bargain respecting theindependence of the public service that once secured the neutrality ofthe service has been broken (Savoie 2003). The CANADIAN system ofstaffing and managing the deputy minister cadre is regarded by public300 VOLUME1: PARLIAMENT,MINISTERS ANDDEPUTYMINISTERS service leaders in other westminster systems as the most politicized,given the powers of the CANADIAN prime minister relative counterpartsin Britain, Australia and New Conventions of the Neutral Public ServiceThe existing regime for the STAFFING , managing and evaluating deputyministers, in my opinion, is a fundamental part of the problem. Thetraditional model is based partly on convention. Formally, as notedabove, the Prime Minister, as head of government, appoints, assigns, andremoves deputy ministers, using the statutory authority vested in theGovernor in in the case of the Prime Minister, whoappoints his or her own deputy minister, ministers do not appoint theirdeputy they may be consulted on appointments, theappointment of deputy ministers is deemed a prime minister sprerogative.

8 Ministers have no right to challenge a prime minister s staffingdecisions. These powers in respect to the deputy minister cadrecomplement the Prime Minister s powers in respect to the appointment,assignment, and removal of the ministers prime minister,in these respects, is the first minister, the chief convention or tradition, however, the Prime Minister decides onappointments, assignments and dismissals on the basis of advice fromthe Clerk, assisted by by convention, deputy ministers areappointed primarily but not exclusively from among the ranks of thepublic service that is staffed under the authority of the PSC on the basisof merit, the highest rank being assistant deputy minister, although thereis now increased interest in recruiting more deputy ministers fromoutside the appointment to the deputy minister cadre is thususually a career promotion based on considerations, by the Clerk andCOSO.

9 Of ability and past performance of career public servants fromthe federal public service. The appointment is meant to be based onmerit, as is the case with the public service that is staffed by or underThe STAFFING and EVALUATION of CANADIAN deputy Ministers in 301 comparative westminster perspective : a proposal for Reformthe authority of the PSC. Notwithstanding their formal appointmentby the Governor in Council and the prerogative powers of the PrimeMinister, deputy ministers are thereby deemed to be professional andnon-partisan public servants. The prerogative powers of the PrimeMinister, in other words, give way to an understanding, or bargain, thatallows the public service leadership themselves to staff and manage thedeputy minister very few exceptions to this tradition, where the Prime Ministeron his or her personal initiative appoints a deputy minister from outsidethe public service, serve to confirm the acceptance of the convention,especially in those instances where a prime minister is seen to be actingfrom a partisan tradition of the federal public serviceis also seen to stand in sharp contrast to the more partisan-politicaltraditions or practices in some, if not all, provincial governments(Lindquist 2000).

10 Where such partisan-politicization occurs, deputyministers are appointed by the premier precisely because they areknown to share the partisan persuasions of the government of the usually means that these deputy ministers are recruited andappointed from outside the provincial public service in question,especially following a change in government. In some instances, attentionis given to their qualifications as well ( partisan but expert ); in someother instances, partisanship and/or personal connections to thepremier are the dominant, even exclusive, considerations. In the lattercases, appointments come close to being patronage appointments forpast partisan services rendered and invariably have the not unexpectedconsequences of introducing incompetence into the public service. Inany event, where partisan considerations come into play the deputyministers in question are merely an extension of the ministry; howeverotherwise personally qualified, they cannot claim to be members of theprofessional and non-partisan public service.