The Uses of Argument, Updated Edition - Weebly

1 The uses of Argument, Updated Edition A central theme throughout the impressive series of philosophicalbooks and articles Stephen Toulmin has published since1948is theway in which assertions and opinions concerning all sorts of topics,brought up in everyday life or in academic research, can be rationallyjustified. Is there one universal system of norms, by which all sorts ofarguments in all sorts of fields must be judged, or must each sort ofargument be judged according to its own norms? InThe uses of Argument(1958)Toulmin sets out his views on thesequestions for the first time. Reacting severely against the narrow approach to ordinary arguments taken in syllogistic and modernlogic, he advocates analogous with existing practice in the field oflaw a procedural rather than formal notion of validity.

2 Accordingto Toulmin, certain constant ( field-invariant ) elements can be dis-cerned in the way in which argumentation develops, while in everycase there will also be some variable ( field-dependent ) elementsin the way in which it is to be judged. Toulmin s broader approachaims at creating a more epistemological and empirical logic that takesboth types of elements into account. In spite of initial criticisms from logicians and fellow philosophers,The uses of Argumenthas been an enduring source of inspiration anddiscussion to students of argumentation from all kinds of disciplinarybackgrounds for more than forty years. Not only Toulmin s views onthe field-dependency of validity criteria but also his model of the layout arguments , with its description of the functional moves inthe argumentation process, have made this book a modern classic inthe study of argumentation.

3 Frans van Eemeren,University of AmsterdamThe uses of ArgumentUpdated EditionSTEPHEN E. TOULMINU niversity of Southern California Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, S o PauloCambridge University PressThe Edinburgh Building, Cambridge , United KingdomFirst published in print format isbn-13 978-0-521-82748-5 hardbackisbn-13 978-0-521-53483-3 paperbackisbn-13 978-0-511-06271-1 eBook (NetLibrary) Stephen E. Toulmin 2003 Cambridge University Press 1958 Stephen E. Toulmin 2003 First published 1958 First paperback Edition 1964 Updated Edition first published 20032003 Information on this title: book is in copyright.

4 Subject to statutory exception and to the provision ofrelevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take placewithout the written permission of Cambridge University 0-511-06271-0 eBook (NetLibrary)isbn-10 0-521-82748-5 hardbackisbn-10 0-521-53483-6 paperbackCambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of s for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does notguarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New - - - - - - ContentsPreface to the Updated EditionpageviiPreface to the Paperback EditionxiPreface to the First EditionxiiiIntroduction1I.

5 Fields of Argument and Modals11 The Phases of an Argument15 Impossibilities and Improprieties21 Force and Criteria28 The Field-Dependence of Our Standards33 Questions for the Agenda36II. Probability41I Know, I Promise, Probably44 Improbable But True 49 Improper Claims and Mistaken Claims53 The Labyrinth of Probability57 Probability and Expectation61 Probability-Relations and Probabilification66Is the Word Probability Ambiguous?69 Probability-Theory and Psychology77 The Development of Our Probability-Concepts82 III. The Layout of Arguments87 The Pattern of an Argument: Data and Warrants89 The Pattern of an Argument: Backing Our Warrants95 Ambiguities in the Syllogism100 The Notion of Universal Premisses 105 The Notion of Formal Validity110vviContentsAnalytic and Substantial Arguments114 The Peculiarities of Analytic Arguments118 Some Crucial Distinctions125 The Perils of Simplicity131IV.

6 Working Logic and Idealised Logic135An Hypothesis and Its Consequences136 The Verification of This Hypothesis143 The Irrelevance of Analytic Criteria153 Logical Modalities156 Logic as a System of Eternal Truths163 System-Building and Systematic Origins of Epistemological Theory195 Further Consequences of Our Hypothesis201 Can Substantial arguments be Redeemed? I: Transcendentalism206 Can Substantial arguments be Redeemed? II: Phenomenalismand Scepticism211 Substantial arguments Do Not Need Redeeming214 The Justification of Induction217 Intuition and the Mechanism of Cognition221 The Irrelevance of the Analytic Ideal228 Conclusion233 References239 Index241 Preface to the Updated EditionBooks are like children.

7 They leave home, make new friends, but rarelycall home, even collect. You find out what they have been up to only bychance. A man at a party turns out to be one of those new friends. Soyou are George s father? Imagine that! So has been the relation betweenThe uses of Argumentand its I wrote it, my aim was strictly philosophical: to criticize the as-sumption, made by most Anglo-American academic philosophers, thatany significant argument can be put in formal terms: not just as asyllogism,since for Aristotle himself any inference can be called a syllogism or linking of statements , but a rigidly demonstrative deduction of the kindto be found in Euclidean geometry.

8 Thus was created the Platonic tradi-tion that, some two millennia later, was revived by Ren e Descartes. ReadersofCosmopolis,ormymore recentReturn to Reason, will be familiar with thisgeneral view of no way had I set out to expound a theory of rhetoric or argumenta-tion: my concern was with twentieth-century epistemology, not informallogic. Still less had I in mind an analytical model like that which, amongscholars of Communication, came to be called the Toulmin model .Many readers in fact gave me an historical background that consignedme to a premature death. When my fianc ee was reading Law, for instance,a fellow-student remarked on her unusual surname: his girlfriend [he ex-plained] had come across it in one of her textbooks, but when he reportedthat Donna was marrying the author, she replied, That s impossible: He sdead!

9 ViiviiiPreface to the Updated EditionMy reaction to being (so to say) adopted by the CommunicationCommunity was, I confess, less inquisitive than it should have been. Eventhe fact that the late Gilbert Ryle gave the book to Otto Bird to review,and Dr Bird wrote of it as being a revival of theTopics made no im-pression on me. Only when I started working in Medical Ethics, and Ireread Aristotle with greater understanding, did the point of this com-mentary sink in. (The book,The Abuse of Casuistry, the scholarly researchfor which was largely the work of my fellow-author, Albert R. Jonsen,was the first solid product of that change of mind.)

10 Taking all thingstogether, our collaboration, first on the National Commission for theProtection of Human Research Subjects, and subsequently on the book,left us with a picture of Aristotle as more of a pragmatist, and less of a for-malist, than historians of thought have tended to assume since the HighMiddle , the earliest books of Aristotle sOrganonare still known as thePriorandPosterior Analytics; but this was, of course, intended to contrastthem with the later books on Ethics, Politics, Aesthetics, and Rhetoric.(The opening of theRhetoricin fact takes up arguments that Aristotlehad included in the Nicomachean Ethics.) So, after all, Otto Bird hadmade an important point.