THE YOM KIPPUR WAR - carterscott.com

1 CAUGHT ON THE H O P : THE. YOM KIPPUR WAR. Elizabeth Stephens examines how thirty-five years ago this month the surprise invasion of Israel by Egypt and its allies started the process that led to Camp David. T. he impact of the Yom Kippiir War gy shock as Arab oil producers unleashed military superpower and secured consid- that erupted on October 6th, the oil weapon to punish the United erable diplomatic and military support 1973, far outweighed its relatively States and its allies for their support of from the United States.

2 Short duration of twenty days of heavy Israel. Finally, it set off a chain of events The fundamental cause of the Yom fighting. It severely tested the d tente that culminated in the 1978 Camp KIPPUR War was the diplomatic impasse hetween the United States and the Sovi- David Accords, the landmark peace thai followed the Six-Day War. At the et Union as the superpowers sought to treaty hetween Egypt and Israel. Khartoum summit ofAugust 1967 the defend the interests of their Middle East Israel's victory against the Arabs in Arahs issued their 'three noes: no peace, clients: Israe!

3 On the American side, 1967 had been swift and absolute, trans- no recognition and no negotiation with Egypt and Syria on the Soviet side. The forming the geographical contours of lhe Israel. This played into Israeli bands and result was the most dangerous moment Middle East. Israel's territorial gains when Colda Meir became Israel s first ol the Cold War since the Cuhan Mis- tripled the country's land area and dra- Female prime minister in 1969 she obdu- sile Crisis in 1962. American support matically reduced its vulnerability to rately refused to countenance withdraw- proved critical to the survival of Israel at Arah attack.

4 Egypt lost the Gaza Strip al from the Occupied Territories. The this seminal moment as the US-Israel and Sinai, Syria the Golan Heights and Muslims', she proclaimed, 'can fight and special relationship, begun in 1967, was Jordan, the West Bank and East lose, tben come back and fight again. consolidated. The conflict is also Jerusalem. In less than a week Israel had But Israel can only lose once.' She was remembered for triggering the first ener- established itseU firmly as the regional acutely aware that Israeli survival 44 OCTOBER 2008 HISTORY TODAY.

5 THE YOM KIPPUR WAR. depended ultimately on Amcriciin sup- Arabs. Tbroughout 1972. bowever, port. The United Nations Security Nixon's overriding concerns were negoti- Council Resolution 242 (passed on ating the bistoric SALT (Strategic Arms November 22nd. 1967, with US sup- Limitation Treaty) agreement witb port), called for Israel's return to its pre- Moscow, ending tbe Vietnam War and 1967 borders, but also for respect for the bis re-election campaign. Consequently, sovereignty of every state in the area.

6 Be was not prepared to risk political cap- Israel m ide its willingness to negotiate ital on brokering peace between Israel dependent on Arab recognition, while and Egypt. Sadat's sudden and unexpect- the Arabs made the return of the occu- ed expulsion of most Soviet advisers pied lands a prerequisite for talks. from Egypt in July 1972 reduced Nixon's Jerusalem's intransigence, in response sense of urgency about doing anytbing. U) the Khartoum Resolution, was com- In Marcb 1973. when Meir visited pounded by tbe conviction, shared by Washington, Nixon and Kissinger tried to tbe CIA, that the Arabs were incapable devise ways and means of drawing Israel of successfully challenging Israeli into talks witb Egypt, tbus breaking the supremacy.

7 An Israeli joke had Moshe deadlock. Tbe previous montb sbe had Dayan, Meir's minister of defence and rebuffed Sadat's latest peace initiative. architect of the 1967 plan of battle, As Kissinger perceived, 'tbe longer tbere bemoaning the laek of action: 'How Opposite; war on two fronts: Israeli troops on the Golan Heights come under Syrian artillery fire. was no cbange in the status quo tbe about invading anotber Arab country?' more Israel would be confirmed in tbe asks a colleague. 'Wbat would we do in Above and below: Time magazine was sure that possession of tbe Occupied Territories'.

8 Tbe afternoon?' responds Dayan. Such Anwar Sadat and Golda Meir held the keys to breaking the Middle East deadlock, but the Altbough Sadat repeatedly warned Wash- complacency was reinforced by the con- Nixon administration could not get Israel to ington that the status quo would pnn'oke struclion of tbe Bar-Lev Line, an inter- agree to talks with Egypt. another war wbicb could hring a renewed locking series of sand-based earthworks Soviet military presence in Egypt, on tbe east bank of tbe Suez Canal Kissinger remained convinced tbat he wbich consumed $500 million in 1971.

9 Was bluffing- As be reflected in bis mem- Tbougbt to be virtually impregnable by oirs, our definition of rationality did not tbe IDF (Israel Defence Forces), by take seriously tbe notion of starting an October 1973 it was tbinly defended. unwinnable war to restore self-respect". Tbe Israelis also assumed that any sur- The diplomatic option closed. Sadat prise Arab attack, wberever it came, now set in motion plans for war. Opera- could be repulsed by their air force, tion Badr, Recognizing tbat he needed a wbich bad proved so devastating in tbe partner.

10 President Hafez al-Assad of Six-Day War. Syria was brought on board to confront Into tbis equation came Anwar Sadat, Israel witb a twT)-front war. Where Sadat who succeeded Gamal Nasser as Egyp- wanted war to kick-start the peace pro- tian president when the latter died sud- cess, Assad ~ bis armed forces re- denly in September 1970. Sadat was not equipped by Moscow - sought to recov- taken seriously by either Washington or er the Golan Heights from Israel. To Jerusalem, being regarded as a transient deceive Israeli intelligence, large-scale leader who made empty threats that were military exercises were staged by Egypt never acted upon.