TheMilitaryDecision-MakingProcess

1 Chapter5 TheMilitaryDecision-MakingProcessDecisio nmakingisknowingiftodecide, movementrates,fuelcon-sumption,weaponsef fects arequantifiableand,therefore, theimpactofleadership,complexityofoperat ions,andun-certaintyregardingenemyintent ions (MDMP)isasingle,established,andprovenana lyticalprocess.(SeeFigure5-1,page5-2.)Th eMDMP isanadaptationoftheArmy ,andhasasitsgoaltheproductionofanorder, ,clarity,soundjudgment,logic, ,deliber-ate,sequential,andtime-consumin gprocessusedwhenadequateplanningtimeands ufficientstaffsupportareavailabletothoro ughlyexaminenumerousfriendlyandenemycour sesofaction(COAs).Thistypicallyoccurswhe ndevelopingthecommander sestimateandopera-tionplans(OPLANs),when planningforanentirelynewmission,duringex tendedoperations, ,butwhereexistingMETT-Tfactorshavenotcha ngedsubstantially.(Seepage5-27foradiscus sionofdecisionmakinginatime-constrainede nvironment.)TheMDMP reliesondoctrine,especiallythetermsandsy mbols(graphics) Itanalyzesandcomparesmultiplefriendlyand en-emyCOAsinanattempttoidentifythebestpo ssiblefriendlyCOA.

2 Itproducesthegreatestintegration,coordin ation,andsynchronizationforanoperationan dminimizestheriskofoverlookingacriticala spectoftheoperation. ,preparingfor, ,thecom-mander ,thereareresponsibilitiesanddecisionstha tarethecommander salone(Figure5-1).Theamountofhisdi-recti nvolvementisdrivenbythetimeavailable,his per-sonalpreferences, ,thelessexperiencedthestaff,andthelessac cessiblethestaff, , ,andtoanalyzeandcomparehisownorganizatio n scapabilitieswiththeenemy tocollectivelyinte-grateinformationwiths ounddoctrineandtechnicalcompetencetoassi stthecommanderinhisdecisions, (XO)manages,coordinates,anddisci-plinest hestaff ,guidance, ,establishesbriefbacktimesandlocations, ,thecommanderandCofS(XO) ,reconnaissanceassetsshouldnotbelaunched withoutusing,asaminimum,thereconnaissanc eplanningfactorsfoundinstep9ofmissionana lysis(page5-8).The5-2FM101-5 RECEIPTOFMISSIONI ssuecdr sinitialguidanceMISSIONANALYSISA pproverestatedmissionStatecommander sintentApproveCCIRI ssuecdr sguidanceCOADEVELOPMENTREHEARSALEXECUTIO N&ASSESSMENTCOACOMPARISONCOAANALYSIS(War Game)COAAPPROVALA pproveCOAR efinecommander sintentSpecifytypeofrehearsalSpecifytype oforderORDERSPRODUCTIONA pproveorderStaffEstimates(continualproce ss)Commander sEstimate(continualprocess)WARNINGORDERW ARNINGORDERWARNINGORDERC ommander sResponsibilityNOTE4:Atanytimeduringexec utionandassessment, :Foradiscussionofrehearsals,execution,an dassessment, ,preparationfor,andexecutionof, , ,whentheplanchanges, ,itcanhelpconfirmordenythecommander sandstaff , , , , (Figure5-2).

3 ,inturn,hasitsownoutputthatdrivessubsequ entsteps.(SeeFigure5-3,page5-4.) (SeeAppendixC.) :Referencestohigherheadquartersinthischa p-termeantheheadquartersoneechelonup, , ,thecom-manderdeterminesthathehastheoppo rtunitytoaccom-plishhishighercommander ,theunit ,whothealternatesare, Higherheadquarters orderorplan,withgraphics.(Whenpossible,e achstaffofficerreceivesacopyoftheorderor plantoassistinfullyunderstandingmissionr equirements.) Mapsoftheareaofoperations. Bothownandhigherheadquarters SOPs. AppropriateFMs(especiallyFM101-5-1). Course of Action AnalysisStep5. Course of Action officers must constantly update their staff esti-mates and other critical information. This informationallows them to develop assumptions that are necessaryto the planning process. Staff officers must be aggres-sive in obtaining this of this information must be a push sys-tem versus a pull system. Subordinate units must rap-idly update their reports as the situation reporting SOPs must be developed, practiced,and the new mission is received, the commander andthe staff must do a quick initial assessment.

4 It is designedto optimize the commander s use of time while preservingtime for subordinate commanders to plan and completecombat preparations. This assessment Determines the time available from mission receiptto mission execution. Determines the time needed to plan, prepare for,and execute the mission for own and subordinate units. Determines the intelligence preparation of thebattlefield (IPB). Determines the staff estimates already available toassist factors to consider are Ambient light requirements for planning, rehears-als, and movement. The staff s experience, cohesiveness, and level ofrest or critical product of this assessment is an initial al-location of available time. The commander and the staffmust balance the desire for detailed planning against theneed for immediate action. The commander must pro-vide guidance to subordinate units as early as possible to5-4FM 101-5 RECEIPT OF MISSIONMISSION ANALYSISCOA DEVELOPMENTCOA COMPARISONCOA ANALYSIS(War Game)COA APPROVALORDERS PRODUCTIONNOTE 1:denotes commander s responsibilityNOTE 2: Underlying the entire process are continuingcommander s and staff !

5 !777!!!!!!!!!!777777 Cdr s initial guidanceWarning order 1 Initial IPB productsRestated missionCdr s intentCdr s guidanceWarning order 2 Staff productsBattlefield frameworkPreliminary movementCOA stmts and sketchesWar-game resultsTask organizationMission to subordinate unitsCCIRD ecision matrixApproved COAR efined cdr s intentSpecified type of orderSpecified type of rehearsalHigh pay-off target listOPLAN/OPORD!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!Mission received from higherHQ or deduced by thecommander/staffHigher HQ order/plan/IPBS taff estimatesFacts & assumptionsRestated missionCdr s guidanceCdr s intentStaff estimates & productsEnemy COAsEnemy COACOA stmts and sketchesStaff COAWar-game resultsEstablish criteriaDecision matrixApproved COAINPUTOUTPUTF igure 5-3. Staff inputs and ,inturn,requiresaggressivecoordination,d econfliction,integra-tion,andassessmento fplansatalllevels, , ,morethananyotherfactor, ,thecommandermustdeterminewhetherornotto dothefullMDMP, (nottobeconfusedwithcommander sguidance,Step15,missionanalysis).

6 Althoughbrief,itincludes HowtoabbreviatetheMDMP,ifrequired(page5- 27). Initialtimeallocation. Liaisonofficerstodispatch. Initialreconnaissancetobegin. Authorizedmovement. ,thegenerallocationoftheoperation,theini tialtimeline,andanymovementorreconnaissa ncetoinitiate.(SeeFigureH-6,pageH-27.) ,notneces-sarilysequential,andresultsint hestaffformallybriefingthecommander.(See Figure5-4.)Inaddi-tiontothestaff smissionanalysis,thecommanderconductshis ownmissionanalysissothathehasaframeofref erencetoassessthestaff , ,priorpreparation, OrderThecommanderandhisstaffthoroughlyan alyzethehigherheadquarters ordertoestablishhorizontalandverticalnes ting,notjustformaneuver, Thehigherheadquarters Commander sintent. Mission,including tasks,constraints,risk,availableassets,a ndareaofoperations. Conceptoftheoperation, Analyzethehigherheadquarters' Conductinitialintelligencepreparationoft hebattlefield(IPB).Step3. Determinespecified,implied, Determineinitialcommander'scriticalinfor mationrequirements(CCIR).

7 Step9. ' ' Timelineformissionexecution. Themissionsofadjacent(toincludefrontandr ear)unitsandtheirrelationtohigherheadqua rters plan. mission,intent,andguidance, orderorguidance, (LNOs)whoarefamiliarwiththehigherheadqua rters (IPB)TheIPBisasystematic, ,drivenbythecommander, ,theG2(S2)ofthehigherheadquartersmustpro videallintelligenceproductstosubordinate unitsassoonastheyareus-able, (S2) (S2) ,andtheplanningprocessistobeIPB-driven, , sandeachstaffofficer sresponsibility;theG2(S2) (S2)indevel-opingthesituationtemplate(SI TTEMP) Definesthebattlefieldoroperationalenviro nmentinordertoidentifythecharacteristics oftheenviron-mentthatinfluencefriendlyan dthreatoperations,tohelpdeterminethearea ofinterest(AI),andtoidentifygapsincurren tintelligence. Describesthebattlefield seffects,includingtheevaluationofallaspe ctsoftheenvironmentwithwhichbothsidesmus tcontend,toincludeterrainandweatherandan yinfrastructureanddemographicsintheareao foperations.

8 Usingtheresultsoftheprevioussteps,andthe ef-fectsofthespecificenvironmentinwhicht heenemycurrentlyoperates,determinestheth reat , ; (S2) (S2),withstaffassistance,continuestheIPB , ,itshouldbedonepriortothestaff , (However,thisfollowstheprocessinStep9ofm issionanalysis.) ,Implied, ,butwhicharenotstatedinthehigherheadquar ters or-der,theenemysituationandcoursesofacti on, , ,theyensuretheyunderstandeachtask sspe-cificrequirements. Afteranalyzingspecifiedandimpliedtasks, ,supportre-lationships,andstatus(current capabilitiesandlimita-tions)ofallunits. , (forexample,maintainare-serveofonecompan y)oraprohibitiononaction(forexample,nore connaissanceforwardofalinebeforeH-hour). ,theconceptofopera-tions, ,includingenemyandfriendlydispositions,a vailabletroops,unitstrengths, ,butunavail-able, Assumingaway potentialproblems,suchasweatherorlikelye n-emyoptions, , ,assumptionsareclearedwiththehigherhead- quarterstoensuretheyareconsistentwithhig herhead-quarters ,plannersshould Listallappropriateassumptionsreceivedfro mhigherheadquarters.

9 Stateexpectedconditionsoverwhichthecom-m anderhasnocontrolbutwhicharerelevanttoth eplan. (SeeAppendixJ.) sCriticalIn-formationRequirements(CCIR)T heCCIR identifyinformationneededbythecom-mander tosupporthisbattlefieldvisualizationandt omakecriticaldecisions, ,assistintheallo-cationofresources, , Whatdoesthecommander5-7FM101-5needtoknow inaspecificsituationtomakeaparticulardec isioninatimelymanner? Thecommanderalonedecideswhatinformationi scritical,basedonhisexperience,themissio n,thehighercommander sintent, (IR) , (PIR) informationabouttheen-emy;essentialeleme ntsoffriendlyinformation(EEFI) informationneededtoprotectfriendlyforces fromtheenemy sinformation-gatheringsystems;andfriendl yforcesinformationrequirements(FFIR) ,thestaff,primar-ilytheG2(S2), (S3) ,asaminimum: Theareaofoperationsforreconnaissance. Missionstatement. Taskorganization. Reconnaissanceobjective. PIRandIR. Lineofdeparture(LD)/lineofcontact(LC)tim e. Initialnamedareasofinterest(NAIs).

10 RoutestoAOandpassageoflinesinstructions. Communicationsandlogisticssupport. Firesupportmeasures. ,itisincorporatedintoacompletereconnaiss anceannextotheoperationorder(OPORD).(See FigureH-22,pageH-60.)Astheseassetscollec tinformation,andotherintelligencesources fillingaps, ,where, (XO)orG3(S3) : Who(whattypesofforces)willexecutetheacti on? Whattypeofaction(forexample,attack,defen d)iscontemplated? Whenwilltheactionbegin? Wherewilltheactionoccur(areaofoperations andobjectives)? Why(forwhatpurpose)willeachforceconducti tspartoftheoperation? ; ,thestaffbriefsthecommanderonitsmissiona nalysisusingthefollowingoutline:5-8FM101 -5 Mission and commander s intent of the headquar-ters two levels up. Mission, commander s intent, concept of the op-eration, and deception plan or objective of the head-quarters one level up. Review of commander s initial guidance. Initial IPB products. Specified, implied, and essential tasks.